Comparative Politics Newsletter
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Letter from the Editors
by Matt Golder & Sona N. Golder
The Pennsylvania State University

Welcome to the now belated Spring 2017 issue of the Comparative Politics Newsletter. This issue includes a symposium on Women/Gender and Comparative Politics, a special topic on Women and the Profession, and an overview of two new gender-related datasets.

I. Symposium on Women/Gender and Comparative Politics

In this issue of the Comparative Politics Newsletter, we wanted to highlight the interesting research being conducted by junior scholars in the area of women/gender and politics. Our symposium has fourteen contributions by some of the leading lights in the next generation of women/gender and politics scholars. The contributions touch on a wide range of topics, including legislative representation, political leadership, violence, group consciousness, women’s movements, Orientalism, and gender gaps, in regions as diverse as Europe, Africa, South America, Asia, the Middle East, and North America.

Legislative Representation
Historically, much of the women/gender and politics literature has addressed the legislative representation of women. Although women’s legislative representation around the world has been increasing steadily over the last several decades, it remains the case that in 2017 only 23.3% of the seats in lower houses or unicameral legislatures are, on average, held by women, and that only in Rwanda and Bolivia do women compose a legislative majority. Gender quotas are one of the principal factors credited with increasing the percentage of women legislators in recent years. Since their introduction in Argentina in 1991, gender quotas have ‘gone global.’ In her contribution, Jennifer Piscopo examines the adoption and evolution of gender quotas in Latin America. In addition to discussing the important role played by activist states, she also highlights the actions of courts, electoral management bodies, and cross-party ‘quota networks’ of female politicians in strengthening gender quotas over time. While many scholars have examined women’s descriptive representation in legislatures, Tiffany Barnes, in her contribution, compares how female legislators act with how male legislators act. She argues that, like any group lacking power and influence, female legislators have to engage in more collaborative and coalition-building projects to achieve their goals than their male counterparts. Tiffany uses data on bill co-sponsorship patterns across provincial legislatures in Argentina to support her argument.

Political Leadership
Rather than focus solely on women’s legislative representation, a few scholars have recently begun to look at women in political leadership positions. Part of the motivation for this new strand in the literature is the growing, if still small, number of women in leadership positions, as well as the increasing recognition that women need to obtain leadership roles if they are to successfully translate their increased descriptive representation into substantively meaningful political influence. In her contribution, Catherine Reyes-Housholder investigates the conditions under which female presidents in Latin America are more likely than their male counterparts to use their office to benefit women. Based on her analysis of presidential politics in Brazil and Chile, she concludes that while there are strong theoretical reasons to think that female presidents will be more likely to push pro-women policies, there is no guarantee that this will happen. Diana O’Brien, in her contribution, focuses on the emergence of female party leaders in Europe and discusses their impact on different facets of descriptive, symbolic, and substantive representation. She argues that “those interested in political parties must take gender seriously, particularly as women’s presence in leadership positions grows.” In their contribution, Olle Folke and Johanne Rickne summarize results from their research on the career trajectories of male and female politicians at the sub-national level in Sweden. Among other things, they find evidence of a ‘political glass ceiling’ for women in ‘progressive’ Sweden. They also find that electoral competition and gender quotas can help equalize the career trajectories of male and female politicians. Gender quotas also seem to have the benefit that they lead to an increase in the competence of male politicians and the disappearance of ‘mediocre’ male leaders from positions of power.

Women’s Movements
While some scholars are begin-

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1 Interestingly, although the percentage of female legislators in Rwanda is over 60%, women are still underrepresented relative to their share of the general population (about 70%). The gender imbalance in the general population can largely be traced back to the fact that the perpetrators of the 1994 Rwandan genocide primarily targeted men.

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ning to shift their attention away from female legislators towards women in political leadership positions, others are emphasizing the important role that unelected civil society actors are playing in promoting women’s issues. In her contribution, Alice Kang argues that women’s organizations have played a vital role in the representation of women’s interests in Africa. In particular, she suggests that variation in the strength of women’s organizations helps to explain why some African countries have adopted gender quotas while others have not.

**Violence** Looking beyond the context of representation, we have two contributions that address the gendered nature of violence. In her contribution, Elin Bjarnegård examines election violence. Among other things, she argues that “men as victims of violence have been largely left out of the picture, and often explicitly so.” Echoing a theme that runs through many of our contributions, Elin highlights the importance of making comparisons between women and men (inter-gender comparisons) rather than simply just among women (intra-gender comparisons) for drawing valid inferences about the gendered nature of, in her case, election violence. She also calls on empirical scholars to look beyond easily observable communal forms of physical violence to examine a broader range of acts that can also be considered forms of election violence. In his contribution, Omar García-Ponce examines the gendered nature of the civil war legacy in Peru. Leveraging the adoption of gender quotas in 1997, Omar finds that the proportion of women candidates on party lists was higher in those municipalities that experienced violence perpetrated by the Shining Path (where the victims were predominantly men) than in those municipalities that experienced sexual violence perpetrated by the state (where the victims were predominantly women). He argues that this difference was not the result of structural factors such as the lower proportion of surviving men in the ‘Shining Path’ municipalities but rather a consequence of behavioral changes on the part of women – women in these areas were able to exploit the new opportunities that were emphasized by women’s organizations.

**Gender Gaps** Two contributions address ‘gender gaps’ with respect to political participation and political preferences. Jessica Gottlieb discusses the difficulties that arise when measuring and interpreting the gender gap that exists with respect to various forms of political participation in Africa. Among other things, she warns against “blindly applying theories developed to explain gender gaps in the higher-income countries” to political outcomes in the developing world, as well as relying on cultural, rather than strategic or instrumental, explanations for gender gaps. In her contribution, Sarah Khan examines the gender gap that exists with respect to preferences for public goods and services in Pakistan. She suggests that observed gaps in the preferences of men and women are shaped by the sexual division of household labor and norms of mobility rather than the individual attributes of men and women. She argues that Pakistani women care more about clean water than men because they are the primary caregivers of children, and that Pakistani men are more likely to be responsible for fetching water because the ability of Pakistani women to freely move around on their own is restricted.

**United States** We also have two contributions examining women/gender and politics in the United States. Mona Morgan-Collins reexamines the electoral impact of the 19th Amendment to the U.S. constitution that extended the suffrage to women. Much of the existing literature, which looks primarily at the state or national level, finds that suffrage extension had little impact on the electoral status quo. Mona argues that we should look at the local level to see the true effects of the 19th Amendment, as analyses that focus on higher levels underestimate the effect of women’s votes on the electoral performance of incumbent politicians. In line with her theory, Mona finds that incumbents in the 1920 congressional elections were sanctioned by women and that this was especially the case when their voting record was ideologically distant from the preferences of the newly enfranchised women. In her contribution, Emily Anne West examines women’s legislative underrepresentation. While most of the extant literature focuses on institutional barriers to women’s representation or women’s reluctance to run for office, Emily investigates whether there is gender bias in voter behavior. Using an online survey experiment where she manipulates the candidates’ gender and their policy congruence with the respondents, her initial descriptive results provide little evidence for voter bias. There is, however, some evidence that Democrat men are more likely to vote for female candidates than Republican men.

**Orientalism** Rochelle Terman, in her contribution, addresses the criticism of Orientalism in the interdisciplinary literature on women in Muslim contexts. As Rochelle explains, Orientalist discourse constructs the
West as culturally and politically superior to the East, and with respect to women it propagates the “trope of the passive, oppressed Muslim woman who is subjugated by her native patriarchal culture.” Critiques of Orientalism emphasize the diversity within Islam and the agency of Muslim women in their own lives. While arguing that comparativists have much to learn from this critical literature, Rochelle also notes some of the literature’s limitations, in particular its attempt to deflect “away from local patriarchal institutions that do not emanate from the West, and [its] troubling tendency to conflate any attempt to condemn gender inequality in the Muslim world with Orientalist thinking.” She also calls on comparativists to test the “empirical claims that go unverified” and that are held “as tenets of faith” in the critical literature.

Group Consciousness Group consciousness is often considered necessary for individuals to act on behalf of their group. For example, women must be conscious of themselves as women before they can be expected to mobilize and act as women. In their contribution, Charles Crabtree and Kostanca Dhima argue that there is a disconnect between how group consciousness is conceptualized in the literature and how scholars go about testing theories of group consciousness. A consequence is that it is not always clear if, or how, one can substantively interpret some of the results in the existing literature. Among other things, they discuss how to correctly specify empirical models to test theories of group consciousness.

II. Special Topic on Women and the Profession

For part of our special topic section on women and the profession, we asked several scholars to reflect on the women/gender and politics subfield. In her contribution, Juliet Williams discusses the relationship between political science and gender studies. She starts by noting that since the early 2000s many programs and departments around the United States and elsewhere have changed their names from Women’s Studies to Gender Studies, Gender and Sexuality Studies, or Women, Gender and Sexuality Studies. This change in nomenclature is designed to better reflect the type of work that is being done in this area. Juliet argues that although political science has come a long way in integrating gender into the study of politics, there is much more that can and should be done. Among other things, she is critical of the way in which the emphasis on ‘women’ in the literature has promoted “the fallacy that men are not appropriate or productive subjects of gender analysis.” She also highlights the ongoing need to address issues of intersectionality, which are centered on the belief that we need to “take gender seriously, but nonetheless … reject the methodological assumption that gender inequality can be understood in isolation from other dimensions of social difference.” Juliet believes that from both a theoretical and empirical perspective, political scientists are “perhaps uniquely equipped to fulfill on intersectionality’s usefulness as a political analytic.”

In two other contributions, we asked the former and current editors of the journal Politics & Gender to give their thoughts on the field and indicate potential avenues for future research. Jill Irvine and Cindy Simon Rosenthal highlight three productive research areas that emerged during their editorial tenure: feminist institutionalism, gender and comparative policy making, and comparative studies in intersectionality. They suggest that, as a whole, the subfield of women/gender and politics is characterized by a growing methodological pluralism and an increasing acceptance that methods perse are not androcentric. Looking to the future, Jill and Cindy call on scholars to move beyond simply reducing the study of gender to the study of women, highlighting that a “great deal of cutting edge scholarship on politics and gender in recent years has focused on constructions of masculinity as well as femininity, on flexible, multiple, and shifting identities encompassed in queer movements and LGBT politics.” They also indicate a desire to see the field move beyond “its largely liberal feminist roots.” As they put it, “employing a gender lens unifies all research on politics and gender, but the tint of the lens can matter very much indeed.” In her contribution, Mary Caputi, the current editor of Politics & Gender, discusses the trends that she sees in the comparative scholarship dealing with gender and the directions in which she wishes to see the journal go under her editorship.

Our final two contributions in our special topics section address institutions that are working to promote and support women in political science. Janet Box-Steffensmeier outlines the historical origins and evolution of Visions in Methodology (VIM), an organization whose broad goal it is to support women in political methodology. Our last contribution comes from APSA’s Committee for the Status of Women in the Profession (CSWP). This contribution outlines the recent
activities of the committee, particularly with respect to its online presence. In addition to building a sense of community among women scholars, the CSWP is also gathering longitudinal data to examine why women remain underrepresented in the top ranks of the political science discipline.

III. Datasets

This issue of the Comparative Politics Newsletter discusses two new datasets that will be of interest to scholars working on a variety of topics related to women/gender and politics beyond. In her contribution, Amanda Clayton describes the new Quota Adoption and Reform Over Time (QAROT) dataset, which provides global information about gender quotas from 1945 through 2015. In addition to describing the dataset, Amanda also provides an example of how the dataset might be used by examining the effect of gender quota adoptions on the passage of women's rights laws. In their contribution, Aksel Sundström, Pamela Paxton, Yi-ting Wang, and Staffan Lindberg describe the new Women's Political Empowerment Index (WPEI), which gauges women's political empowerment since 1900 in a global sample of 173 countries. The WPEI is based on three subindices that are designed to capture women's choice, agency, and participation in societal decision-making processes. To illustrate the usefulness of the WPEI, our contributors graphically present and discuss the historical trajectory of their (sub)indices for four countries: Denmark, the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Russia.

As you can see, we have a fantastic group of scholars working in various areas of the women/gender and politics subfield. We have enjoyed reading all of the contributions and we hope, and suspect, that you will too. Before closing, we'd like to thank our editorial assistants, Charles Crabtree and Yaoyao Dai, for their help at various stages in the production of this issue of the Newsletter. If you would like to cite this, or any other, issue of the Comparative Politics Newsletter, we recommend using a variant of the following citation:


Finally, if you have ideas for possible symposia or special topics, or would like to publicize a dataset of broad appeal, please contact us. As always, you can contact us through the Contact page of our webpage at http://comparativenewsletter.com/contact or simply use our Penn State email addresses: (sgolder@psu.edu, mgolder@psu.edu).

Matt and Sona

Symposium: Woman/Gender and Comparative Politics

Gendering Legislative Behavior: Institutional Constraints and Collaboration in Argentina

by Tiffany D. Barnes
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As women gain access to parliaments in record numbers worldwide, stories of women working together to accomplish bipartisan feats are appearing across the globe. Republican U.S. Senator Susan Collins, for example, pieced together the bipartisan coalition that ended the October 2013 government shutdown in the United States. Her coalition – disproportionately comprised of women – laid the foundation for the new federal fiscal plan. Female senators suggested their ability to compromise was par for the course. Senator Collins explained, “I don’t think it’s a coincidence that women were so heavily involved in trying to end this stalemate. Although we span the ideological spectrum, we are used to working together in a collaborative way” (Weisman and Steinhauer, 2013). Stories of collaboration have also appeared in Rwanda, where, two years after the genocide, women legislators formed a women’s caucus, the first group in Rwanda to ever reach across party lines. In Uruguay, female legislators also united into a women’s caucus, obtaining consensus on legislation to prohibit sexual harassment in the workplace. Deputy Margarita Percovich of Uruguay stated, “Traditional politics, with its endless fighting, had us all tired out. The men emphasized differences, but we did exactly the opposite.”

These examples illustrate that collaboration is an important aspect of the policy-making process and democratic representation. Most scholarship, however,
focuses primarily on the competitive aspects of democracy. From Schumpeter’s (1942) ‘competitive struggle’ to Dahl’s (1971) ‘contestation and participation’, democracy has been defined as a process by which the power to decide is acquired through competition. This adversarial understanding of democracy is reflected in scholars’ tendencies to focus on studying polarization and gridlock. As scholars, we assume that legislators have a single-minded focus on defeating their competitors. Still, we know that collaboration happens, perhaps even often. This is puzzling: Why, if politicians can secure power to make political decisions via competition, would we ever expect to observe collaboration?

In my new book, Gendering Legislative Behavior: Institutional Constraints and Collaboration (Cambridge University Press, 2016), I address this puzzle. Using evidence from 200 interviews with political elites from nineteen Argentine provinces, a novel dataset from 23 Argentine chambers over eighteen years, and qualitative case studies from across the world, I reexamine traditional notions of competitive democracy by evaluating patterns of collaboration among legislators, especially among female legislators.

In doing so, I tackle three important questions: Can democracy be collaborative? Why do women collaborate? And when do women collaborate? To empirically evaluate support for these expectations, I gathered original archival data covering nearly two decades from 23 subnational chambers in Argentina. The fieldwork was conducted between 2007 and 2013 during six different trips to Argentina. The data includes all cosponsored legislation, committee appointments, and leadership posts for over 7,000 male and female legislators.

As the first country to adopt legislative gender quotas, Argentina is one of the only contexts in the world where women have held a sizable share of seats in the legislature over a long timeline in a large number of chambers. Gender quotas were first adopted in Argentina at the national level in 1991. The following year, quota adoption began to spread rapidly across the provincial legislatures. A subnational analysis of Argentina, thus, allows for an interesting comparative analysis across a large number of cases over a long period of time with a substantial proportion of women, while effectively eliminating potentially confounding country-level factors (Barnes, 2012). In what follows, I provide an overview of my theoretical argument and outline the empirical evidence used to support my claims.

I. Can Democracy be Collaborative?

I argue that democracy can be collaborative and that many of the political behaviors we observe are clearly more collaborative than competitive. Although the tension between cooperation and competition is central to the literature on election laws (Cox, 1997; Duverger, 1954; Lijphart, 2012), with few exceptions (Alemán and Calvo, 2010; Calvo and Leiras, 2012; Kirkland, 2011), modern scholars have paid little attention to the collaborative aspects of the policy making process – leaving us with an incomplete picture of representative democracy. Indeed, modern day, procedural definitions of democracy focus primarily on competition (Schumpeter, 1942). In this view, power is vested in the majority and is maintained through exclusion and competition (Lijphart, 1984, 2012). Clearly, competition is essential to democracy; but the near-exclusive emphasis on competition runs counter to other core democratic principles and leaves no room for collaboration. If groups of people are continually denied access to power, democracy is likely to be undermined over time (Lijphart, 1984; Mainwaring, Brinks and Pérez-Liñán, 2001, 2007). For democracy to be legitimate it needs to incorporate preferences and information from all legislators (not merely those in the winning majority) beyond the process of simply aggregating preferences through voting procedures or voting strategically to maximize one’s preferences over a set of predetermined outcomes.

Collaboration enhances democracy by encouraging the inclusion and participation of all groups, enabling them to voice their concerns and influence the policymaking process. By collaborating with other representatives – both within their own party and across party lines – legislators can increase their influence over group decisions, shape the outcome of legislation, and develop more efficient and effective policy. Through collaboration, legislators can raise more awareness around an issue, increasing the probability that it gets on the legislative agenda (Krutz, 2005; Wilson and Young, 1997) and is ultimately passed into law (Alemán and Calvo, 2010).

Given these benefits of collaboration, I argue that all legislators have an incentive to collaborate. Nonethe-
less, collaboration is costly, and thus not all legislators will choose to collaborate all of the time. Instead, legislators must determine if the benefits of collaboration outweigh the costs. Legislators in positions of power often do not need to incur the costs of collaboration in order to exert influence in the policy-making process, as they have access to a number of resources they can use to wield influence. By contrast, out-of-power legislators have far fewer resources at their disposal and therefore have a stronger incentive to collaborate to exert influence in the policy-making process. Thus, although all legislators have an incentive to collaborate, legislators in positions of institutional weakness will collaborate more than their powerful colleagues.

Using bill cosponsorship data, which represents the culmination of the collaborative policy-making process, I demonstrate that democracy can be collaborative, that out-of-power legislators collaborate more frequently than those in power, and that women collaborate more than men. Specifically, the data show that out-of-power groups collaborate more frequently than do legislators in power. Consistent with my expectations, legislators in the opposition party and those in minority parties collaborate more frequently than do their counterparts in the governor’s party or the majority party. Importantly, among legislators in positions of institutional weakness collaboration is more likely to unfold in the policy-making process between legislators from the same political party than with those from different political parties. Equally important, I show that across the board, women collaborate more than do men. Women cosponsor a larger number of bills and have a larger number of overall cosponsors than do men. Women are more likely to cross party lines to collaborate and to collaborate with women. These trends present compelling evidence that women collaborate more than men and raise a second question: Why do women collaborate?

II. Why Do Women Collaborate?

I contend that women are marginalized in the legislatures where they serve and consequently find themselves in a position of institutional weakness. Given this, there is little doubt that they can benefit from collaboration. When women enter into a male-dominated institution, they face formal and informal structural barriers that prevent them from wielding influence in the legislative process. Women are marginalized despite having high levels of descriptive representation as a group and seniority as individuals (Barnes, 2014; Krook and O’Brien, 2012; Schwindt-Bayer, 2010). Women’s marginalization is not merely a product of their numeric status in the chamber, but it is also because they lack access to formal and informal positions of power. Women encounter a series of formal structural barriers because they simply do not have the same opportunities as men to hold leadership posts and powerful committee positions in the chamber (Heath, Schwindt-Bayer and Taylor-Robinson, 2005; Kittilson, 2006; O’Brien, 2015). Legislators holding these positions have disproportionate influence in shaping the legislative agenda, the content of bills, and deciding how legislative resources are distributed. Because women are systematically excluded from these powerful positions, they are much less able to shape legislation and allocate resources to their constituents.

Women also face informal barriers that limit their influence in parliament. They are often excluded from important leadership discussions and professional networks (Barnes, 2014; Franceschet and Piccopo, 2008; Rosenthal, 1998; Schwindt-Bayer, 2006). Women are subject to negative stereotypes about their ability to lead, to legislate, and to influence stereotypically masculine policy domains such as economic policies (Holman, Merolla and Zechmeister, 2011; Kathlene, 1994; Duerst-Laht, 2005). Together, these formal and informal barriers limit women’s legislative influence.

Despite these barriers, female legislators, like all legislators, have an obligation to represent their constituents’ interests by voicing their concerns and shaping policy. They also have an incentive to behave in a way that allows them to advance their political career. In order to do their jobs effectively, female legislators must work around these barriers. Due to their marginalization, I contend that women, like other groups not in positions of power, can greatly benefit from collaboration. By collaborating – both within their party and across party lines – women can attain more power and exert more influence on the policy-making process.
exert more influence on the policy-making process.

Leveraging data from 23 Argentine provincial chambers, I present empirical evidence that women face structural barriers that limit their influence in the policy-making process. In legislatures, power is distributed via leadership posts and powerful committee appointments. I thus compare women's and men's leadership appointments and committee posts to show that despite having high levels of descriptive representation as a group and seniority as individuals, women's marginalization exists across a vast array of legislative power.

For example, I demonstrate that male legislators are always privileged in their committee appointments. Specifically, men are twice as likely as women to be appointed to the budget committee – the most important committee, as it hears legislation that determines how money will be allocated – and they are twenty percent more likely than women to be appointed to other powerful committees (such as the general legislation committee that serves as a clearing house for all legislation). Similarly, even though women are sometimes appointed to leadership positions within committees, they are far less likely than men to serve in the leadership of the most powerful committees.

Together, my findings provide strong evidence for my explanation of why women collaborate. Women's marginalization across a vast array of legislative power – including chamber-wide leadership posts, committee leadership posts, and powerful committee appointments – implies that women do not have the same opportunities to influence the policy-making process as men. As a result, women who want to exert influence on the legislative process must legislate differently than men. I argue that, by collaborating with female colleagues, women can successfully navigate these barriers to power.

III. When Do Women Collaborate?

Despite the benefits of collaboration, patterns of collaboration vary among female legislators because not all women have the same opportunities to work cooperatively. One reason for this variation in women's legislative behavior is that a number of institutional contexts – that vary both between and within legislative chambers – structure women's legislative behavior (Clayton, Josefsson and Wang, 2016; Osborn, 2012; Schwindt-Bayer, 2010). With respect to institutions that vary largely between chambers, both partisan constraints and women's numeric representation should shape women's legislative behavior. I argue that electoral institutions that concentrate power into the hands of party leaders and foster strong party loyalty constrain women's propensity to collaborate. But electoral institutions that allow legislators to act independently of the political party and tolerate the pursuit of a legislative agenda beyond the party's platform impose fewer constraints on women's collaboration. Moreover, this relationship will be stronger or weaker depending on women's numeric representation. As women's marginalization cannot be explained by their numeric status in the chamber, rather than alleviating marginalization, increases in numeric representation expose women's marginalization. Since legislators are motivated to collaborate to overcome institutional weakness, this implies that increases in numeric representation would further motivate collaboration among women. Thus, I expect that increases in women's numeric representation will spur collaboration among women when they face weak party pressure. At the same time, increases in women's numeric representation makes it more likely that collaboration among women will increase their influence over outcomes. Consequently, in contexts where party constraints are strong, increases in women's numeric representation heighten party leaders' incentives to limit women's collaboration.

Women's legislative behavior will also vary within legislatures. Specifically, female legislators who are members of the governor's party face fewer partisan pressures than women who are members of the opposition parties. As a result, they have more opportunities to collaborate with female colleagues. With respect to seniority status, I argue that women who have served previous terms in office will have larger political networks within the chamber and are more willing to defy party norms than are their junior colleagues. For this reason they will be more likely to cross party lines to collaborate with women. Next, I argue that because women are more likely than men to prioritize women's issues, women will seek out female collaborators when working on issues in this area. In sum, I argue that women's legislative collaboration will vary both between and within legislative contexts.

Using cosponsorship data from 23 provincial chambers over an eighteen year period, which vary dramat-
ically in both the level of partisan constraints and the share of women in the chamber, I show that women's collaboration is most likely to unfold where party leaders exercise little control over legislative behavior. And, in districts with weak party constraints, women's propensity to collaborate increases when they comprise larger proportions of the chamber. By contrast, in districts where party leaders exercise strong constraints over legislators' behavior, women are only marginally more likely than men to collaborate with other women, and their propensity to do so decreases when women comprise a larger share of the chamber.

I further show that female members of the executive's party—who are subject to fewer partisan constraints—are systematically more likely than women from the opposition party to collaborate with women to promote shared interests and exert their influence in the chamber. Men, in contrast, do not have a strong incentive to collaborate with female colleagues, and thus their gender patterns of collaboration are largely unaltered by their affiliation with the governor. With respect to seniority, I show that women who have served previous terms in the legislature are systematically more likely than their junior colleagues to cross party lines to collaborate with female colleagues—indicating that senior legislators are more willing to defy party norms. Finally, I show that all legislators are far more likely to choose to collaborate with female colleagues when working on issues that disproportionately influence the lives of women. This pattern is especially strong among female legislators. Nonetheless, women's collaborative patterns are still structured by the larger legislative context such that women from districts with strong party discipline behave more similarly to their male colleagues than do women from districts with weak party discipline.

IV. The Importance of Studying Women's Legislative Collaboration

The study of women's legislative collaboration makes several important contributions to our understanding of representative democracy, the advancement of women's rights, and electoral system design. First, increases in women's representation around the world raise profound and broad questions about whether democracy is understood in particularly gendered ways, as dominated by competition rather than collaboration (Duerst-Lahti and Kelly, 1995; Rosenthal, 1998). In particular, if and to the extent that women do have incentives to behave differently in politics from men, increased women's representation has the potential to change the nature of policy-making and partisan competition around the world.

Second, the findings from my book imply that women are using their non-agentic traits to make democracy better. This is somewhat counterintuitive, because abundant evidence shows women are socialized in a way that limits their ability to wield influence in organizations (Propp, 1995; Thomas-Hunt and Phillips, 2004). Women do not typically exhibit agentic traits such as power, confidence, and independence-oriented behaviors; instead women are socialized to be more collaborative, cooperative, and compromising (Eagly and Karau, 2002; Eagly, Wood and Diekman, 2000). While individual women may wield less power than their male colleagues, I find that women are using their non-agentic skills to make democracy more representative.

Third, the findings from this book imply that female legislators facing weak partisan constraints are more likely to work with like-minded colleagues to promote women's interests. However, simply increasing women's numeric representation is not sufficient to influence policy agendas in legislative contexts where women face strong partisan constraints. Instead, when partisan constraints are strong, external pressure from autonomous women's movements is likely crucial for the promotion of women's rights. Moreover, in such contexts, advocates of women's rights may benefit more from targeting party bosses and party platforms than from lobbying individual legislators.

Finally, this research has important implications for electoral system design. Scholars are typically concerned with engineering institutions that increase the numeric representation of marginalized groups. My book explains why it is important for scholars to also consider how institutions shape legislative behavior once members of these groups are in office.


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**Gender and Election Violence: Advancing the Comparative Agenda**

by Elin Bjarnegård

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Election violence is an important issue from a number of perspectives. Understanding the causes and consequences of violations of personal integrity is always relevant and important, but election violence adds a different dimension to this already serious issue: it also violates electoral integrity and decreases democratic quality (Norris, 2013). It is thus important to understand the phenomenon of election violence thoroughly and evaluate it from different angles.

Definitions of election violence usually start with the motive behind the violent acts: election violence is committed whenever the goal of the violence is to affect an electoral outcome or prevent someone from running in an election. In this contribution, I define election violence as occurring when the goal of the violence is to violate electoral integrity and the means by which the violence is conducted violates the personal integrity of individuals involved in the electoral process. Personal integrity can be violated in different ways – through acts of intimidation, threats, or physical violence. All such violations of personal integrity can be carried out with the intent to severely disturb or illegitimately affect the democratic process. While physical violence can influence elections in very direct and obvious ways, by preventing candidates from campaigning or standing for elections, threats and intimidation can also influence electoral decisions through the fear that they generate (Höglund, 2009). The range of activities that count as election violence is broad and should not be confined to an exclusive focus on physical violence.

From the existing research on gender and violence, we know that men and women are prone to fall victims to different types of violence. Whereas men tend to be victims of physical and fatal violence, women are more likely to be targets of psychological or non-lethal physical sexual violence (Bjarnegård et al., 2015). The violence conducted against men and women also differs along other dimensions. For example, men tend to be victims of violence committed by a perpetrator unknown to them, as well as victims of crime- and conflict-related violence taking place in public. In contrast, violence against women is often perpetrated by a spouse or an individual known to them, and generally takes place less openly, often in the home (Kellermann and Mercy, 1992; Tjaden and Thoennes, 2000; UNODC, 2013).

By merging insights about violations of electoral integrity on the one hand with insights about gender-based violence on the other, we can begin to devise strategies for comparative research on election violence that takes into account its relevant gender aspects. It is possible, for example, that both the prevalence and forms of violence affecting men and women also differ in the electoral sphere. To date, though, studies have not been well designed to capture these gendered differences. There are at least two reasons for this. First, most studies of election violence employ data that focus on physical violence in the public sphere. As a result, these studies inadvertently capture a more ‘masculine’ experience of violence. Second, most studies of gendered political violence focus on the experience of women and neglect to document the experiences of men. As a result, they capture a more ‘feminine’ experience of violence and implicitly suggest that violence against men is non-gendered. In this contribution, I argue that we can better capture the different experiences that men and women have with respect to election violence by looking at a wide variety of forms of violence and by not limiting the pool of potential victims to a certain sex.

I. Forms of Violence

From a theoretical perspective, academics and practitioners recognize that election violence encompasses many different forms – they all recognize that electoral integrity can be violated in various ways. Scholars differentiate election violence from other types of violence in terms of the timing and purpose of the violence. In contrast to other forms of violence, election violence takes place during the election period with the objective of influencing the electoral process (Fischer, 2002; Höglund, 2009). Election violence is also commonly defined to encompass acts beyond physical vio-
lence. For example, Höglund (2009, 417) includes activities like “harassing, assault, and intimidation of candidates, election workers, and voters; rioting, destruction of property; and political assassination” as forms of election violence. Similarly, Fischer (2002, 3) defines election violence as “any random or organized act or threat to intimidate, physically harm, blackmail, or abuse a political stakeholder in seeking to determine, delay, or to otherwise influence an electoral process.”

| Focusing on only women’s experiences of violence does not allow us to distinguish between violence where gender is part of the motive and contexts where violence is widespread and affects all political actors. |

While there is theoretical agreement that election violence can take many different forms, this is seldom reflected in empirical studies of election violence. Empirical research on election violence has, with a few exceptions, been conducted at the aggregate level, focusing on countries rather than on individual experiences. Data tends to be collected from electoral management bodies, election observers, or secondary sources such as media reports. As a result, there is an inevitable bias towards the reporting of physical acts of violence that take place in the public sphere (Collier, 2009; Fischer, 2002; Gillies, 2011; Opitz, Fjelde and Höglund, 2013; Rapoport and Weinberg, 2000). A consequence is that violence that is not easily observable, because it is not visible to outsiders, not reported, or does not take place in the public arena, is not included in most empirical studies.

There are some exceptions. The Election Violence Education and Resolution (EVER) project, launched by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) in 2003, was a project that involved the community-based monitoring of electoral violence in thirteen countries. A report based on the project by Bardall (2011) revealed a higher level of election violence conducted against women than is usually found in public sources. One way in which the EVER project improved the gender-sensitivity of the data collection process was by specifically asking about different forms of violence and where these forms of violence took place. The results showed that while female victims of election violence most often reported cases of intimidation and psychological abuse, male victims typically reported cases of physical violence that took place in the public sphere (Bardall, 2011). Perpetrators who use violence against political candidates in order to affect the outcome of an election are likely to choose the most cost-effective form of violence to achieve that end. The gender of the person targeted may well affect such calculations and explain such gender differences.

Broadly categorizing different forms of violence into physical violence and psychological violence is illuminating from a gender perspective (Krook and Restrepo Sanín, 2016a). To improve data collection efforts in this regard, it would help if scholars made the different manifestations of these forms of violence more concrete and provided examples so as to avoid misunderstandings based on different understandings of the terminology. Scholars should also recognize that both physical and psychological violence can have sexual connotations and that both forms of violence can take place in the public as well as the private sphere.

II. Types of Victims

In emerging research on gender and political violence, men as victims of violence have been largely left out of the picture, and often explicitly so. In their earlier research, Krook and Restrepo Sanín (2016a) labeled the focus of their research “gender and political violence.” Since then, though, they have increasingly shifted to the concept of Violence Against Women in Politics (VAWIP) (Krook and Restrepo Sanín, 2016b; Krook, 2017). Although this focus on political violence against women partly stems from an understanding that research on election violence is biased towards the experiences of men, there are a number of reasons why it is unfortunate that the same mistake of gender bias is now being repeated in reverse.

A comparison of the experiences of men and women can bring about useful knowledge and is the only way for us to investigate gender differences in the prevalence of election violence. Focusing on only women’s experiences of violence does not allow us to distinguish between violence where gender is part of the motive and contexts where violence is widespread and affects all political actors. As the proportion of women in politics increases in contexts where political violence is normalized and seen as an acceptable way of doing politics, the number of women who are victims of violence will
necessarily increase (Piscopo, 2016). Where political violence is routinely used to affect the electoral process, we may expect women and men to experience different forms of violence, but we should not expect a large difference in the extent to which women and men are victims. Unless we explicitly compare the experiences of men and women, we cannot determine if women and men are victims of violence to the same extent or if one sex is more at risk in certain contexts. Together with an analysis of different forms of violence, such a comparison would tell us more about how vulnerabilities may be differentiated based on gender. The experiences of men are often seen as the norm and are thus not problematized or scrutinized in gendered analyses (Bjarnegård, 2013). However, the fact that men may be more likely to be victims of (certain forms of) violence in some contexts is also a highly gendered phenomenon that needs to be understood.

Some scholars claim that women are more at risk of experiencing election violence because they are newcomers to the political sphere. Misogyny may cause the presence of women in politics to be seen as threatening and provocative (Krook, 2017). This line of research describes political violence against women as a form of backlash. The general idea is that the greater inclusion of women in politics comes about despite the resistance of many powerful actors, and these actors react negatively, and violently, to the growing presence of women in the political sphere. Such violence or election fraud can be a tactic to resist or contest gender quotas (Krook, 2016). Female politicians often recount stories of intimidation and threats they perceive to be targeting them as women (Krook and Restrepo Sanín, 2016b). If this account is accurate, we would expect a greater prevalence of election violence against women compared to men. To determine whether this is the case, though, we need to document men’s experiences of violence in order to investigate whether men also experience intimidation and threats at a similar level and of a similar kind to women.

Research on political violence, both gender-blind and gender-sensitive, tends to focus on documented incidents of violence rather than potential victims. The problem is that when we document only the experiences of those who have experienced violations of personal integrity for electoral reasons, it becomes impossible to measure the prevalence of violence. In order to achieve measurable variation in election violence, research should focus on a specific population with a particular function in relation to the election – a population that potentially includes individuals with and without experiences of violence, such as voters, election officials, party supporters, or candidates. An experimental study in Nigeria focused on a broad definition of election violence and conducted a survey of community members (Collier and Vicente, 2013). Although the study failed to disaggregate the data that was collected along gender lines, it points to a possible way forward – the documentation of personal accounts on a broad range of issues related to election violence, rather than the documentation of accounts of only those people who have experienced violent incidents.

III. Ways Forward

Researching gender and election violence is no easy task. The project Gender Aspects of Election Violence at Uppsala University is working to develop concepts and methods to improve data collection. So far, we have conducted pilot studies in the Maldives and Myanmar, and a full-scale survey study is scheduled to be implemented in Cambodia during the 2018 national election. The project focuses on the experiences of political candidates – a group of individuals who can be delineated and surveyed on the basis of their function in the election rather than on the basis of their experiences with election violence. The idea is to survey candidates, asking them about their experience with a broad range of possible election violence, and to disaggregate the data along gender lines. In what follows, I briefly present some early and preliminary results, along with some of the lessons we have learned.

Explicitly asking about a variety of forms of violence is necessary if they are all to be documented. Even experts on the issue of election violence disagree on what to include, and so it is safe to say that political candidates will not all interpret the meaning of election violence in the same way. Much depends on the context and political climate in which the candidates operate. In the Maldives, election violence is widespread and normalized, and although there were specific questions on our survey about whether they had experienced threats, respondents often did not answer in the affirmative. Commenting on the questionnaire afterwards, the political candidates said that they did not consider it relevant to report on threats “because it happens all the time in politics.” Questionnaires need to be designed so that they...
are able to capture this normalization of psychological political violence by actively encouraging respondents to also document everyday events.

An additional difficulty related to the need to compare men and women may be that there are very few politically active women in some highly patriarchal societies. For instance, there were five women parliamentarians in the Maldives and even among the candidates it was very difficult to get a large enough sample of women to conduct any useful statistical analyses on gender differences. However, the low numbers of women may partly be a result of the intimidation that politically active women face in these contexts, and documenting the experiences of women politicians working in extremely male dominated spheres is also important. Under such circumstances it is crucial to specifically target women respondents and possibly also necessary to complement survey data with qualitative interview material.

Research on political violence, both gender-blind and gender-sensitive, tends to focus on documented incidents of violence rather than potential victims. The problem is that when we document only the experiences of those who have experienced violations of personal integrity for electoral reasons, it becomes impossible to measure the prevalence of violence.

Even with these caveats in mind, it is clear that expanding the forms of violence in the questionnaire and asking both men and women about election violence is fruitful. While the election in Myanmar was much less violent than the election in the Maldives, gendered patterns were evident in both settings: women candidates were disproportionately the victims of psychological violence, particularly in the form of libel and rumors, in both countries. Libel and rumors were often spread on social media, and in the case of women candidates almost always had sexual connotations. This demonstrates that our attention needs to move beyond simply looking at the form of violence to also look at the content of election violence. Among all candidates who mentioned libel and rumors as a problem in the Myanmar election, female candidates mentioned rumors about their sexual immorality, whereas male candidates mentioned rumors about their close connections to Muslims. Women and men are seemingly vulnerable to different types of rumors: whereas rumors about promiscuity are not seen as hurtful to male candidates but could be detrimental to a woman’s campaign, islamophobia maps on to ideas about masculinity and are rarely applied to female candidates. The Maldives, however, is a Muslim country where the regime has become increasingly fundamentalist. The most common way of defaming female candidates was to associate them with being ‘a modern woman’. This includes not being covered up, and thus makes liberal women candidates more visible and therefore more vulnerable. Liberal men candidates are not as easily distinguished by the way they dress.

In the Maldives election, the more violent of the two elections, women not only reported different forms of violence, they also reported more incidences of violence. It is inherently difficult to grade experiences of violence. In this instance, we only counted incidents of violence and did not weigh them by their severity (either in terms of personal integrity or electoral integrity). While we may safely assume that a perpetrator may consider it less costly to issue a threat on social media as opposed to physically attacking someone, it is more difficult to come up with a relevant cost-estimate from the point of view of the victim, or from the point of view of electoral integrity.

To summarize, the way forward if we are to merge insights from research on electoral integrity with research on gender and political violence is to situate our questions at the intersection of electoral and personal integrity. This implies two strategies for improved comparative research designs: (i) expanding the operational definition of election violence beyond communal, physical violence and (2) identifying our respondents by their status in relation to the election, thus including both men and women as well as both victims and non-victims.

References


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All individuals have attributes such as gender, ethnicity, religion, and class that make them eligible for membership in certain groups (Chandra, 2004, 2006; Chandra and Boulet, 2012).1 When do individuals who are eligible for membership in a group take action on behalf of the group? In other words, when do women mobilize as women? When do black women mobilize as black women? When do white men mobilize as white men, and so on? It is widely accepted that group consciousness is a necessary condition for individuals to take action on behalf of a group. For example, it is only when women become ‘conscious’ of themselves as women that we can expect them to mobilize as women and promote their group-specific interests through political action. In addition to research addressing the theoretical concept of group consciousness, there is a vast literature that examines the emergence and consequences of group consciousness. In this essay, we argue that there is a disconnect between how group consciousness is conceptualized and how scholars test theories of group consciousness.

Despite the broad consensus on how group consciousness should be conceptualized and how the different dimensions of group consciousness can be operationalized, there is an unfortunate gap between theory and empirics in much of the literature.

Conceptually, it is widely recognized that group consciousness requires three things: (i) individuals must feel close to their group, (ii) they must believe their group is disadvantaged (or may lose their privileged position), and (iii) they must believe that collective action could improve their group’s status (Miller et al., 1981; Gurin, 1985; McClain et al., 2009; Sanchez and Vargas, 2016). The key thing to note here is the

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1This essay draws on the discussion in Crabtree et al. (2017).
explicit recognition in the literature that these three dimensions – closeness, discrimination, collective action – are necessary conditions for group consciousness. To date, scholars interested in testing how group membership affects political action have typically included measures of one, two, or three of these dimensions in their empirical analyses, almost always in an additive manner. We know, though, that additive models, even when they include measures of all three dimensions of group consciousness, are incapable of adequately testing theories built on necessary conditions (Clark, Gilligan and Golder, 2006).

In what follows, we demonstrate that only an interactive model specification can fully capture the literature's conceptual/theoretical understanding of group consciousness. Importantly, an interactive model allows us to test whether all three dimensions of group consciousness are truly necessary for group membership to affect political behavior. If it turns out that one or more of the dimensions is not necessary, then this signals one of two possibilities: either the way that scholars regularly operationalize the different dimensions of group consciousness is flawed or the concept, as currently defined, is problematic.

I. Conceptualizing Group Consciousness

The concept of group consciousness can be traced back to work by Marx on class consciousness and his distinction between a ‘class in itself’ and a ‘class for itself’ (Gurin, Miller and Gurin, 1980; Marx, 1995). Loosely speaking, individuals are members of a ‘class in itself’ if they are objectively a member of the class (which is determined by their ‘relation to the means of production’). Individuals are members of a ‘class for itself’ only if they are organized and conscious of their status as a member of the class. One of the goals of the socialist project was to make workers conscious of the fact that they were workers. This goal of ‘class formation’ (Katznelson and Zolberg, 1986) was seen as a prerequisite for workers to ‘act’ as workers and promote their interests as workers. Marx’s ideas on class consciousness and his recognition that an individual’s membership in a class is not sufficient for her to take action on behalf of her class have since been used to examine group consciousness with respect to things like gender, ethnicity, and religion.

For many years, political scientists conceptualized group consciousness in terms of group identification (Verba and Nie, 1972). According to Conover (1984, 761), group identification requires both “a self-awareness of one’s objective membership in the group and a psychological sense of attachment to the group.” Individuals not only have to be an objective member of the group, they also have to feel ‘close’ to the group. Challenging this approach of equating group consciousness with group identification, Miller et al. (1981) argued that group consciousness requires not only “identification with a group” but also “a political awareness or ideology regarding the group’s relative position in society along with a commitment to collective action aimed at realizing the group’s interests” (485). In effect, Miller et al. (1981) identified three conditions as being necessary for an objective group member to exhibit group consciousness: (i) she must feel close to her group, (ii) she must believe that her group is disadvantaged, and (iii) she must believe that collective action could improve her group’s status.

Over the last three decades, this new conceptualization of group consciousness has become standard in the literature (Gurin, 1985; Gurin and Townsend, 1986; Cook, 1989; Wilcox, 1996; Reingold and Foust, 1998; Stokes, 2003; Simien and Clawson, 2004; Sanchez, 2006a,b; Lee, 2007; McClain et al., 2009; Sanchez and Vargas, 2016). For example, Wilcox (1996, 81) claims that “group consciousness requires not only an acknowledgement of discrimination, but a rejection of an explanation for that discrimination rooted in individual failings, a belief that society had distributed power unfairly, and support for collective action to remedy these problems.” Similarly, McClain et al. (2009, 476) state that “group consciousness is in-group identification politicized by a set of ideological beliefs about one’s group’s social standing, as well as a view that collective action is the best means by which the group can improve its status and realize its interests.” We could have provided many more definitions of group consciousness but they all follow the same basic approach.

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1In this sense, group identification involves an interaction between group membership and one’s strength of group attachment. Only when you are a member of the group and you feel close to the group do you exhibit group identification. This interaction should be explicitly incorporated into empirical analyses examining the effect of group identification on political behavior.

2There was also an explicit recognition that group consciousness could apply to members of advantaged in-groups, if they fear that their group is threatened with losing its privileged position (Miller et al., 1981). This allows one to examine things like white, male, or white male group consciousness (Jardina, 2014; Schildkraut, 2017).

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Significantly, all of the definitions recognize that three dimensions – *closeness, discrimination, collective action* – are jointly necessary for group consciousness. An individual who strongly identifies with a group, but who lacks awareness of the group's position relative to other groups, or does not believe that collective action can improve her group's status, has only one of the required elements of group consciousness and thus does not have group consciousness. Only when an individual has all three components does she exhibit group consciousness, and only then can we expect her to take political action on behalf of her group.

II. Operationalizing the Dimensions of Group Consciousness

Just as there is a strong consensus on how group consciousness should be conceptualized, there is also broad agreement on how the different dimensions of group consciousness can be operationalized. The basic approach has been to ask members of a group, such as women, to respond to a series of survey questions about their attitudes and beliefs. To see if group members feel ‘close’ to their group, scholars usually ask respondents: “How close do you feel in your ideas, interests, and feelings to [insert group here]?” To see if group members believe that their group is disadvantaged, scholars typically ask respondents: “How much discrimination or unfair treatment do you think [insert group here] face in the U.S.?” Finally, to see if group members believe that collective action is needed to improve their group's status, scholars usually ask respondents whether they agree with the following statement: “It is important for people to work together to improve the position of [insert group here].” While there is some small variation in the precise wording of these questions across different studies, there is broad agreement that these types of survey questions provide a satisfactory means for operationalizing the different dimensions of group consciousness.

III. Research Design and Model Specification

Despite the broad consensus on how group consciousness should be conceptualized and how the different dimensions of group consciousness can be operationalized, there is an unfortunate gap between theory and empirics in much of the literature. Part of the problem has to do with the fact that there has “not been a consistent measurement strategy employed by scholars in this area” (Sanchez and Vargas, 2016, 161). Many scholars, for example, fail to take account of all three of the dimensions of group consciousness in their empirical analyses, while others attempt to combine two or more of the different dimensions into a single measure of group consciousness. As we'll see, neither of these approaches adequately capture the predominant concept of group consciousness in the literature. A consequence of all this is that there is much confusion on how to, and indeed whether one can, meaningfully interpret the empirical results in existing studies. In their review of the literature, for example, McClain et al. (2009, 477) ask how they are to “interpret findings where only some dimensions are explanatory, when theoretically group consciousness is viewed as consisting of a combination of factors? The [empirical] literature is muddled on whether each dimension is both necessary and sufficient to make a case for the effect of group consciousness.”

A fundamental problem in existing studies is that scholars almost always enter measures of the different dimensions of group consciousness into their models of political behavior in an additive manner. It is well-known, though, that additive models, even when all three dimensions of group consciousness are included, are incapable of testing theories built on necessary conditions (Clark, Gilligan and Golder, 2006). The appropriate way to test such theories is to employ an interactive model specification. Interestingly, this point was recognized by Miller et al. (1981) in their foundational article, but has largely been overlooked in the subsequent research.

In Model (1) below, we present an interactive model specification that can test whether group consciousness, as conceptualized in the literature, affects political behavior. The model includes all three of the dimensions required for group consciousness – *Closeness, Discrimination, Collective Action* – as well as all of their interactions (Brambor, Clark and Golder, 2006). For the sake of the following discussion, we'll assume that *Political Behavior* is expected to be positively related to group consciousness. To keep things simple we'll also assume

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4Note the use of words like ‘and’, ‘as well as’, ‘along with,’ ‘not only’, instead of ‘or’ when defining group consciousness.

5We should be clear that we are not arguing for, or seeking to justify, this particular conceptualization of group consciousness. Rather our goal is simply to indicate that there is a standard conceptualization of group consciousness in the existing literature and that this conceptualization implies a particular model specification for testing theories of group consciousness.

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that Closeness, Discrimination, and Collective Action are all dichotomous variables that each take on the values 1 (present) or 0 (absent) and are based on responses from group members to the types of survey questions discussed earlier.6

Political Behavior = \( \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Closeness} + \beta_2 \text{Discrimination} + \beta_3 \text{Collective Action} + \beta_4 \text{Closeness} \times \text{Discrimination} + \beta_5 \text{Closeness} \times \text{Collective Action} + \beta_6 \text{Discrimination} \times \text{Collective Action} + \beta_7 \text{Closeness} \times \text{Discrimination} \times \text{Collective Action} + \epsilon \)  

(1)

The conceptualization of group consciousness that predominates in the literature makes specific predictions about the sign of each of the coefficients in Model (1). To see this, let’s focus on the marginal effect of Closeness, which is calculated by taking the derivative of Political Behavior with respect to Closeness: \( \beta_1 + \beta_4 \text{Discrimination} + \beta_5 \text{Collective Action} + \beta_7 \text{Discrimination} \times \text{Collective Action} \). As we can see, \( \beta_1 \) indicates the effect of Closeness on Political Behavior when Discrimination and Collective Action are both absent. According to how group consciousness is conceptualized in the literature, \( \beta_1 \) should be 0 as two of the necessary conditions for group consciousness – Discrimination and Collective Action – are absent. \( \beta_1 + \beta_4 \) captures the marginal effect of Closeness when Discrimination is present but Collective Action is absent. \( \beta_1 + \beta_5 \) should also be 0 because Collective Action is considered necessary for group consciousness and it is absent here. Since we expect \( \beta_1 = 0 \), this implies that \( \beta_4 \) should also be 0. Along similar lines, \( \beta_1 + \beta_5 \) captures the marginal effect of Closeness when Collective Action is present but Discrimination is absent. Since Discrimination is supposedly necessary for group consciousness, but is absent here, \( \beta_1 + \beta_5 \) should be 0. Since we expect \( \beta_1 = 0 \), this implies that \( \beta_5 \) should also be 0. Finally, \( \beta_1 + \beta_4 + \beta_5 + \beta_7 \) indicates the marginal effect of Closeness when Discrimination and Collective Action are both present. Since all three of the necessary elements of group consciousness are now present, we expect this marginal effect on Political Behavior to be positive. Given that we expect \( \beta_1 = \beta_4 = \beta_5 = 0 \), it follows that \( \beta_7 \) must be positive.

So far, we have focused on the marginal effect of Closeness on Political Behavior. However, a similar argument can be made with respect to the marginal effects of Discrimination and Collective Action. The bottom line is that if Closeness, Discrimination, and Collective Action are all necessary conditions for group consciousness, as the literature asserts, then we must expect that \( \beta_1 = \beta_2 = \beta_3 = \beta_4 = \beta_5 = \beta_6 = 0 \) and that \( \beta_7 > 0 \). If we do not observe this pattern of coefficients, then this signals one of two possibilities. The first possibility is that we have failed to appropriately operationalize the individual components of group consciousness. This would be deeply problematic as scholars have largely used the same survey-based measures for the different dimensions of group consciousness for the last three decades. The second possibility is that the predominant conceptualization of group consciousness in the literature is flawed and in need of revision.

One might wonder if it is possible to test theories of group consciousness with an additive model specification by simply including a dichotomous Group Consciousness variable that equals 1 if Closeness = Discrimination = Collective Action = 1, and 0 otherwise. Note, though, that this is equivalent to estimating an interaction model where Closeness × Discrimination × Collective Action is the only variable and all of the constitutive elements of this interaction term are omitted. This is problematic as omitting constitutive terms runs the strong risk that the estimated coefficients will be biased (Brambor, Clark and Golder, 2006). Moreover, such a model specification provides a weaker test of group consciousness theories than is possible. Rather than testing the prediction that \( \beta_1 = \beta_2 = \beta_3 = \beta_4 = \beta_5 = \beta_6 = 0 \), we would simply be assuming/forcing all of these coefficients to be zero. Note also that omitting the constitutive terms throws away potentially useful substantive information concerning the degree to which the different dimensions of group consciousness are necessary or sufficient for political behavior (Clark, Gilligan and Golder, 2006, 321).

An Alternative Conceptualization of Group Consciousness Rather than include each of the dimensions of group consciousness in their empirical analyses of political behavior, a few scholars choose instead to include some aggregate measure of group consciousness. Although they often claim to be building on the same theoretical concept of group consciousness, the empirical strategy adopted by these scholars cannot evaluate,
and indeed is at odds with, a theory of group consciousness built on necessary conditions. These scholars are, in fact, employing a competing conceptualization of group consciousness in which group consciousness is conceptualized in terms of an underlying trait, like self-esteem, fear, or ability, that cannot be directly observed (Jackman, 2008; Trochim and Donnelly, 2008; Zeller and Carmines, 1980). According to this conceptualization, the three dimensions – closeness, discrimination, and collective action – represent different manifest indicators of group consciousness that can be combined into a single measure of group consciousness. As scholars move from this theoretical concept to their empirical measure, the pertinent question becomes “whether the survey questions often used to measure group consciousness from a multidimensional perspective actually account for the latent concept of group identity [consciousness]” (Sanchez and Vargas, 2016, 160).

If group consciousness is latent, it follows that the appropriate way to model it empirically is with either factor analysis (Rummel, 1967) or item response theory (IRT) models (Borsboom, 2005). While both approaches differ in important ways (Takane and de Leeuw, 1987), each allows researchers to combine multiple measures related to some latent construct into a single scaled variable that is supposed to capture the underlying construct of interest. Once scholars have the scaled measure, they can model the relationship between group consciousness and political behavior with the additive specification shown in Model (2).

\[
\text{Political Behavior} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 \text{Group Consciousness} + \nu
\]  

\[(2)\]

IV. Testing Theories of Group Consciousness

As should be clear, how we conceptualize group consciousness has important implications for how we test theories of group consciousness, or, alternatively, how we test theories of group consciousness tells us something about how we are (possibly implicitly) conceptualizing group consciousness. To a large extent, there are no clear tests in the existing literature of these competing approaches (necessary conditions or underlying trait) to understanding the effect of group consciousness on political behavior.

In Crabtree et al. (2017), we outline an experiment that we are conducting to remedy this situation with respect to the group consciousness of women and men (as well as blacks and whites). One of the key issues in evaluating theories of group consciousness is in finding a behavioral outcome (Political Behavior) that should vary systematically with an individual’s level of group consciousness. Among other things, existing studies tend to focus on self-reported political behavior such as voter turnout. There are at least two issues with these studies. One is that we do not actually observe individual behavior, only self-reported behavior (Barabas and Jerit, 2010; Mullinix et al., 2015). Another is that it is not always clear from a theoretical perspective that the political behavior under consideration, such as voter turnout, should vary strongly with group consciousness.

In our experiment, we first collect information about how participants score on each of the individual dimensions of group consciousness using the standard survey questions discussed previously.7 We then ask participants to engage in an activity that can benefit in-group members and an activity that can benefit out-group members. By differencing how participants act in these two scenarios, we create a measure of Political Behavior that captures the extent to which individuals are willing to act on behalf of in-group, as opposed to out-group, members. Participants who exhibit group consciousness based on their survey responses should act more favorably towards their in-group relative to the out-group than participants who do not exhibit group consciousness. One of the advantages of our experimental approach is that we get to observe behavior directly, avoiding the problems associated with inferring behavior based on self-reporting. We also obtain a behavioral measure that should almost certainly vary with group consciousness. Our hope is that the results of our experiment will provide a clearer understanding of how group consciousness affects political behavior in general, as well as useful insights for both the theoretical and empirical literatures dealing with gender and racial group consciousness more specifically.

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\[7\text{For more precise details of our experimental design, see Crabtree et al. (2017).}\]


Women in Politics: A Necessary Crisis for the Mediocre Men?

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What forces shape women’s underrepresentation in politics? We have studied this research question using Swedish microdata over the last six years. Here we summarize our methods and findings. All of our papers examine gender inequality in political careers. While women’s numerical representation has grown in recent decades in most countries, women continue to lag far behind men when it comes to political power. Women climb slower up the political career ladder, which results in less power. In other words, increasing the number of women does not translate into increased influence unless the career patterns of male and female politicians also become more equal.

While most research in comparative politics uses cross-national data, micro-level data from a single country offers certain analytical advantages. For example, single-country studies are able to hold constant many relevant institutions such as the electoral system, the party system, and a variety of norms and practices (Krook and Mackay, 2011). In a cross-country setting, these differences are likely to confound gender-based recruitment, and may be difficult to capture with control variables (or be endogenous controls).

Studying subnational political units within a single country results in a large number of observations, which increases the statistical power of the findings. Local branches of political parties – henceforth ‘local parties’ – are also critical entryways into politics. Local parties also tend to have considerable autonomy in their recruitment processes, which gives meaningful variation in recruitment practices across space and over time.

Our research focuses on Sweden, where there are currently ten parties in parliament, but thousands of local branches of these parties. Each national party has a largely autonomous branch in each of the 290 municipalities. These local parties recruit politicians from the municipal population and promote them over time to become, most importantly, committee chairs or mayors. As in most other countries, local politicians and local political leaders make important decisions. Swedish local governments spend 25% of the country’s GDP and hire 20% of the labor force. Local politics is also the most important entryway into national politics. Over two-thirds of freshmen parliamentarians in Sweden come directly from municipal councils.

Our research relies on individual-level data on politicians. This data is quite detailed in the Swedish case, but similar datasets on local politicians are also readily available in a wide range of countries, such as Brazil (Brollo and Troiano, 2016), Denmark (Dahlgaard, 2016), Italy (Baltrunaite et al., 2014), Finland (Kotakorpi, Poutvaara and Terviö, 2014) and the United States (Silberman, 2015). In Sweden, the data is based on the mandatory personal identification codes that are listed on each party’s ballots. Ballots must be reported to the Electoral Agency and could hence be scanned as part of our research project. We combined these ballots with data from Statistics Sweden to create a yearly panel of the universe of nominated (and elected) politicians at all levels for nine elections (1982–2014).

This research overview provides examples from our research on Sweden of how individual-level data at the subnational level can be used to study women’s political representation. All five studies that we review examine various aspects of gender differences within individual careers. In the first study (Folke and Rickne, 2016b), we provide a formal definition of the political glass ceiling, and a test to determine whether there is one. In the next three studies, we find evidence of two factors that allow women’s political careers to become more equal to those of men: electoral competition and gender quotas. We find that harsher competition places women on a more equal career footing (Folke and Rickne, 2016a), while quotas increase the probability that women will be promoted to leadership positions and that mediocre men will be removed from such positions (O’Brien and Rickne, 2016; Besley et al., Forthcoming). The fifth study (Folke and Rickne, 2016c) finds evidence of an important supply constraint on women’s careers, which is that women’s likelihood of divorce greatly increases with political promotions. We explain our methods and findings in more detail below.

I. The Glass Ceiling in Politics

The concept of the ‘glass ceiling’ has been less stringently applied in political science than in sociology. It
is sometimes interpreted, or used in catchy titles, to denote the absence of women from a particular top position in politics. In sociology, it is a theoretical concept that implies there is a specific reason for women’s under-representation in top posts. We argue that theory and empirical studies in political science of the glass ceiling should take this definition into account. In our paper (O’Brien and Rickne, 2016), we stipulate criteria to define the glass ceiling in politics. We use these criteria to suggest an empirical method to test for the existence of such a ceiling.

We find that harsher competition places women on a more equal career footing …, while quotas increase the probability that women will be promoted to leadership positions and that mediocre men will be removed from such positions.

A glass ceiling exists if women are absent from top posts because of discriminatory barriers to their career advancement. According to this definition, the discrimination must also become more severe for recruitment to higher levels. We specify four theoretical criteria. First, the existence of ‘vertical conditional inequality’ means that the smaller proportion of women in higher office must not be fully explained by job-relevant characteristics. Second, the criterion of ‘bottom-to-top inequality acceleration’ requires that the proportion of women must decrease as the hierarchical level of the position increases. The third criterion is ‘career advancement inequality’, meaning that there is gender inequality in the probability of advancing to a higher level. Finally, the existence of a glass ceiling should entail ‘diverging career trajectories’, meaning that the discrimination against female candidates must grow over the course of a political career. The longer men and women have spent in the political organization, the greater the career discrepancy.

Testing for the existence of a glass ceiling is important for policy reasons. Efficient policies for increased gender equality need to target the right source(s). For example, if women are less ambitious, a mentoring program could help. If they have access to fewer campaign resources, a policy could target their financing networks. A glass ceiling, by contrast, means that a policy must target the norms and practices that underpin discriminatory promotions. Strategies that improve the size or quality of the pool of female candidates will be less efficient, because these qualified women will be overlooked unless meritocracy is enforced. If women’s skills are not valued, efforts to enhance these skills will also be a less efficient method for career equality than making sure that their existing skills are equally considered.

Empirically testing the glass ceiling criteria requires data on the qualifications and positions held by individual candidates. We must also be able to follow the career progression of individual candidates over time. Since this is not possible in all settings, one often has to settle for testing only one or two of the criteria. The richness of the Swedish data allows us to test all of these criteria, which results in strong support for a glass ceiling. We find that women are much less likely to reach the top positions in the municipal council, and that gender differences cannot be explained by differences in qualifications. This inequality also increases for higher political positions, and increases according to the length of time that men and women serve as local politicians.

It is remarkable that we find this result in Sweden, a context with progressive norms on gender equality, a developed welfare state, a list-based proportional election system, and high levels of numerical female representation in politics. To the extent that these factors make the organizational environment conducive to gender equality in careers, the presence of a glass ceiling in Sweden indicates that it is likely to also exist in other contexts.

II. Reducing Career Inequalities: Competition and Quotas

How can we reduce inequalities in career prospects? We explore two sources of variation: (i) political competition (Folke and Rickne, 2016a) and (ii) gender quotas (O’Brien and Rickne, 2016; Besley et al., Forthcoming). Political competition is a basic ingredient of a functioning democratic system. In contrast to a single-party system, a multi-party democracy lets parties compete for votes, and voters – in turn – can use their votes to hold politicians accountable.

Economists expect competition between firms to reduce discriminatory hiring, an argument that we ex-
tend to political parties. In the market for private firms, the costs of production rise if a firm allows a preference for hiring males to get in the way of meritocratic recruitment (Becker, 1957). Such a firm becomes less efficient, and when competition is fierce, its risk of going out of business increases. In other words, competition increases the need for efficiency and reduces discrimination as firms must hire and retain the best workers. This logic also applies to political organizations: choosing mediocre men over competent women can make a party less likely to win votes.

By examining local-level politics we can observe variation in political competition while holding system-level electoral institutions constant. We also hold constant the party system and cultural features that could confound the correlation between competition and gender equality in a cross-national setting. The level of competition varies substantially between the 290 Swedish municipalities. In some places, the Social Democrats have been in power since the creation of a multi-party system a hundred years ago, while other municipalities have experienced numerous changes in governing parties or coalitions over time.

Our empirical analysis relates gender differences in political careers to the level of competition. The results show that more competition is associated with more gender-equal careers. This is true when we look at gender differences in reelection, a key process for accumulating political seniority in order to reach positions of influence over time. It is also true when we measure gender differences in top appointments. For example, women are more likely to be appointed to local party leadership positions in more competitive places.

Why are political careers more gender equal in more competitive contexts? We find some revealing statistics in surveys of local politicians regarding the nature of their local parties’ nomination processes. Competitive contexts are associated with more influence from party branches – e.g. the youth league and the women’s branch – in the nomination procedure. Female, but not male, politicians are also more likely to respond that competence is an important recruitment criterion when competition is fiercer. Both correlations support the conjecture that parties respond to competition by implementing a more meritocratic and inclusive recruitment process. These results speak to the debate on whether there is a tradeoff between gender equality and meritocracy.

A second factor that helps level the playing field between men’s and women’s political careers is gender quotas (O’Brien and Rickne, 2016). This result may be surprising, since opponents of quotas often claim the opposite. Mediocre ‘quota women’ are expected to flow into the organization and undercut the belief in women’s competence as a group. In turn, women are predicted to grow in numbers but lose in promotion probabilities, meaning that the quota has traded numerical representation for substantive influence over policy. A similar argument is that quotas restrict women’s access to power by triggering a backlash among male elites, who control the nomination process for higher positions.

We study the impact of a political-party-level gender quota. In 1993, the Swedish Social Democratic Party demanded that all of the party’s ballots must be zipped, alternating the names of men and women. The quota was adopted by the party’s central board in response to the threat of a feminist breakout party at the national level. In our data, the reform creates a pre-quota period (1982–1991) and a post-quota period (1994–2010). In each of Sweden’s 290 municipalities, the introduction of the quota is an exogenous event that forced the local Social Democratic Party to change its nomination process.

Local parties had to increase their proportion of women by different amounts. We call this the ‘quota bite’ – the increase in the proportion of elected women between 1991 and 1994, when the names on the ballot were zipped. We use a difference-in-differences estimation to compare the selection of female leaders before and after the introduction of quotas, depending on the quota bite and – importantly – within municipalities. Do we see that women’s relative career opportunities improve or deteriorate depending on the size of the quota bite? If women were stigmatized, this stigma should grow worse with the proportion of women who entered, and the same is true for backlash. Conversely, a larger share of elected women could cooperate with each other to push for female leadership. Under those circumstances, a larger quota bite should trigger an improvement in women’s access to leadership posts.

Our results show that women became more likely to occupy top posts in local parties where the quota
had larger impacts. We call this an acceleration effect, because the quota accelerated women’s influence by increasing their numbers as well as their access to top posts.

In another paper, we examine the same gender quota but focus on the selection of men (Besley et al., Forthcoming). This paper also sheds some light on a possible mechanism driving the increase in women’s influence. We build a theoretical model for male party leaders’ recruitment strategies with respect to the competence of rank-and-file politicians. Leaders are theorized to trade off the party’s electoral performance for their own reappointment. By recruiting more mediocre (male) followers, their chance of being reappointed to leadership positions increases, while the party’s electoral chances are undercut. It follows that a competent leader can ‘afford’ more competent followers without jeopardizing his own hold on power.

A gender quota results in an inflow of women, which undercuts the power of male leaders. For any given increase in inflow, mediocre men are more threatened. These mediocre leaders could, in theory, react with a backlash against meritocracy by only picking mediocre men for the reduced number of positions available to men on the ballot. But given that they also care about the party’s electoral chances, and the policies that follow from an electoral win, we theorize that they do not. Instead, our empirical findings show that they choose to resign. We find that a larger quota bite triggers an improvement in the competence of the elected men and, importantly, in the disappearance of mediocre male leaders from positions of power.

III. Reducing Career Inequalities: Competition and Quotas

Gender inequality in political careers can be discussed in a ‘supply and demand’ framework. The papers summarized above strongly suggest that party elites demand fewer women than men for top posts by discriminating against female politicians in career promotions. This negative bias can be counteracted, however, by gender quotas or political competition.

On the supply side, surveys of male and female politicians generally do not find a gender difference in the taste for political power: they show similar levels of ambition to reach top posts. Our research also shows that the presence of children in the household has little bearing on gender differences in dropping out of politics. The presence of small children in the household cannot, for example, explain (any of) the gender difference in political promotions in our study of the glass ceiling (Folke and Rickne, 2016b). Another example is the paper on political competition. We again subdivide the sample by whether a politician has small children or not. Political competition improves women’s chances of promotion in both groups (Folke and Rickne, 2016a).

Nevertheless, it remains a fact that women do more household chores and take more parental leave. Silvermann (2015) provide compelling evidence from U.S. states. She shows that fewer women run for, and win seats in, state legislatures with long travel times to the state capitol. In ongoing research (Folke and Rickne, 2016c), we examine the family constraint from another angle by examining how promotions to top political posts affect politicians’ marriage durability.

For two political jobs – mayor and parliamentarian – we can follow successful and unsuccessful job contenders over time, both before and after their promotions. With this data, we can use a difference-in-differences approach to estimate the causal effect of promotion on divorce. The results show that a promotion to these top posts doubles the probability of divorce for women in the three years after the election, but does not affect the divorce probability for men.

Women who divorce after their promotion tend to have undertaken the vast majority of the child care in the family, and are younger than their husbands by a greater margin. These findings connect household formation to career inequality in politics, suggesting that the initial match on the marriage market affects women’s ability to combine a stable family situation with political leadership positions. The family becomes a source of support for men’s careers, but a source of stress and conflict for women, particularly if the relationship was matched in a gender-unequal fashion from the beginning. Future research could explore the role of household formation in political career inequalities.

References

Civil War and Political Participation: The Case of Peru

by Omar García-Ponce
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From the Trojan War to the current Syrian conflict, war combatants have overwhelmingly been male.\(^1\) Notwithstanding numerous exceptions to this rule, this implies that men die disproportionately more frequently than women in armed conflicts.\(^2\) Women, in turn, are exposed to a broader range of wartime experiences: some are recruited as fighters, others become targets of violence specifically because they are women, and some others become refugees or itinerant migrants. Yet at the same time, many women remain in their communities, often adopting social and political roles that traditionally been male prerogatives. For instance, women may enter the labor force or increase their participation as community organizers and political activists to cope with the adverse consequences of war and its aftermath.

Since women experience violent conflict differently than men, legacies of war are unlikely to be gender neutral. However, our understanding of how – and to what extent – violent conflict affects women and men differently remains limited. A number of studies have examined the impact of civil war violence on behavioral outcomes, such as political engagement (Blattman, 2009), reintegration success (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2007), and human capital accumulation (Shemyakina, 2011). But little empirical research has looked into how war (and postwar) experiences vary by gender and how these experiences influence behavior along gender lines.

A growing body of evidence suggests that wars reshape the social structure in gender-specific ways, creating new opportunities for women in politics. For example, a number of historical and sociological studies link the enfranchisement of women in Britain to social and cultural changes induced by World War I (Grayzel, 1999; Ramirez, Soysal and Shanahan, 1997). Similarly, recent case studies and policy reports provide qualitative evidence that countries tend to see an expansion of women’s political roles during wartime. It appears that women engage more actively in public life through their participation in organizations such as schools, hospi-

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\(^1\) Rough estimates indicate that less than one percent of all warriors in history, and less than five percent in the present interstate system, have been female (Goldstein, 2003, 10).

\(^2\) Based on survey data from thirteen countries, Obermeyer, Murray and Gakidou (2008) estimate that males accounted for 81% of violent war deaths from 1955–2002.

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The question of whether violent conflict affects political behavior in gender-specific ways has received limited attention in current quantitative research – a concern that has been echoed in reviews of the literature on the legacies of civil war (Buvinic et al., 2013; Justino et al., 2012). I seek to fill this gap in the literature by studying the legacy of the Shining Path conflict in Peru. Using rich micro-level data on civil war violence and women’s participation in local politics, I present evidence that new opportunities for women as political actors may arise during wartime, persist in the postwar period, and be transmitted across generations.

I. Women and Wartime Violence

The Communist Party of Peru, also known as Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path), emerged in the mid-1960s as a local political movement in Ayacucho, one of the poorest regions of the country. The movement was led by Abimael Guzmán, a professor of philosophy at the local University of Huamanga. Shining Path perpetrated its first attacks in the early 1980s, and rapidly spread throughout the country. By 1990, the civil war had practically expanded to one-third of Peruvian municipalities, covering 75% of the total number of provinces. As shown in Figure 1, based on data from the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the highest points of violence were reached in the mid-1980s and in the early 1990s. Abimael Guzmán was captured in September 1992, which marked the beginning of a new period characterized by a decline in the intensity of political violence. By 1995, violence had ceased in most regions.

Based on historical accounts, at least three different stories could be told about the role of women during the Peruvian civil war (Degregori, 1996; Jaquette and Wolchik, 1998; Palmer, 1992; Stern, 1998). First, female participation was one of the most striking features of the insurgency – according to some estimates, women made up approximately one-third of Shining Path’s membership (Starn, 1995). Nevertheless, historians seem to agree that a gender agenda was not part of Shining Path’s platform. Gender issues were merely used as propaganda. In other words, while some women joined the Shining Path in search of new spaces for participation, their interests were not incorporated in a programmatic manner. Instead, women in the Shining Path “found themselves inserted into insurgent versions of patriarchal subordination” (Stern, 1998, 342).

Second, the conflict in Peru was characterized by vibrant female-led movements to protest against violence – including a nation-wide march for peace in 1988. Furthermore, numerous civic organizations emerged during the conflict. For the most part, these groups were composed of women and addressed practical issues, such as economic needs, displacement, and human rights violations. Historians agree that the conflict empowered Peruvian women and brought them into the public sphere. For instance, Stern argues that “[t]he insurgency created new and visible spaces for some female youth to assume roles and responsibilities at odds with conventional social restrictions […] Women’s new prominence as citizen-subjects, with their own political organizations and agendas, has left an important and probably inerasable legacy” (Stern, 1998, 342-3).

A third group of women became targets of violence. While the use of gender-based violence was not a widespread strategy of war during the conflict, there is evidence that sexual violence against women was used as a tool for punishing rebels and potential recruits in specific areas of the country (Theidon, 2004). Most cases of sexual violence were perpetrated by the state. According to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, while the Shining Path was responsible for more than half of the conflict-related deaths and disappearances, the Maoist insurgents were responsible for only 11% of the reported cases of sexual violence. About 85% of the reported rapes were attributed to state security forces.

II. Electoral Gender Quotas in the Aftermath of Civil War

In October 1997, after major armed conflict had ceased, Peru adopted electoral gender quotas for both national and local elections. The quota law stipulated that at least 25% of the candidates competing for a seat in the national congress or in a municipal council should

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1 There is also cross-country quantitative evidence that seems to corroborate this trend (Hughes, 2009).

2 Electoral gender quotas were neither an explicit demand from civil society organizations protesting against violence nor an issue raised by Shining Path’s supporters.
be female. Interestingly, the new electoral rule was introduced for political reasons unrelated to the conflict.\textsuperscript{4} In fact, the adoption of gender quotas was perceived as an abrupt policy change, which unleashed an intense search for female candidates to meet the percentages established by law.

Women had historically been excluded from leadership positions in political organizations at both national and local levels. In the 1995 elections, for example, only 5.8% of the registered candidates for municipal elections were women. The first election subjected to gender quotas (the 1998 municipal election) was scheduled months apart from the passage of the quota law. Political parties suddenly faced the need to incorporate women in their lists of candidates. They targeted potential female candidates among grassroots organizations, many of which emerged during the conflict. These women were regarded as particularly qualified candidates because they had already acquired experience as community leaders or political activists (Hurtado, 2005).

The implementation of electoral gender quotas in Peru is generally regarded as a successful one – the impact of quotas was greater than in many other Latin American countries (Schmidt and Saunders, 2004). In the first national election held after the adoption of gender quotas, the percentage of congressional seats held by women increased from 11% to 20%. Likewise, the percentage of female councilors almost doubled at the provincial level. But what is particularly interesting is that the most spectacular increases took place in areas affected by the civil war. In these municipalities, the proportion of female council members more than tripled.

\textbf{III. The Legacy of the Conflict on Female Political Participation}

The empirical question that I address here is whether Peruvian municipalities affected by the Shining Path insurgency experienced a differential increase in the proportion of female candidates running for local councilors after the adoption of gender quotas. To do
so, I constructed an original municipality-level dataset measuring the proportion of female candidates in the 1995 (pre-quota) and the 1998 (post-quota) municipal elections. I then combined this dataset with data on violent events from the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Additionally, I used high-resolution geographic data and census data to measure several characteristics of the municipalities that may be correlated with both the presence of civil war violence and patterns of female political participation.

The estimation of the causal effect of violence is challenging because the Shining Path conflict was not a phenomenon randomly distributed across Peruvian municipalities. In other words, some municipalities were more likely to experience violence than others, and the reasons that made these municipalities more violence prone may also explain why the implementation of gender quotas was more successful in some areas than in others. To credibly isolate the extent to which a civil war legacy explains a municipality’s response to the quota, I use a difference-in-differences design with fixed effects. I test whether the proportion of female candidates in local (municipal) elections changed differentially in municipalities affected by civil war violence (treatment group) versus municipalities that remained unaffected (control group), before and after the implementation of the electoral gender quotas.

The essence of the empirical strategy is captured by Table 1, which shows the average percentage of female candidates in conflict-affected municipalities versus peaceful municipalities, before and after the adoption of the quota law. A simple difference-in-differences in means suggests a differential increase of about four percentage points in female political participation in conflict-affected areas. This empirical finding is robust to a number of potential confounding factors and sensitivity checks. While this is a seemingly subtle effect, it is important to consider that the median municipality in Peru registered 30 candidates in the 1998 elections, and several municipalities registered more than a hundred. A substantive interpretation of these results implies that municipalities in which 36 or more candidates were registered (the average Peruvian municipality) had one additional women running for office as a result of the conflict.

A potential concern is that these results are driven by extreme values or that the difference in the percentage of female candidates before and after the quota is distributed very differently in conflict-affected versus peaceful municipalities. Figure 2 shows that this is not the case. The histograms indicate that the distribution of the difference in the proportion of female candidates before and after the quota is fairly similar across both groups.

I further examine the heterogeneous effects of different types of violence, and find that while larger effects are observed in areas with a higher proportion of violent events perpetrated by the Shining Path, the positive effects of violence on women’s political engagement are reversed in areas affected by sexual violence (mostly perpetrated by state security forces), which underscores how different types of violence exert starkly different effects. The straightforward interpretation of these findings is that the positive effects of violence on women’s political participation occur in areas where males became the principal target of the conflict. However, such effects are reversed in areas where women were the targets; that is, in municipalities that experienced sexual violence but did not experience Shining Path violence.

IV. Potential Mechanisms

There are several plausible mechanisms by which civil war may affect female political participation. These mechanisms can be broadly grouped into two categories: structural and behavioral. Think of this conceptual distinction as two dimensions of the supply of female candidates that are likely to be affected by wartime violence. For example, the structural dimension captures conflict-induced changes in the sex ratio, which in turn affect the relative size of the pool of female candidates. In contrast, the behavioral dimension captures conflict-induced changes in individual decisions on whether to engage in politics or not.

In the case of Peru, the increase in female political participation observed in conflict-affected areas does not seem to be driven by structural changes induced by the conflict. In other words, the effects of Shining Path violence on female political participation are not driven by the loss of men in the community or by changes in household composition. Based on historical accounts, the evidence instead points to a behavioral mechanism: traditional social norms changed during wartime, empowering women as political actors. Either as heads of households, community organizers, political activists,
Table 1: Percentage of Female Candidates Before and After the 1997 Gender Quota

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipalities</th>
<th>Pre-quota</th>
<th>Post-quota</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conflict-affected</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>30.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peaceful Municipalities</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>27.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Table 1 indicates the average percentage of female candidates that ran in conflict-affected and peaceful municipalities, before and after the adoption of gender quotas in 1997.

Figure 2: Difference in the Proportion of Female Candidates Before and After the 1997 Gender Quota

Note: Figure 2 indicates the difference in the average proportion of female candidates that ran in conflict-affected and peaceful municipalities, before and after the adoption of gender quotas in 1997.
or Shining Path combatants, women’s roles changed dramatically within their communities.

If the conflict induced a transformation of gender roles, then the gendered effects of wartime violence on female political engagement should also be observed among a younger generation of women, namely those who were too young to be directly affected by the conflict but not too young to be influenced by the change in their mother’s political behavior. In other words, women who were exposed to the conflict during their childhood or pre-adulthood should exhibit higher levels of political participation, relative to those who were unexposed, because they observed the greater engagement of their mothers in civic or political life. Based on different pieces of survey data, I find that women exposed to the conflict during their childhood do exhibit higher levels of civic and political engagement than their counterparts – those who were born in the same municipality but in a different year, and those who were born in a different municipality but belong to the same cohort. Most importantly, similar effects are not observed among males.

V. Final Thoughts

Three main conclusions can be drawn from the case of Peru. First, new opportunities for women as political actors may arise during wartime. In the presence of a post-conflict policy that incentivizes female political participation, these effects may persist in the postwar period and be transmitted across generations. Second, a more nuanced picture of the effects of civil war violence on political behavior emerges when exploring the heterogeneity of these effects based on the type of violence. Not all types of violence affect political engagement in the same way. For instance, war killings, typically associated with men, tend to have a positive impact on female political participation; sexual violence against women induces the opposite effect. Who does what to whom makes a difference. A third conclusion is that increased female political participation during and after war is not necessarily explained by structural changes induced by the conflict, such as the loss of men in the community. Instead, the evidence points to behavioral adjustments linked to wartime experiences.

What are the broader implications of these findings? The results imply that the adoption of gender quotas in post-conflict settings represents a critical institutional choice for the development of gender political equality. If wartime experiences are likely to activate female political engagement, as it has been suggested in this and other studies, there is a high opportunity cost of not providing an institutional channel for the sustained participation of women in politics after war. The sudden empowerment that women experience as social and political actors during wartime may vanish, or even be reversed, quickly after the war comes to an end. A unique opportunity to successfully create a more equal representation of women and men in politics may be lost if the reconfiguration of political institutions after the conflict is not accompanied by policies explicitly aimed at incentivizing and formalizing women’s political participation. Understanding the gender consequences of civil war is critical to better inform policy-making in the post-conflict era.

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### Measuring and Interpreting the Gender Gap in Political Participation

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### I. Motivation

The economics literature measures the status of women across countries and societies by identifying the gap in social and economic indicators that are fundamental to human welfare, including health and wealth. For instance, Duflo (2012) cites the shrinking gender gap in primary school enrollment and labor force participation across low- and middle-income countries over the past few decades as signs of progress with respect to the relative status of women. Political scientists have similarly contributed to examining the relative status of women by measuring the gender gap in political indicators such as representation and participation. They have identified, for example, the growing representation of women in national legislatures across the world, due in large part to the adoption of gender quotas (Schwindt-Bayer, 2009), and an often large but variable gender gap in political participation in Latin America (Desposato and Norrander, 2009) and Africa (Isaksson, Kotsadam and Nerman, 2014) as well as globally (Inglehart and Norris, 2003).

While the relative political status of women can be as, or more, important than their economic status – especially when considering how change to such status might come about, it is not as straightforward to measure or interpret. I will begin by discussing some of the findings in the literature with respect to the size of the gender gap in women’s political status, and common explanations for variation therein. Next, I will highlight some of the nuances that must be considered when interpreting evidence of a gender gap in political participation. Paying attention to these, I argue, is critical for proposing pathways to overcoming existing gender gaps. While I primarily rely on findings in the existing literature to advance these arguments, I will additionally offer new analyses of Afrobarometer data (Rounds 4 and 5) that build upon those in existing studies.

There are three potential pitfalls that must be avoided in the study of gender gaps in political participation. First, while counterintuitive on its face, a small gender gap is not necessarily better for women. As I will show, a relatively small gender gap in voter turnout across many developing democracies in Africa is not accompanied by equally small gaps in other forms of participation. Rather than a sign of women’s equal status, this could instead be a sign of vulnerability to pressure to turn out by political parties or local brokers. Second, theories developed to explain gender differences in participation in the developed world may not be applicable to understanding the same phenomenon in the developing world. For instance, Gottlieb, Grossman and Robinson (Forthcoming) show that a growing gender gap in political preferences is a sign of women’s disempowerment in Africa contrary to the finding in more developed countries that an increasing gap in women’s political leanings is instead a sign of their liberation from men (Iversen and Rosenbluth, 2006). Third, relying on
cultural explanations to explain features of the political gender gap may hide more straightforward rational explanations. In particular, I will show that the greater likelihood of a gender gap in political participation in Africa’s Muslim communities may be attributable to the politics of being a minority group rather than a cultural explanation.

II. Determinants of the Gender Gap in Political Participation

While the gender gap in political participation is a global phenomenon, its determinants vary both across contexts and across specific outcomes. In terms of context, differential access to resources between men and women accounts for more of the gender gap in participation in developed societies than developing ones. Burns, Schlozman and Verba (2001) find that gendered differences in the stockpile of education and employment in the U.S. contribute considerably to the gap in participation. Expanding the scope to 70 mostly high- or middle-income countries, Inglehart and Norris (2003) show that individual-level characteristics such as education, class, and religiosity completely account for any gender gap in political activism. By contrast, studies of developing nations largely disconfirm the idea that resource differentials are alone, or even largely, responsible for the gender gap in civic participation. In a study across seventeen Latin American countries, Desposato and Norrander (2009) find that individual-level characteristics such as education and socio-economic status indeed generate what they call differential treatments. Because men and women demonstrate different average levels of these attributes, which are themselves known to be predictors of political participation, this leads to differential rates of participation. However, these factors account for little of the variation. Instead, they find some individual-level covariates moderate participation differently for men and women. For instance, employment is an important predictor of participation for women but not men, suggesting that men and women experience different barriers to participation. Institutional features such as political freedoms and the share of female representatives also explain some of the variation. In Africa, Isaksson, Kotsadam and Nerman (2014) similarly find that resources such as information access, education, and poverty explain only a modest share of the gender gap in Africa, and they propose that greater gaps are produced by higher levels of perceived intimidation and clientelism and more unequal gender norms.1 Taken together, these findings suggest that in developing societies, formal or informal institutional factors matter to gender differentials in political participation as much, if not more, than individual attributes.

Another important way in which the gender gap in political participation varies is across outcomes, though not enough attention has been paid to this in the literature. Desposato and Norrander (2009) differentiate between conventional participation – turning out to vote or discussing and following politics, and unconventional participation – participating in protests or demonstrations. They find different determinants of the gender gap for these two types of outcomes. For instance, religiosity decreases the gender gap in conventional participation (because women are more religious) and increases the gender gap in unconventional participation. Different from this Latin America study, in a U.S. study, Verba, Burns and Schlozman (1997) distinguish between turnout – which has shown relatively little gender inequality, and political interest, efficacy and information – which demonstrate far greater gender disparities. Future studies of the determinants of the gender gap in political outcomes should be more attuned to the potentially different theoretical expectations that would lead women and men to participate at different rates across outcomes.

We show how the gender gap in political preferences (where women and men have more distinct policy preferences) can be a sign of women’s liberation in developed countries but women’s vulnerability in developed ones.

III. Analyses

To illustrate the points I will make in the next section with respect to measuring and interpreting the gender gap in political participation, I analyze determinants of the gender gap in the African context. Isaksson, Kotsadam and Nerman (2014) already identify and test determinants of the important gender gap in political participation across Africa using Round 4 of the

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1 Duflo (2012) argues that progress toward women’s empowerment is similarly dogged by persistent biases against female infants, against women in the workplace, and against female leaders.
Afrobarometer. In a related study with colleagues Guy Grossman and Amanda Robinson, I investigate the determinants of a gender gap in political priorities, e.g. where men and women have different preferences over what the government should be doing for them. Following the research design in Gottlieb, Grossman and Robinson (Forthcoming), I update the analysis of the gender gap in political participation in Isaksson, Kotssadam and Nerman (2014) in a few ways. First, I add Round 5 of the Afrobarometer which nearly doubles the number of countries in the sample, from 20 to 34. Second, I include country-level variables measuring political and economic factors to exploit both within- and across-country predictors of the gender gap. Correlates for both the individual- and country-levels are constructed for employment, Islam, and vulnerability. And third, I disaggregate and expand upon the outcomes tested. While they test a joint indicator of non-electoral participation (raising an issue) and electoral participation (voting), I test four different outcomes and exploit their meaningful differences. These outcomes include political knowledge, civic participation, political participation, and voting.

Figure 1 presents the results of this exercise for all determinants in which there is a substantively interesting relationship with at least one of the outcomes. Each of the graphs plots the marginal effect of being a woman on the outcome of interest indicated on the y-axis; a gender gap in the expected direction would thus be indicated by a coefficient statistically significantly less than zero. The running variable on the x-axis in each graph is the determinant of the gender gap of interest: self-reported employment levels, self-reported identification with the Muslim faith, and a country-level index of vulnerability that includes the extent and legality of polygamy, adolescent fertility rate, and the average age of first marriage for women.

Similar to existing studies, we see a large gender gap (women participating less than men) in civic and political participation and political knowledge. The gap is largest for knowledge and smallest for civic participation. Perhaps surprisingly, however, there is no gender gap in voting among some subsamples of the population, namely among the unemployed and among Muslims. To permit comparisons of the effect of being a woman across outcomes, I normalize each outcome variable so that it has a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. The net effect of being a woman on voting is about 0.1 standard deviations, while it is more than twice that for political participation, nearly three times that for civic participation, and more than four times that for being politically informed.

In terms of the reported determinants, the gender gap is larger among Muslims for the three non-voting outcomes, and significantly so for civic participation and political information. The unemployed tend to experience a larger gender gap, but this is not statistically significant at conventional levels. Similarly, the gender gap appears larger in more vulnerable places, but this apparent variation is not statistically significant.

Figure 1 presents the results of this exercise for all determinants in which there is a substantively interesting relationship with at least one of the outcomes. Each of the graphs plots the marginal effect of being a woman on the outcome of interest indicated on the y-axis; a gender gap in the expected direction would thus be indicated by a coefficient statistically significantly less than zero. The running variable on the x-axis in each graph is the determinant of the gender gap of interest: self-reported employment levels, self-reported identification with the Muslim faith, and a country-level index of vulnerability that includes the extent and legality of polygamy, adolescent fertility rate, and the average age of first marriage for women.

IV. Potential Pitfalls in Measurement and Interpretation

Comparing the findings of the exercise in the last section with those of existing studies highlights one of the potential pitfalls in the measurement and interpretation of quantitative studies of the gender gap in political participation. Disaggregating the outcome variable demonstrated that one of the outcomes was not like...
Figure 1: Marginal Effect of being Female on the Probability of Four Forms of Participation

Note: Each row corresponds to a different form of participation: political knowledge (top), civic participation, political participation, and voting (bottom). The three columns distinguish the marginal effect of being female on each form of participation according to whether the individual is employed (left), Muslim (middle), and whether she lives in a ‘vulnerable’ country (right). The results are based on empirical analyses using data from Rounds 4 and 5 of the Afrobarometer.
the others. While the size of the gender gap in three of the four outcomes is highly correlated (between 0.33 and 0.42) across country-regions (the lowest geographic unit reported by the Afrobarometer), the gender gap in each of these outcomes and that in voting is much less correlated (between 0.07 and 0.19). The sub-sample analyses shed light on what might be going on. Among groups where women are worse off with respect to the other outcomes (unemployed, Muslim), they are better off with respect to voting. This implies that the influence of gender on voting may not be subject to the same social or political factors as the other measures.

Observations in Bleck and Michelitch (2017) echo this interpretation. They, too, recognize the large gender gap in political information and the small gender gap in voting across African countries, and raise the distinction between mobilized and autonomous participation. Citing Collier (1982), Bleck and Michelitch imply that the lack of gender discrepancy in voting may be more attributable to the capacity of political entrepreneurs, e.g. chiefs or brokers, than the articulation of distinct preferences and interests. As further support of the gender-blindness of political parties and their agents, Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer (2012) find that the gender gap in electoral participation narrows when election results are allocated more proportionally across political parties that must reach out to a broader, more diverse base to win votes. While we might take solace in the fact that women are at least expressing political preferences at rates close to those of men, there is discouraging evidence about the autonomy with which women form political opinions. Women in Africa are much more likely to say “Don’t Know” when asked about their political beliefs (Logan and Bratton, 2006). Women are also much more likely than men to report voting in accordance with their caste, clan, or household head (Giné and Mansuri, 2011).

A second potential pitfall in explaining or interpreting gender gaps in political outcomes in the developing world is blindly applying theories developed to explain gender gaps in higher-income countries. A prime example of this is illustrated in Gottlieb, Grossman and Robinson (Forthcoming). We show how the gender gap in political preferences (where women and men have more distinct policy preferences) can be a sign of women’s liberation in developed countries but women’s vulnerability in developed ones. In higher-income countries, women tend to increase their support for state services relative to men as they become less reliant on their husband’s income (Iversen and Rosenbluth, 2006; Edlund and Pande, 2002) and as they increase their valuation of self-sufficiency (Finseraas, Jakobsson and Kotsadam, 2012). So while married women who do not work are most likely to share their spouse’s policy preferences, women who do work or who have a higher expectation of needing to provide for themselves are more likely to have distinct political preferences.

But as we see in the Afrobarometer data, increasingly distinct policy preferences among men and women in Africa is often a sign of greater vulnerability (Gottlieb, Grossman and Robinson, Forthcoming). For instance, among the unemployed, women are much more likely than men to think the government should prioritize water services and much less likely to think the government should prioritize infrastructure. These gaps close among employed women and men, likely because employed women are less likely to be the ones fetching water and more likely to utilize infrastructure such as roads. Thus, the gender gap in policy priorities has opposite normative interpretations across these two settings.

Third, relying on cultural distinctions to explain features of the political gender gap can overshadow more instrumental or strategic explanations. As is evident in Figure 1, the gender gap in civic participation and political information is larger among Muslims in Africa than among other groups. This finding has been echoed elsewhere. Fish (2011), for instance, finds greater gender gaps in literacy, income, and political position in Muslim-majority societies relative to others, and Field, Jayachandran and Pande (2010) report that Muslim women in India failed to benefit from a training in business entrepreneurship that generated significant economic returns for Hindu women in the same program.

However, if we look at where this ‘Muslim effect’ is occurring, we see that, at least in the African context, the phenomenon is limited to places where Muslims are a minority group. In Muslim-majority countries, however, the gender gap is not any larger among Muslims than other groups. In fact, when Muslims are in the majority, the gender gap among Muslims across all outcomes but civic participation actually appears smaller than that in other groups (see Figure 2). This

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10 In our sample, these are Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Sierra Leone.
Figure 2: The Differential Effect of being Female Across Muslim and non-Muslim Groups in Countries with Varying Muslim Group Size

Note: This figure plots the marginal effect of being female on four different forms of participation: political knowledge, civic participation, political participation, and voting. The marginal effect of being female is calculated for both non-Muslim individuals (gray) and Muslim individuals (black). It is also calculated conditional on the share of a country’s population that is Muslim (the horizontal axis). The results are based on empirical analyses using data from Rounds 4 and 5 of the Afrobarometer.
begs the question of whether it is something about being a woman in a minority group rather than a Muslim woman that induces this larger gap.

There are good reasons to think that women in minority groups could suffer additional disadvantages. First, minority status implies a different culture (and perhaps even language) than the rest of the country, which makes getting a job or access to other immediate economic needs more difficult. Thus, minority women would have even less time to spend on things like political participation. Minority groups may also be averse to acculturation or assimilation with the majority group, and one way of slowing down the assimilation process over generations is to reinforce traditional cultural norms that can often be disadvantageous to women. For instance, U.S.-born Mexican women experience worse rates of domestic violence than their Mexican counterparts (Kantor, Jasinski and Aldarondo, 1994; Sorenson and Telles, 1991). Finally, overt discrimination or xenophobic sentiments directed at minority groups may have an even more negative impact on women than men (Kasturirangan, Krishnan and Riger, 2004), or negative psychosocial impacts on men that lead them to oppress women more than they otherwise would. While preliminary, these findings and potential mechanisms suggest the importance of considering more macro-political factors in understanding localized differentiation in the gender gap – as well as point to a fruitful area for future research.

V. Overcoming the Gender Gap

Getting the measurement and interpretation of these gender gaps right is normatively important if we want to understand how they might eventually be overcome. In this enterprise as well, it is critical to make distinctions among outcomes. For outcomes where women face higher social costs to participation, the gender gap may be far more difficult to eliminate. For instance, increasing resources through education or training has often failed to have as great an impact on women's civic or political participation relative to men's (Finkel, 2002), and in one case, it even had perverse consequences (Gottlieb, 2016). By contrast, Grossman, Humphreys and Sacramone-Lutz (2014) find that reducing resource costs through information technology in Uganda can flatten gender disparities in the rate at which people contact politicians. A likely reason for the success of this particular intervention is that the outcome under study – text-messaging politicians – is a relatively anonymous, and thus less socially costly, form of participation. Thus, overcoming gender disparities may be easier relative to those where egalitarian gender norms constrain women's political engagement.

Where there are robust gender norms against women's participation in the public sphere, is there any hope for change? In a study with Amanda Robinson (2016), we find evidence of one local institution that seems to have succeeded, at least in part, in overcoming some of these barriers to participation. We show that membership in a matrilineal group – a kinship system in which descent is traced through the female line – reduces the gender gap in civic and political participation consistently within and across countries. The data suggests that the expectation that women will have access to land is what is driving these differences.

References


Sixty years ago, the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council met at Stanford University to examine the role of interest groups in the political process (Almond, 1958). The scholars sought to understand who translates the interests of different segments of society into political demands, and if and how these demands are met; they were, to use contemporary terms, evaluating the representation of group interests. In the minds of these scholars, the major segments of society included trade unions, business groups, student movements, kinship and lineage groups, and religious and ethnic groups. While visionary, the founders of the subfield overlooked one large and politically salient cleavage group: women.

Since the 1960s, scholars have studied the representation of women’s interests, including in Africa. This scholarship examines how parliamentarians act on behalf of women (Atanga, 2010; Bauer and Britton, 2006; Burnet, 2008; Clayton, Josefsson and Wang, 2016; Tamale, 1999; Yoon, 2011). Many works also focus on the actions (or inactions) of nonelected representatives. These include state agencies (Tsikata, 2000), political parties (Goetz and Hassim, 2003), and autonomous social movements (Hassim, 2006; Steady, 2006; Tripp, 2000; Tripp et al., 2009). Together, they bolster a call from scholars to broaden our understanding of representation and include actors outside the halls of elected office (Weldon, 2002; Lovenduski, 2005; Beckwith and Cowell-Meyers, 2007; Celis et al., 2008).

In this essay, I ask who claims to act for women in Africa to better understand women’s substantive representation – actions taken in the public sphere to advance the interests of a group (Pitkin, 1967, 209-212). I argue that nonelected representatives – namely, women's
organizations – play a crucial role in the representation of women's interests in the world's second largest continent. Women's organizations provide a space in which individuals socially construct what is in their interests. In the public arena, women-led groups voice political demands in the name of women. Furthermore, women-led organizations represent women not just in Christian-majority Africa but also in Muslim-majority countries. Having elected officials from a segment of society is not, on its own, sufficient for a group's interests to become political demands.

To advance our understanding of who makes claims on behalf of cleavage groups and how their political demands translate into public policy, my work includes cross-national statistical and small-N analyses. In the next section, I discuss my large-N research on women's organizations and substantive representation in Africa, followed by a report of my work on women's representation in the Muslim-majority Republic of Niger. I follow Beckwith's (2011) definition of interests as conditions that are essential for life chances and opportunities to act. What constitutes a group's interests depends on the context, but includes an interest in having access to positions of power and in living without violence. Issues are choices that focus on specific aspects of a group's interests, such as gender quotas. Preferences are the positions that actors take on specific policies (e.g., a preference for quotas). Therefore, women share interests but not necessarily preferences on issues.

I. The Importance of Women's Organizations: Cross-National Analyses

Women share an interest in accessing positions of power. We know that the adoption of gender quotas improves women's chances of holding office around the world. Yet, not all countries introduced quotas right away, and some countries have yet to opt for them. Why have some countries adopted gender quotas and not others?

In an article with Aili Mari Tripp (Forthcoming), I argue that national-level women's organizations helped drive the adoption of gender quota laws in Africa. More precisely, we focus on coalitions of civil society organizations, which are the temporary, decision-oriented, joint use of resources by two or more organizations. Civil society coalitions identify policy gaps, propose specific solutions, adapt their proposals to the national context, and signal to decision-makers that there is domestic and broad-based support for change. We propose that pro-quota coalitions increase the likelihood that quotas are adopted.

Country-specific case studies point to the role of women's organizations in the adoption of gender quotas, but to our knowledge, the existing statistical cross-national research has not included them as an explanatory factor. Scholars using cross-national evidence find that international factors (such as pressure from established democracies and connections to the international women's movement) and having a post-conflict context influence the spread of reform (Anderson and Swiss, 2014; Bush, 2011; Cole, 2013; Hughes et al., 2016; Swiss and Fallon, Forthcoming). Yet, omitted in the empirical tests is the role of domestic women's organizations.

We examine pro-quota women's organizations systematically across countries. Drawing on secondary sources, newspaper accounts, and information from country experts, we compiled a dataset of pro-quota women's coalitions from 1989 to 2014 in 50 countries in Africa. By our count, 33 countries had a pro-quota coalition. Of those, 21 countries adopted quotas during our study period and twelve did not. It is also important to note that some countries without pro-quota coalitions (as we defined them), such as the Republic of Congo, adopted quotas.

Readers of an earlier version of our study asked us to examine what influences the emergence of coalitions. Perhaps the emergence of pro-quota coalitions is endogenous to foreign aid, connections to the international women's movement, and the post-conflict context. Using event history analysis, we find that dependence on foreign aid from democracies does not correlate with whether and when pro-quota coalitions form. Connections to the international women's movement does not correlate either. We do find that the emergence of coalitions has a positive correlation with whether a country recently emerged out of a major armed conflict as well as if the country is majority-Muslim. Whether
a country has a plurality electoral system has a negative correlation with the formation of coalitions, as does a measure of the number of politicized ethnic groups.

Controlling for the abovementioned factors, we find that having a pro-quota coalition nevertheless correlates with the adoption of gender quotas. Countries with coalitions are more likely to adopt quotas and likely to do so more quickly. In line with the studies cited above, there is a positive relationship with aid from democracies and connections to the international women's movement. Also consistent with the existing scholarship, quotas are slower to be adopted in countries that use majoritarian electoral systems. We find that there is a large substantive impact of having coalitions and a large substantive impact from having a post-conflict context.

In an earlier cross-national study of women's organizations and interest articulation, I hypothesized that civil society advocacy – by women's organizations and Catholic organizations – influence whether and when countries ratify international human rights treaties (Kang, 2014). I focus on who articulated demands for the ratification of the Maputo Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa (hereafter, Maputo Protocol). In 2003, the African Union adopted the Maputo Protocol. The regional treaty is arguably the most liberal international agreement concerning women's rights. For instance, it states that women have the right to a medical abortion if a woman's life is in danger and in cases of rape and incest.

To systematically study the ratification of the women's rights treaty, I tracked if and when countries ratified the Maputo Protocol from 2003 until 2010 for 47 countries. I developed a proxy measure of women's mobilization for the ratification of the Maputo Protocol using national newspapers and international wire reporting. To illustrate, in 2007, New Vision reported that Akina Mama wa Afrika talked about the ratification of the Maputo Protocol with a gender minister in Uganda. I coded 23 countries as having pro-Protocol activity by civil society, fifteen of which ratified the treaty. Recognizing that newspaper reporting does not capture the full picture, I use a second measure for women's organizations: whether women and men in a country belonged to Solidarity for African Women's Rights (SOAWR) or Women in Law and Development in Africa (WILDAF) in 2003. Twenty four African countries had a chapter in one or both of the pan-African organizations.

I find that countries where civil society actors advocated for the Protocol were faster to ratify the treaty than countries without them. Membership in SOAWR and WILDAF in 2003 also correlates significantly and positively with the ratification of the Maputo Protocol. Wealthier countries and countries receiving higher levels of foreign aid were not more likely or faster to ratify. Countries with higher levels of democracy were faster to ratify the treaty, as were countries with higher percentages of women in parliament.

In addition, I examined the role of anti-Protocol organizations. While I find that both pro- and anti-Protocol activists formed transnational networks and employed similar kinds of tactics (such as lobbying, consciousness-raising, and demonstrations), I do not find consistent evidence that the emergence of anti-Protocol activity correlates with whether or how quickly countries ratified the Protocol.

So far, I have described two works using cross-national time-series analyses. Together, they suggest that women's organizations play a significant role in representing women's interests in Africa.

II. Women's Organizations and Substantive Representation in Niger

Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, U.S. policymakers, the popular media, and scholars paid heightened attention to Muslim women's interests, often with a negative tone (Abu-Lughod, 2002). As a second-year graduate student, I was interested in the spread of policies promoting women's rights in Africa. In a statistical paper on Africa, I included a variable for whether a country was majority-Muslim and was surprised to see that quota adoption was positively correlated with having a Muslim-majority context. Despite the fervor in the U.S. over Muslim women's lives, few studies had been done to understand how and why women's interests are represented in predominantly Muslim countries in Africa.

My book examines the micropolitics of policymaking in the Republic of Niger and argues that women's organizations played a major role in articulating women's interests.
interests (Kang, 2015). State-run women’s organizations under military rule in the 1970s and 1980s and autonomous women’s organizations in the 1990s and 2000s helped put new issues on the national agenda. These issues included better child support for women, making it more difficult for men to unilaterally divorce their wives, the adoption of gender quota laws, having more women in the executive cabinet, and putting the country in line with international women’s rights law. If the issue was stalled, women’s organizations brought them back to life, persisting in their demands on behalf of women.

Through interviews with elected officials, ministers, bureaucrats, women’s and conservative religious activists, and representatives of international donors in Niger, I demonstrate that women’s organizations in predominantly Muslim countries such as Niger can and do influence policymaking, contrary to some of the conventional wisdom. But I also examined the rise and power of religious organizations that mobilized against some of the proposed reforms. Some religious organizations took a conservative stance on family law and international women’s rights law. In a context where the state has taken an ambiguous stance toward religion and relies on religious leaders for moral authority, the backlash against family law reform was effective. Nevertheless, women’s organizations made political claims and sought to collaborate with conservative religious groups in the name of women.

III. Broader Implications and Questions

Scholars of comparative politics seek to understand the context in which those in power respond to the needs of the powerless. Making sense of individual attitudes – of voters and of elected officials – has and will continue to be important in this endeavor. The scholarship on women, gender, and politics in Africa, however, points to a middle force. It is the same phenomenon that Gabriel Almond and his colleagues sought to compare upon the founding of contemporary comparative politics: collective action in the form of organized groups. Organizations provide a structure within which individuals see themselves as having shared interests, a common destiny. They often pursue political change, sometimes successfully and sometimes not.

Developing cross-sectional time-series measures of women’s organizations and their demands for issue-specific reform is not easy, or not easy from my experience. The data can be time-consuming to collect. Relying on English-language sources alone presents issues of bias, requiring researchers to collect data in multiple languages. No measure will be perfect. Nevertheless, I contend that it is important for the subfield and for scholars of women, gender, and politics to include the presence (or activity) of cleavage-based organizations. Without such measures of group-level behavior, we are hampered in our ability to test and develop theories of political representation.

Finally, women’s organizations do not work alone. To better understand who claims to represent the interests of segments of society, and whether those claims are effective, more theorizing and testing needs to be done on the role of opposing organizations, bridges (individuals who have one foot in the state and one foot in civil society organizations), and allies (bureaucratic, appointed, party, or elected officials who are not a member of the group). We need to test hypotheses about what happens when two groups clash over the same issue and the conditions in which officials become allies for women. Scholars of comparative women, gender, and politics will always need to study politicians but with an eye on the groups that put pressure on them.

References


What Women Want: Gender Gaps in Political Preferences

by Sarah Khan
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I. From Men's and Women's Preferences to Gender Gaps

Evidence from multiple countries in the developed world demonstrates that men and women hold systematically different political attitudes and policy preferences (Iversen and Rosenbluth, 2006), which may translate into substantive differences in partisan attachment and voting patterns (Corder and Wolbrecht, 2016; Inglehart and Norris, 2000).

There is relatively less work on the existence and origins of this gap in the context of the developing world and low-income countries (Gottlieb, Grossman and Robinson, Forthcoming). However, the studies that do exist suggest that gaps in men’s and women’s preferences indeed exist in the developing world, although they might be qualitatively different from those in the developed world. In a field experiment in Indonesia, where villages are randomly assigned to choose development projects, Olken (2010) finds that women are far more likely than men to prefer drinking water projects, and far less likely than men to prefer projects involving roads and bridges. Chattopadhyay and Duflo’s (2004) seminal study on the effects of village-level quotas for women in India reveals a similar pattern: women in West Bengal and Rajasthan are more likely than men to complain to their village representatives about issues related to water provision, and in Rajasthan, like

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in Indonesia, they are less likely than men to make requests related to roads. In Sub-Saharan Africa, Gottlieb, Grossman and Robinson (Forthcoming) find that women are more likely than men to prioritize drinking water and poverty alleviation schemes. Brule and Gaikwad (2017) find that women belonging to patrilineal tribes in Meghalaya, India are on average more supportive of public welfare schemes than men, and that unlike men, their support does not decrease when they are reminded of the personal financial burden of such schemes.

In most of the above-mentioned studies, the observed differences in men's and women's political preferences are referred to as a “gender gap” (Gottlieb, Grossman and Robinson, Forthcoming; Brule and Gaikwad, 2017) or as “gender-based differences” (Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004). What about these differences makes them ‘gender-based’ rather than simply differences between men and women? In her essay on what it means to study gender and the state, Htun (2005) proposes approaching gender as a “social position and attribute of social structures”, rather than an attribute of individuals; she identifies the “sexual division of labor” as one such social structure or institution. Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) engage with the idea that women’s higher preference for water is driven by the sexual division of labor: women in their study areas are primarily responsible for collecting drinking water for their households. Gottlieb, Grossman and Robinson (Forthcoming) posit the same, and find that while women’s individual-level employment does not significantly narrow the gap in prioritization of water, the gap narrows in places where the share of women in the labor force is higher. This suggests that it is perhaps the social norms of the sexual division of labor, rather than individual women’s situations, that shape the gap in public goods priorities. The former is likely to change only when a certain threshold of women begin to participate in the economy and incur a higher opportunity cost of water collection. Brule and Gaikwad (2017) take advantage of the coexistence of matrilineal and patrilineal tribes in Meghalaya, India to show that the gender gap in political economy preferences ceases to exist, and is in fact reversed, in matrilineal tribes where women are the traditional inheritors of assets. Importantly, the gap persists even when controlling for individual-level wealth in patrilineal tribes, demonstrating that the systematic difference between men’s and women’s preferences is driven not just by differences in their individual asset ownership, but also by the cultural norms that dictate the inheritance and ownership of such assets.

That the observed differences in preferences between men and women across these studies seem to be driven by attributes of social structures rather than the attributes of individual men and women is what makes them ‘gender-based differences.’ In the remainder of this essay, I discuss the content and origin of such differences, drawing on evidence from Pakistan.

II. Understanding Women’s Preference for Drinking Water

In a survey of 800 households in the Faisalabad district of Pakistan conducted in 2016, I find that drinking water is the most frequently named top priority for both men and women across a set of different public goods and services (Khan, 2017). However, as Figure 1 indicates, I also find that a significantly higher proportion of women name drinking water as their top priority.

On first glance, it may seem that these findings confirm those from Indonesia, India, and sub-Saharan Africa. However, there is an important distinction: women in this particular district of Pakistan are not primarily responsible for drinking water collection. In the survey sample, many of the households either have a piped water supply on the premises, or purchase potable water from door-to-door vendors. Among households that have to fetch water, only 22% report that a female household member is responsible for the task. In addition to asking respondents about who is responsible for water collection in their own households, I also ask them who they think performs the task of the water collection in the district as a whole: a majority of men (66%) and women (52%) agree that it is “mostly men.” Thus, it seems that water-collection is neither a task disproportionately performed by women, nor is it perceived to be a ‘woman’s job’ in this particular context.

How should we interpret the situation of the women in Faisalabad, who are more likely than men to prioritize access to drinking water, yet are not responsible for fetching this water, nor is it the norm that they should do so? Gottlieb, Grossman and Robinson (Forthcoming) note that “women who are constrained by traditional gender roles are more likely to prioritize access to clean water relative to other policy domains because norms prescribe fetching water as a role for women.” Should
we interpret women's apparent freedom from the task of water collection in this context as a sign of evolving gender roles?

To understand this puzzle, I interviewed multiple community-based mobilizers who have been involved in organizing women for donor-funded village development projects, similar to the ones in the Olken (2010) study. The interviewees reveal that women's groups tend to prefer projects centered on water provision, healthcare, and education. Why water? Because women are the ones who take care of children, and unclean water makes children sick. Waterborne diseases are a serious public health concern, and the most common one, diarrhea, is a major cause of under-five child mortality in the developing world.1

Traditional gender roles are alive and well: women perform the bulk of childcare in this context. Moreover, it is widely accepted that they are responsible for doing so: 80% of surveyed men and 88% of surveyed women agree that household chores are solely a woman's responsibility. This, coupled with the threat to children's health from unclean water, is an explanation for why women prioritize water provision at higher rates than men, even when they are not responsible for fetching the water.

It is also worth asking why women are not primarily responsible for collecting water in this setting, even though a majority of survey respondents see household chores as the exclusive domain of women. Among households that do not have access to drinking water on their premises in the Faisalabad district as a whole, women or girls are responsible for water collection only 24% of the time (Punjab Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2014 Final Report, 2016). However, this number looks very different for urban and rural areas within the district (17% and 51% respectively). The reason for this discrepancy lies in part with cultural norms regarding women's mobility and seclusion in Pakistan, which restrict women's ability to travel unaccompanied or without the permission of a male household member/relative (Jacoby and Mansuri, 2011; Mumtaz and Salway, 2005). The exact nature of these restrictions is “determined not so much by physical geography as by

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1 According to the Punjab Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2014 Final Report (2016), 16% of children in this particular district under the age of five had experienced an episode of diarrhea within the two weeks preceding the survey.

Note: Data are based on survey responses from 800 households in the Faisalabad district of Pakistan in 2016.
social geography” (Mumtaz, 2012). In practice, restrictions on women’s mobility may be relaxed for travel occurring within a hamlet or settlement (Jacoby and Mansuri, 2011) or within spaces populated by members of the same biradari\(^2\) (Mumtaz, 2012). For the purposes of water collection, traveling to a water source in a rural area is less likely to involve contact with non-biradari members than in urban settlements, which are populated by migrants from different villages and biradaris. The surveyed households are mostly located in peri-urban communities, where women are ostensibly less mobile due to the aforementioned norms and only a small proportion of them are permitted to travel unaccompanied to the nearest water source. In this particular setting, not being responsible for collecting water does not imply that women are less constrained by traditional gender roles, but rather that they are more constrained by gendered norms of mobility.

The observed gap in men’s and women’s preferences in this case is indeed driven by social structures and norms rather than just the individual attributes of men and women. However, a closer examination reveals that it is a different facet of the sexual division of labor (childcare, rather than the task of fetching water) and context-specific norms (restrictions on women’s mobility) that explain the gap.

### III. Stated Preferences vs. Interests

Thus far, I have used the phrase ‘women’s preferences’ simply to describe the stated preferences of women responding to survey questions. Can we use these stated preferences to make claims about women’s interests. In other words, if a sizable proportion of women state that they prefer a particular good/service/policy, is it appropriate to say that the provision of said good/service or implementation of said policy is in the ‘interest’ of those women?

Drawing such a conclusion may be problematic for a number of reasons. As Weldon (2011) notes, feminist theorists and scholars today generally reject the notion of “women’s shared identities or interests.” The crux of the feminist critique is that emphasizing a notion of a shared group identity and interests among women runs the risk of essentialism (Celis et al., 2014) and ignoring other forms of shared identity (sexual orientation, race, ethnicity, class) held by women that may make for vastly different experiences, concerns, and interests (Baldez, 2011).

Apart from the problems associated with aggregating individual preferences to define a collective interest, taking individual preferences to be indicative of individual interests also poses a number of issues. One such issue is that individuals may not have enough information to know what is in their objective interest. Mansbridge (1983, 2003) equates interests with ‘enlightened preferences’; that is, the preferences an individual would have if they had access to ‘all of the information.’ Another possibility is that individuals may adapt their preferences to ‘adjust to their possibilities.’ In other words, individuals in a state of oppression or deprivation may come to see their situation as inevitable and adopt preferences that perpetuate those conditions (Elster, 1982). Elster’s definition of adaptive preferences draws on the ‘sour grapes’ metaphor – a choice made by an individual because the alternative is seen as unattainable. Khader (2011) defines adaptive preferences slightly differently, as ones that are “inconsistent with basic flourishing that a person developed under conditions non-conducive to basic flourishing and that we expect [...] to change under conditions conducive to basic flourishing.”

An observationally equivalent division of labor may imply very different things about women’s actual situation – being free from the task of fetching water implies a modicum of empowerment for women in sub-Saharan Africa, but is indicative of restrictions on mobility for women in Pakistan.

The discrepancy between individual preferences and collective interests is empirically observable when we compare women’s responses to two different survey questions. The first asks respondents to rank a set of public goods and services, in the order of personal preference (see Figure 1). The second asks respondents to rank the same public goods and services in the order that they would “most improve the lives of women” (see Figure 2).

Notably, the proportion of women citing water as a top priority decreases by nearly half when the question

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\(^2\) Clan or kinship network.
is about improving women’s lives, rather than their personal preference (comparing women’s responses in Figures 1 and 2). Although roads are the second most frequently cited good when women are asked about their personal preferences, only 3% of women cite roads when asked about what would improve women’s lives. Drinking water, as previously discussed, is a good that directly affects children’s health. Given constraints on women’s mobility, roads are more frequently used by men. It appears then that when asked about their personal preferences, women seem to prioritize the goods and services that directly impact household members other than themselves. Sen (1990) notes a similar pattern in the context of India, and attributes it to the influence of a family-based identity:

In some contexts the family identity may exert such a strong influence on our perceptions that we may not find it easy to formulate any clear notion of our own individual welfare [...] It has often been observed that if a typical Indian rural woman was asked about her personal ‘welfare’, she would find the question unintelligible, and if she was able to reply, she might answer the question in terms of her reading of the welfare of her family.

However, when asked about goods and services that would improve women’s lives, women cite gas, education, and health much more frequently than when asked about their personal preferences. Education and health are both services with wide gender disparities in access all over Pakistan. The aforementioned norms of mobility mean that it is simply more difficult for women to travel to physical schools (Jacoby and Mansuri, 2011), health centers, and clinics (Mumtaz and Salway, 2005) to access these services on their own. The sexual division of labor means that women do the bulk of cooking in households – 60% of surveyed households use gas for cooking, while others have to rely on wood, charcoal, and in a small number of cases, animal dung. However, even among households that use gas, the shortage of gas means that it is only available at certain times due to scheduled gas ‘load-shedding.’ Interviews reveal that women often organize their own schedule according to when the gas supply will be available, frequently sacrificing sleep time to do cooking work at odd hours of

Note: Data are based on survey responses from 800 households in the Faisalabad district of Pakistan in 2016.

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the night. Moreover, a shortage of cooked meals due to the nonavailability of gas or cooking fuel is a reason for domestic disputes, and even physical domestic violence perpetrated against women. Thus, even though the availability of gas affects the entire household at some level, due to the strong norms of the sexual division of labor it affects women disproportionately.

Female survey respondents cite the goods and services that affect women disproportionately when asked about what would most improve women's lives. Though they do not prioritize these goods and services to the same extent when asked about personal preferences, it seems that they do share a notion of what goods/services are most conducive to women's welfare and interests.

Sen's (1990) assessment of the family as a strong influence on women's preferences may explain why women's personal preferences appear to reflect the goods and services that most directly affect family members (children and male household members) other than themselves. However, it is important to note that this differential influence on women is again a product of larger social forces. The same factors that influence the content of women's preferences also influence the processes by which these preferences are formed.

As part of this survey, I ask respondents to name a person with whom they regularly discuss matters of public goods and service provision. A summary of the responses are shown in Figure 3. Firstly, a majority of women are unable to name even one person. Among those who do, the most frequently named person is their spouse; less than 10% of women report discussing these issues with a female friend or family member, and hardly any report discussing them with male relatives or co-workers. This is very different from men's reported patterns of interaction. The most frequently named discussion partner for men is other men: either friends or relatives. Significantly fewer men name their spouse as a discussion partner compared to women; however, men are equally likely to name a female friend or relative. Unlike women, men also name their co-workers as discussion partners, which is unsurprising given the large disparity in employment rates between men and women in the sample. Women's stated personal preferences over public goods and services may be strongly influenced by family identity in part because their main interactions about these issues are with their spouse. The same norms of mobility that constrain women's access to healthcare and education also limit their social interactions to being mostly within the household. If women do not talk to other women about issues of community service provision any more than men do, it is unsurprising that they are no more likely to state a personal preference for the goods or services they perceive as being most conducive to women's collective interest.

IV. Towards a Gendered Analysis of Differences

If we are to take the 'gender' in gender gaps seriously, it requires going beyond individual attributes to explain observed differences in men's and women's political preferences. The concept of gender as an "attribute of social structures" (Htun, 2005) demands that we pay attention to these social structures in our characterization of differences between men and women as gender gaps. For a full explanation, however, we must also bring in context. The sexual division of labor may exist across contexts as a social structure and set of norms that informs men's and women's lived experiences and preferences, but it also interacts with other context-specific norms. An observationally equivalent division of labor may imply very different things about women's actual situation – being free from the task of fetching water implies a modicum of empowerment for women in sub-Saharan Africa, but is indicative of restrictions on mobility for women in Pakistan.

The gender gap in preferences extends not just to the content, but also the process by which preferences are formed. Social structures such as the household division of labor also shape women's interactions and the composition of their social and political networks. Paying attention to the conditions under which an individual's preferences are formed may give us a clue as to whether they are more or less likely to be aligned with her interests (Khader, 2011). Although the notion of women's collective interests is a contested one, the low levels of interaction among women beg the question: would women's personal preferences look different if they talked to other women about public goods and ser-

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3 A Pakistani legislator stated during a National Assembly session that gas load-shedding was leading to couples getting separated and an increased divorce rate ("Divorce in Pakistan on the rise due to gas loadshedding, MNA claims", DAWN, November 29, 2016)

4 Note that this is a different explanation from one that emphasizes the role of women's other-regarding preferences in leading them to prioritize other household members' needs over their own.
Figure 3: Regular Discussion Partner on Community Services, by Gender

Note: Data are based on survey responses from 800 households in the Faisalabad district of Pakistan in 2016. Respondents were asked to name a person with whom they regularly discuss matters of public goods and service provision.

venues? Would they look more like what women think women’s interests are, or something else altogether?

References


The Electoral Impact of Women's Suffrage: The Case of the Nineteenth Amendment

by Mona Morgan-Collins
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I. The Puzzle: Calculated Democratization Going Wrong?

A perennial debate in political science explores the origins of democracy. Why does the elite ever decide to democratize and when do politicians agree to extend the right to vote to a previously excluded group? The most prominent explanations in political science emphasize strategic calculations on the part of elites, who consider the economic and political consequences of the reforms (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000; Ansell and Samuels, 2014; Boix, 2003). But redistributive consequences are not the only thing that office-seeking politicians think about when it comes to suffrage extension. Previous research tells us that politicians who face high costs of intimidation support a secret vote as a way to maximize their chances for electoral survival (Mares, 2015), and that parties who expect to electorally benefit from suffrage extension support it (Przeworski, 2009; Teele, 2015). In the United States, Western politicians who were under greater electoral threat and believed to benefit from the reform enfranchised women earlier (Teele, 2015), while in Europe, Christian Democrats in the Catholic South sought to enfranchise women because they believed Christian Democrats were most likely to benefit from it (Przeworski, 2009).

Although strategic theories of democratization suggest that politicians consider the electoral impact of women’s suffrage, a long tradition in political science disputes that suffrage reforms have a sizable electoral impact. Enfranchising poor men in the United Kingdom and in Italy, for example, did not result in large electoral swings for parties associated with the poor (Berlin and Dewan, 2011; Larcinese, 2014). In the U.S., a typical text on the subject claims that women did not vote as a block and mostly disregards any possibility that women’s suffrage had a significant electoral impact (Clark and Clark, 2008, p.2; Duverger, 1955, p.122; Freeman, 2002, p.2; Lemons, 1973, p.112; Manza and Brooks, 1998; Skocpol, 1992, p.506; Andersen, 1996, p.153; Bagby, 1962, p.160; Kleppner, 1986, p.178). The most comprehensive empirical evidence on women’s early voting behavior to date also suggests that the gender-voting gap in presidential elections in the U.S. was fairly small after most women were enfranchised. Moreover, the gender gap did not have a uniform direction and varied across time and space (Corder and Wolbrecht, 2016).

II. Existing Explanations: Miscalculation or Successful Mitigation?

How can it be that politicians make calculated decisions based on the expected electoral impact of the reforms, yet there is not much evidence that suffrage reforms actually affected the electoral status quo?

In the case of women’s suffrage, the most commonly cited explanation suggests that politicians simply miscalculated the effects of the reform. Politicians’ expectations must have been unfounded, it is argued, their expectations never materialized and the reforms merely doubled the vote for each party (Kleppner, 1986, p.178; Andersen, 1996, p.153; McConaughy, 2013; Duverger, 1955, p.122). This “family-hypothesis”, however, is generally inconsistent with the fact that American women organized separately from men and endorsed distinct issues and agendas. The capacity of American women to organize was immense: women contributed to more...
than half of the signatures on the petition to Congress to abolish slavery and women’s organizations boasted over one million members across the nation by 1910 (Skocpol, 1992, pp.323-340; Banaszak, 1996, p.45). Moreover, as much as today, American women tended to care about different issues than men, such as education, maternity or prohibition, and, overall, tended to hold more progressive preferences than men (Anderson, 1996, pp.153-4; Cott, 1990, p.157; Harvey, 1998, p.11; Skocpol, 1992, p.2, 325; Goss, 2013, p.4, 2).

There is, however, another explanation for the puzzle. Maybe politicians did not miscalculate the electoral effects of suffrage; perhaps they successfully mitigated its impact by ‘switching colors’ just before the first election after suffrage. In a Downsian model of political competition, office-seeking parties and candidates adjust their programmatic positions in order to maximize votes. Vote-maximizing politicians specifically appeal to the new median voter, because whoever is closest to the median voter has the best chance to win the election. To the extent that voters are forward-looking and politicians can credibly adjust their positions, these mechanisms may produce a shift in public policies after suffrage that renders the new voters indifferent between parties and candidates. Rather than evaluating the platforms of two candidates, they sanction incumbents, particularly when these incumbents’ voting records are most distant from the preferences of the newly enfranchised groups. To the extent that the issues that matter to the newly enfranchised groups have supporters and opposition in all parties, and to the extent that newly enfranchised groups are not strongly partisan, suffrage reforms will shake up the electoral status at the local level.

In the first election after suffrage, newly enfranchised groups are, for the first time, able to evaluate incumbents. Yet these incumbents were not necessarily incentivized to respond to the newly enfranchised groups. Prior to suffrage extension, politicians do not have an incentive to develop a rapport with the excluded electorate, nor represent their preferences. If they do, they may risk punishment from the old electorate in case the reform does not pass. Because incumbents carry the load of their own past performance, incumbents’ ability to respond to the new voters in the first election after suffrage is more restricted than that of challengers. As a result, incumbents will suffer an electoral loss, particularly when these incumbents’ ideological positions are most distant from those of the newly enfranchised groups. If a politician has been actively opposing issues that matter to a newly enfranchised group, it is not easy to immediately ‘transform’ himself into an advocate of the group at the first election after suffrage extension. Besides, a shift in policies just before an election may be perceived as opportunistic, appear confusing, and may undermine the credibility of parties.

III. Third Explanation: Sanctioning of Incumbent Politicians and Incumbency Disadvantage

In my research, I emphasize the heterogeneous nature of the electoral impact of suffrage extension at the local level and provide a third explanation for the puzzle. While politicians and parties attempt to mitigate the electoral impact of the reforms, their ability to succeed in doing so is limited, at least initially. If newly enfranchised groups have a memory of the past performance of politicians or parties, incumbents will have a hard time to credibly adjust their positions after suffrage extension. As a result, newly enfranchised groups will not be indifferent between parties and candidates. Rather than evaluating the platforms of two candidates, they sanction incumbents, particularly when these incumbents’ voting records are most distant from the preferences of the newly enfranchised groups. To the extent that the issues that matter to the newly enfranchised groups have supporters and opposition in all parties, and to the extent that newly enfranchised groups are not strongly partisan, suffrage reforms will shake up the electoral status at the local level.
may underestimate the electoral impact of suffrage. The prevalent claim that newly enfranchised women in the U.S. did not vote as a block for a single party does not necessarily imply that women's suffrage had no electoral impact. If women sanctioned incumbent politicians, the electoral impact of suffrage cannot be easily captured at the state or national level, or in elections without an incumbent. Instead, it is best captured at the more local, individual level.

IV. What We Know about Newly Enfranchised Women in the United States

American women at the time of suffrage extension organized heavily on progressive issues that included causes such as prohibition and suffrage, but also addressed topics such as prostitution, abolition, food regulations, maternity, education, the minimum wage, and spousal military benefits (Andersen, 1996, pp.153-4; Cott, 1990, p.157; Harvey, 1998, p.11; Skocpol, 1992, p.2, 325; Goss, 2013, p.4, 27). After the Nineteenth Amendment, a newly established umbrella organization, the Women's Joint Congressional Committee, became central to the women's progressive lobby in Congress, mostly pursuing maternalist progressive legislation at the time of an otherwise conservative period (Andersen, 1996, p.154; Lemons, 1973, p.56; Wilson, 2007). Yet progressive politicians were in both major parties. Emily Blair, a future strategist in the Democratic party, rightly observed that the vote choice of women might be hard in the 1920 election, because progressive Republicans and liberal Democrats did not differ much (Andersen, 1996, p.110). Indeed, the two most important subjects for women before the Nineteenth Amendment – prohibition and suffrage (Goss, 2013, p.40) – had supporters and vehement opposition in both major parties.

Mobilizing all women for one party would not have been feasible (Andersen, 1996, p.149), but mobilizing women for or against individual politicians allowed organized women to exert substantive leverage over individual candidates (Harvey, 1998, pp.1-14; Andersen, 1996, p.149; Schuyler, 2006, p.220). The two largest women's organizations, the National American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA) and the Woman's Christian Temperance Union (WCTU), were both organized by Congressional districts and actively disseminated information about politicians' past performance to women in these politicians' districts (Banaszak, 1996, pp.134-5; Andersen, 1996, p.149; Schuyler, 2006, p.4, 45-74). Among the most famous targets were Senators James Wadsworth, John Weeks, and Frank Brandegee, all of whom had a troublesome voting record on the Seventeenth, Eighteenth, and Nineteenth Amendments (Lemons, 1973, pp.90-96; Andersen, 1996, pp.155-158). It may not be a coincidence that women's suffrage in the U.S. corresponds with a temporary decrease in the incumbency advantage from about 2.5% before suffrage to about 0.5% in 1920, and does not reach pre-suffrage levels until a decade later (Gelman and King, 1990).

If newly enfranchised groups sanction the most ideologically distant incumbents, studies that measure the electoral impact of suffrage at the state or national level may underestimate the electoral level may underestimate the electoral impact of suffrage. The prevalent claim that newly enfranchised women in the U.S. did not vote as a block for a single party does not necessarily imply that women's suffrage had no electoral impact.

Even where turnout was very low, such as in the South, party leaders feared the electoral revolt of women because, particularly under low turnout, organized women could operate as swing voters (Schuyler, 2006, pp.8-10). At the presidential level, President Harding, an otherwise pro-business oriented Republican, skillfully consulted women's organizations and attracted women with carefully designed broad social and 'dry' programs in the first election after the Nineteenth Amendment (Bagby, 1962, p.149; Freeman, 2002, p.24; Gustafson, 2001, p.191; Lemons, 1973, pp.87-9). Most importantly, contemporary sources often reported that, at the local level, women had demonstrated an impact on elections in which they could already vote (Wilson, 2007, p.4; Andersen, 1996, p.160, 170; Schuyler, 2006, pp.8-10; Cott, 1990, p.158). For example, the flagship journal of women's political activism, the Woman Citizen, published on 26 August 1922, reported:

...[Women] claim the credit of being largely responsible for the defeat of the machine in Pennsylvania and the nomination of Gifford Pinchot for governor. They were also active in Iowa, where colonel Brookhart, a progressive, if not radical, was nominated;

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in North Dakota where Senator McCumber lost nomination to Lynn J. Frazier, at one time non-partisan governor; and in Nebraska where R. B. Howell won the Republican nomination for the Senate. Mr. Howell is also a progressive and was originally an advocate of both prohibition and woman suffrage ... (quoted in Andersen, 1996, p. 157).

V. Applying a Difference-in-Differences Strategy to Unravel the Electoral Impact of Women’s Suffrage in the United States

Studying the electoral impact of suffrage reforms is difficult, mostly because of the lack of good, large-scale survey data. I therefore resort to a careful study of aggregate electoral results in the 34 states where women voted in the congressional election of 1920, that is in the first election after the adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment. To this end, in my dissertation research, I exploit the heterogeneity of the proportion of women across counties. If women sanctioned incumbents, the electoral impact of suffrage should be greater in counties with more women. This difference-in-differences strategy allows me to compare counties that received a higher ‘dosage’ of suffrage extension to counties with a lower dosage. Localities with more women were more exposed to the treatment and should therefore show a more profound change in incumbent support. The idea of using the ‘dosage’ of suffrage extension in examining the effects of suffrage reforms was first used by Berlin-ski and Dewan (2011) and is now a frequently applied technique (Carruthers and Wanamaker, 2015; Kroth, Larcinese and Wehner, 2016; Larcinese, 2014; Vernby, 2013).

Applying this less traditional difference-in-differences approach, I provide evidence for the ‘sanctioning’ mechanism that underlines the electoral impact of suffrage extension. Using evidence from the Nineteenth Amendment in the U.S., I find that incumbents were sanctioned after suffrage was extended to women, particularly when the incumbent’s voting record was most distant from the preferences of the newly enfranchised women. Incumbents performed worse in counties with the most eligible women. Moreover, these effects were strongest if the incumbents were least progressive, indicating that women sanctioned incumbents on their past voting record and punished incumbents with the most anti-progressive voting records in the previous Congress.

The most severe concern for this difference-in-differences estimation strategy is that the support for incumbents could be trending differently in counties with different exposure to the treatment. This is a standard concern of all difference-in-differences specifications. If the parallel trend assumption does not hold, these results would be biased and inconsistent. To this end, I apply several placebo tests and show that counties with more women were not trending differently before suffrage. In other words, incumbents were not performing worse or better in counties with more women prior to suffrage. Moreover, I show that incumbents performed worse in counties with more women only in states that were affected by the Nineteenth Amendment. In the same election of 1920, incumbents did not lose votes in counties with more women in states where women were not enfranchised. Further reassuring is the fact that women in Illinois punished incumbents in the congressional election in 1920, where they voted for the first time, but they did not punish the same party in the presidential election, where they already voted before the Nineteenth Amendment.

Substantively, my research challenges the most prevalent notions in the literature that American women either voted like their husbands or that parties completely mitigated the electoral impact of the suffrage extension.

A related caveat is that this difference-in-differences specification uncovers the gender-voting gap for incumbent support only to the extent that men did not strategically respond to suffrage. If, for example, men attempted to ‘negate’ women’s suffrage extension, this method would capture the overall impact of the reform, but would not necessarily uncover the gender gap. While, like in the case of the parallel trend assumption above, I cannot directly differentiate between these two explanations, I can exploit data from Chicago, where authorities kept voting records separately by sex and show that, for example, men did not increase their participation more in places with more women. This provides some reassurance that, at least in Chicago, men did not strategically mobilize to counter women’s votes.
VI. What Have We Learned and What Have We Yet to Learn?

A careful examination of the electoral impact of women’s enfranchisement in the U.S. helps to illuminate how preferences of newly enfranchised groups translate into their vote choice. It shows that not only did women hold distinct preferences, but that they also voted on them and sanctioned incumbent politicians. My research also points to the limitations of incumbents in mitigating the electoral impact of suffrage reforms. Shifting an ideological position after suffrage may go only so far; being an incumbent at the time of suffrage, is, in fact, a liability.

Substantively, my research challenges the most prevalent notions in the literature that American women either voted like their husbands or that parties completely mitigated the electoral impact of the suffrage extension. While strategic politicians decide to democratize when they expect to benefit from the reform, and while politicians subsequently shift their position to accommodate the new electorate, the enfranchised women were not fooled by politicians’ attempts to switch colors just before the election; they sanctioned the most incongruent incumbent politicians.

Future research should explore to what extent the findings from the U.S. are generalizable to other contexts. In most of Western Europe, for example, proportional systems placed emphasis on parties over individual candidates, multi-party systems allowed for greater differentiation between parties on issues that mattered to women, and women were often considered to hold more redistributive, but also more conservative, preferences than men. How did the extension of the suffrage to women impact electoral politics in these contexts?

References


Gender and Party Leadership: Existing Research and New Directions

by Diana Z. O’Brien
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For the first time in almost a century, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom held elections in the same year in 2017. It wasn’t just the timing that made these elections exceptional. Breaking with entrenched male political dominance, women played a key role in the campaigns in each country. Angela Merkel and Theresa May sought to retain their positions as heads of government in Germany and the United Kingdom. France saw a fierce far-right challenger in Marine Le Pen.

Merkel, May, and Le Pen are prominent examples of the growing number of female leaders in established democracies. Large and small political parties, in both government and opposition, and from across the ideological spectrum have all selected women for their top posts. This is a significant development because party leaders are the most important political figures in advanced parliamentary democracies. They are influential actors within their parties, and they shape their organizations’ vote-, office-, and policy-seeking aims. Importantly, the most prestigious government position available to the party when in office is typically reserved for the party leader, including the post of prime minister.

Women’s increased access to these positions is clearly an important development in women’s political equality. Despite the vital role played by party leaders, women’s inclusion in (and exclusion from) this post remains understudied in both the gender and politics and party politics literatures. In this essay, I address three questions related to gender and party leadership. First, when do women gain access to party leadership? Second, what institutional interventions can increase women’s inclusion in the post? Third, what are the consequences of the ascension of female party leaders for women’s descriptive, symbolic, and substantive representation?

In response to these questions, I outline both the existing scholarship and the work that remains to be done. Though we are clearly still at the onset of this field of study, the results demonstrate that party leadership is a fundamentally gendered institution that demands significant attention from both women and politics and party politics scholars alike.

I. Accessing the Party Leadership

Female party leaders are understudied in large part because women’s leadership is still viewed as anomalous. Political scientists assume that there are only a handful of high-profile women in these posts, and thus no way to systematically study gender and party leadership. Yet,

1 The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems is a “collaborative program of research among election study teams from around the world.” Participating countries include a common set of survey questions in their postelection studies. This data, as well as “voting, demographic, district and macro/electoral system variables,” are combined in a “single, free, public dataset for use in comparative study and cross-level analysis.” More information can be found at http://www.cses.org/.
there are a growing number of women in power. Using the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) as a data source, I identified the leaders of 162 parties from 26 OECD countries in elections between 1996 and 2015. Of the 404 total party-election observations, 72 (almost 20%) are female led. Nineteen countries have had at least one female-headed party during this era.

What explains women's access to party leadership? Intuitively, we might first turn to party ideology, as left-leaning parties have been at the forefront of advancing women's representation in advanced industrialized democracies. Indeed, greens far outpace all other party families on this front, with near parity in the selection of male and female leaders. Beyond green parties, however, the ideological dividing lines become less clear. In the CSES dataset, fully 43% of female-led parties are centrist or right-leaning organizations. The only parties that remain exclusively male led are ethnic and regional organizations. Otherwise, there are examples of women at the helm of center-right, nationalist, agrarian, and special issue parties. In fact, Merkel, May, and Le Pen each lead right parties, while some important left-leaning organizations – including the British Labour Party and German Social Democrats – have yet to break with their male-dominated status quo.

Large and small political parties, in both government and opposition, and from across the ideological spectrum have all selected women for their top posts. This is a significant development because party leaders are the most important political figures in advanced parliamentary democracies.

The failure of ideology alone to predict the selection of female party leaders suggests that comparative politics scholars must look for explanations beyond the factors that predict women's numeric representation more broadly. O'Brien (2015) points to the possibility that parties' political performances create distinct opportunity structures for male and female would-be leaders. When parties are performing well – that is, when they are in government or gaining seat share – they have few incentives to deviate from the male-dominated status quo. When parties are performing poorly, fewer strong male challengers emerge and there are greater incentives for the party to accept new and different types of leaders (particularly women). Looking at patterns in women's leadership across 71 political parties in eleven parliamentary democracies between 1965 and 2013, this work shows that women are most likely to first come to power in minor opposition parties and those that are losing seat share. This relationship holds even when accounting for factors like party ideology and the supply of women for the post.

Case study research further supports the notion that party performance creates distinct opportunity structures for male and female aspirants. Work from Canada shows that women come to power in minor parties (O’Neill and Stewart, 2009) and opposition parties that are unlikely to serve in government in the near future (Bashevkin, 2010). Indeed, Trimble and Arscott (2003, 77) assert that the most common pathway to power for Canadian female party leaders is to take control of “electorally decimated and moribund parties.” Focusing particular attention on Merkel and the United Kingdom’s Margaret Thatcher, Beckwith (2015) argues that women are more likely to become party leaders when the incumbent male leader is removed because of a scandal or major electoral loss, and the political climate is so uncertain that the strongest male challengers choose not to pursue the post.

II. Institutional Interventions that Increase Women’s Access to Power

That the most desirable leadership positions remain male dominated suggests that women are disadvantaged in their access to power. Female politicians are clearly playing by a different (and more difficult) set of rules when it comes to party leadership. These findings, in turn, raise questions about whether mechanisms exist that mitigate (or further exacerbate) these barriers to office.

Are there reforms that could bolster women’s presence in leadership posts? Efforts to increase women’s political representation increasingly focus on the adoption of gender quotas – positive discrimination policies that mandate the selection or election of female legislative candidates. More than 100 countries have some form of gender quota, and these policies have been described as the electoral reform of our generation. The

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1 Based on Comparative Manifestos Project party family classifications.
widespread diffusion of quotas raises the question of whether they affect women's subsequent access to more powerful posts.

O’Brien and Rickne (2016) ask whether quotas help or hinder women's selection to, and survival in, leadership posts within political organizations. On the one hand, there is reason to expect acceleration effects, with quotas increasing women's access to these posts. Quotas have been shown to increase the number of well-qualified women elected to office, for example, thus increasing the supply of prospective female leaders. They can also foster a more female-friendly legislative culture, enhance beliefs about women's capacity to govern, and incentivize female politicians' joint mobilization. On the other hand, there is reason to fear tradeoff effects. Some quota women report facing stigmatization and backlash, and quotas may erect barriers to women's organizing. This suggests that these policies may inhibit women's selection and reappointment to leadership positions.

To test for acceleration and tradeoff effects, O'Brien and Rickne exploit a natural experiment – a 50-50 quota imposed by the national board of the Swedish Social Democratic Party on 290 municipal branches. They find that quotas positively affect women's appointment to leadership posts, but do not influence their survival in office. Having established these baseline results, they further demonstrate that the quota bolstered the number and share of qualified prospective female leaders, which likely contributed to their accelerating force. Examining trends in parties from across established democracies, they offer preliminary evidence suggesting that these acceleration effects hold more broadly.

When properly implemented, quotas can bolster women's access to leadership posts. At the same time, quotas alone are insufficient to wholly eliminate gender inequalities. Women have yet to reach parity in their access to power even within local-level Swedish Social Democratic parties. Electoral affirmative action also fails to facilitate women's reappointment to these posts. This suggests that activists and politicians have more work to do in promoting women's access to power.

Just as practitioners must keep working on behalf of female (would be) leaders, comparative politics scholars must continue studying them. Questions remain both about women's access to leadership posts and also the conditions that facilitate their (re)appointment to office. No work to date, for example, has systematically considered the diffusion of female leadership within and across parties. In some cases, a woman's selection as party leader shatters the glass ceiling, and subsequent female leaders emerge both within the organization and in competing parties. In others, after the first female leader, parties revert to the male-dominated status quo. Yet, we cannot predict when and why these different responses arise. More research is also needed into the mechanisms that might bolster (or inhibit) women's access to power. Beyond quotas, future work should consider the effects of leadership selection processes, as different selectorates may be more or less responsive to selecting female leaders based on parties' electoral performances. Likewise, scholars should examine other party-level features that might allow women to gain power, including women's caucuses.

III. Consequences of Women's Access to Power

One growing body of scholarship addresses the causes of women's ascension to party leadership. A related and even less studied topic concerns the consequences of women's access to power. Although party leaders are the most prominent political figures in established democracies, little is known about the broader implications of women's presence in these posts, particularly with respect to women's representation. Party leaders, for example, influence their copartisans' career paths, which suggests that they may affect other women's presence in political posts (descriptive representation). Leaders are also the most visible members of their party, and as such likely affect citizens' attitudes about the political system and its leaders (symbolic representation). Finally, party leaders shape their parties' platforms, and so may influence their parties' policy positions, particularly related to women (substantive representation). The following subsections address each of these implications in turn.

**Descriptive Representation** Party leaders can affect all stages of their copartisans' career paths, from candidate recruitment to the allocation of high-profile political posts – including identifying a successor for the leadership role. The ways in which gender intersects with these dynamics has not been well studied and whether (and how) male and female leaders differ on this front largely remains an open question. At the same time, preliminary evidence suggests that the presence of a female leader affects women's descriptive representation
in both legislatures and cabinets.

Women’s presence as party leaders is expected to bolster women’s descriptive representation in legislatures for at least three related reasons. First, female leaders may actively recruit – and encourage the selection of – female candidates. Second, female leaders may make their parties friendlier to female aspirants and candidates. Third, role model effects may encourage female aspirants to run for office in female-led parties. Women’s presence on parties’ national executive committees does lead to women’s increased representation in parties’ parliamentary delegations (Kittilson, 2006). Female local party presidents are also more likely to select female candidates for office (Cheng and Tavits, 2011). Yet, it remains to be seen whether this relationship holds across place and time, as well as among different party families.

Despite the presence of high-profile female leaders in Europe and other advanced parliamentary democracies, existing work has neither examined whether the presence of leaders like Merkel or May influences men’s and women’s beliefs about women’s (political) abilities nor whether women’s presence in these posts affects voters’ trust in the political system.

What about more prestigious political positions? No work to date considers the relationship between female leaders and women’s access to powerful posts within legislatures (such as committee leadership). Likewise, when women are crowned as the heir apparent – and whether and whom female leaders identify as successors – has not been studied. Existing scholarship does examine the relationship between female leaders and women’s access to ministerial posts. Cross-national scholarship reveals no link (Krook and O’Brien, 2012). Region-specific research, in contrast, suggests that female and male leaders do have different incentives and constraints when appointing their cabinets, but these gendered motivations differ based on regime type.

Female presidents appoint more women to their cabinets than their male counterparts (Reyes-Housholder, 2016). The opposite relationship holds in parliamentary systems. The presence of a female prime minister or a female-led coalition party is associated with fewer female-held portfolios, particularly as compared to exclusively male-led left governments (O’Brien et al., 2015). Female leaders are also no more likely than their male counterparts to appoint women to high-prestige posts. These differences likely stem from the expectations and constraints placed on female leaders across the two different systems. Presidents have more control over cabinet composition, and female leaders have more women in their networks. Voters in presidential systems also expect female presidents to appoint women to their cabinets (Reyes-Housholder, 2016). Importantly, fixed term elections and term limits provide female presidents with greater freedom vis-à-vis ministerial appointments. Female leaders in parliamentary systems, in contrast, can be removed from their post at any time (through the loss of a confidence vote or their removal as party leader). They are thus incentivized to be more risk averse with their cabinet appointments and curry favor with male voters and elites. Nominating too many female ministers – or placing them in high-profile posts – can be interpreted as favoritism or identity politics.

Symbolic Representation The influence of female party leaders likely extends beyond elites to citizens. Party leaders are the most high profile politicians in parliamentary democracies. They represent the public face of the party and affect citizens’ decision to vote for (or against) the organization (Bittner, 2011; Stewart and Clarke, 1992). Arguably, the most visible characteristic of a party leader is his or her sex. This suggests that female party leaders may shape both citizens’ beliefs about women’s role in politics and also their perceptions of politics more broadly.

Women’s increased presence in legislatures enhances female citizens’ beliefs about their own capacity to govern (Alexander, 2012). Initial evidence from Latin America suggests that this effect extends to female presidents (Reyes-Housholder and Schwindt-Bayer, 2016). Despite the presence of high-profile female leaders in Europe and other advanced parliamentary democracies, existing work has neither examined whether the presence of leaders like Merkel or May influences men’s and women’s beliefs about women’s (political) abilities nor whether women’s presence in these posts affects voters’ trust in the political system. Beyond establishing the baseline effect, scholars should consider how the impact of female leaders differs based on respon-
dent sex, party membership, and political knowledge, as well as whether their influence can extend beyond national borders (for example, to citizens in other European states). If we do find effects, we need to consider whether these are enduring or ephemeral. More generally, the audience effects of party leaders clearly represent a rich avenue for future research. In particular, this is an area of study that will benefit from both survey and experimental data. Combining the two approaches will reveal both the presence of gendered effects and the mechanisms driving these results.

Substantive Representation One of the driving questions in women and politics scholarship concerns the descriptive-substantive link: does the presence of female politicians facilitate women's policy representation? This scholarship has focused almost exclusively on female legislators, despite the fact that in many countries parliamentarians have limited policy-making authority. There has been much less attention to female party leaders' efforts on this front. Yet, preliminary evidence suggests that female leaders do not behave like male parliamentarians. While women's presence in the parliamentary party shifts parties' agendas leftward, for example, female leaders do not affect their parties' ideological positions (Greene and O'Brien, 2016). Preliminary work on parties' efforts to represent women on their platforms likewise suggests that while female MPs might bolster representation, female leaders fail to do so (Bertelli and O'Brien, 2016).

More work is needed to establish whether there are policy areas in which systematic differences do emerge between male and female leaders. We should also further investigate the null findings to ensure that there are no differences between female leaders from left and right (or major and minor) parties. At the same time, activists and scholars should be prepared for the possibility that female leaders do not pursue markedly different policies than their male counterparts. Parties are unlikely to select leaders of either sex who would move their position too far from the status quo. And female leaders, because their position in office is more precarious, may be especially unlikely to challenge convention.

IV. Conclusions

German Chancellor Angela Merkel has been described not only as the de facto leader of the European Union, but also as the most powerful woman in the world. Merkel would have neither title were she not also the leader of the Christian Democratic Union, a position she has held since 2000. Her rise to power and long tenure in office, in turn, offer important lessons for women and politics scholars and party politics scholars alike.

Women and politics researchers recognize the significance of Merkel's leadership. At the same time, the existing scholarship has paid much more attention to female legislators than female party leaders. Indeed, we can better predict Merkel's election to the Bundestag then her rise to party leadership. Likewise, much more attention has been paid to the substantive and symbolic effects of female parliamentarians than female party leaders. The ascensions of Merkel and other women like her provide a set of topics for women and politics scholars to pursue, including questions concerning when women gain access to power, and the consequences of their leadership for women's descriptive, symbolic, and substantive representation.

Just as women and politics scholars are beginning to address questions of party leadership, party politics researchers must also incorporate a gendered lens into their work. Merkel's leadership, for example, has been greatly shaped by gendered norms and expectations. From her initial selection when the party was out of power following a corruption scandal, to the composition of her cabinet, her public image among citizens and elites, and even her long tenure in office, gender has meaningfully shaped Merkel's leadership. Indeed, her career clearly illustrates that the party leadership is itself a gendered institution. Those interested in political parties must take gender seriously, particularly as women's presence in leadership positions grows. Otherwise, we risk missing a pivotal piece of the puzzle of party leadership.

References

Gender quota laws constitute the most significant and most popular electoral reform of the past thirty years. These measures require that political parties nominate specified percentages of women to legislative office. First adopted by Argentina in 1991, quotas now exist in more than 80 countries worldwide, from advanced industrialized democracies such as France to post-conflict, semi-authoritarian states such as Rwanda. By April 2017, all Latin American countries save Guatemala and Venezuela had adopted quota laws.1 The global adoption of quotas, as well as their continuous reengineering to enhance effectiveness, signals the growing normative acceptance that women's political inclusion is fair and just. For comparative politics scholars, studying quotas’ adoption and implementation provides insight into the causes and consequences of electoral reform. When and why do political parties devolve power to certain social groups? How do these institutional rules transform candidate recruitment, legislative behavior, and policy outcomes? These questions are fundamentally about who accesses political power and with what results – questions at the heart of political science.

The robust and flourishing research agenda on quota laws addresses these questions, and in doing so underscores why gender remains central to the study of comparative politics. The most enduring political cleavage worldwide is between men and women, with men maintaining a near-monopoly on political authority (Beckwith, 2010). By studying the processes through which male dominance is maintained or eroded, scholars have revealed how gender blind accounts of party or elite behavior risk under-theorizing or under-explaining outcomes. For instance, parties run women in losing or unwinnable districts even when their qualifications match or exceed those of men (Ryan, Haslam and Kulich, 2010), suggesting that (usually male) party leaders do not objectively choose the best candidates. My own research has shown that these practices persist under quotas, as party leaders pursue minimal compliance with the law (Piscopo, 2016b).

1Venezuela’s National Electoral Chamber enforces a 50 percent candidate quota for women on electoral lists, but this initiative is not authorized by statute.
More broadly, my research examines how commitments to gender equality on the part of different political actors explain the evolution of quota laws, especially when such strengthening and diffusion processes would seem counterintuitive from a party-centered perspective. I examine how and when female politicians cooperate to strengthen quota laws and change parties’ candidate selection procedures, as well as the transformations that occur as more female politicians enter the legislature. In this brief piece, I begin with an overview of quotas’ adoption and implementation worldwide, followed by an explanation of why these processes occurred in Latin America. I close with a brief discussion of how women’s political inclusion has influenced policy change.

I. Gender Quotas Go Global

Increasing women’s presence in elected office has long been an international and national policy goal. The United Nations’ First World Conference on Women, held in Mexico City in 1975, highlighted women’s underrepresentation in political life and recommended positive action to correct this imbalance. This call would be repeated in numerous international, regional, and domestic fora over the next decades, in nearly every corner of the globe. Gender-balance in political decision-making currently informs numerous development indicators and objectives, including the gender equality targets set by the Millennium and Sustainable Development Goals. The normative arguments underlying these goals are that women’s political presence indicates their full citizenship in a given country, while their absence suggests that countries remain anti-modern or undemocratic.

Yet plenty of international norms do not become encoded in national laws nor enforced with rigor, making gender quota laws a notable exception. In 1995, women held 11.6 percent of seats in the world’s lower or unicameral chambers of parliament; by April 2017, this average had climbed to 23.3 percent (IPU, 2017). Scholars concur that quota laws are the driving force underlying this trend (Paxton and Hughes, 2015; Clayton, 2017). Quota laws have appeared in Western and Southern Europe (France, Belgium, Spain, Portugal, and Italy), but are most commonly adopted in developing, democratizing, and/or post-conflict countries in the Global South. The measures succeeded where politically-active women organized to demand greater representation, and party elites viewed quotas as instrumental, enhancing their modern image (Towns, 2012). Indeed, many first-generation quota laws contained significant loopholes or escape clauses, allowing party leaders to reap significant public relations benefits while nominating very few women in practice. This reality shaped the key finding from early waves of quota scholarship (Htun and Jones, 2002): gender quota laws would remain ineffective because party leaders could avoid implementing them.

Yet this conventional wisdom is no longer true. The vast majority of countries have reformed their first-generation quota laws, eliminating loopholes, raising thresholds from 20 or 30 percent to 40 or 50 percent, and tightening electoral management bodies’ ability to supervise implementation and penalize noncompliance. Nearly one-third of the world’s legislatures currently have over 30 percent women, and Bolivia and Rwanda have majority-female parliaments (IPU, 2017). In Latin America and in Africa, permanent laws mandating gender parity – rather than temporary measures allowing affirmative action – have become the new gold standard (Piscopo, 2016a; Bauer, 2012). Quotas and parity now govern elections not just at the national level, but also at the subnational levels. From Mexico to Niger, political parties cannot ignore the quota, as electoral institutions or constitutional courts will prevent non-compliant parties from entering the election (Piscopo, 2017a; Kang, 2013).

Quotas have also jumped from the legislature to other government branches and to the public and private sector. For example, Bolivia and Ecuador apply gender parity rules to the legislative, judicial, and executive branches at all levels. Colombia and Niger have gender quotas for the public administration. The U.S. state of Iowa now requires gender balance on public boards and commissions at all levels of state government. Eleven Western European countries have passed quotas for corporate boards since 2004, and women currently hold over 20 percent of corporate board seats in Iceland and France and over 40 percent of the seats in Norway (Piscopo and Muntean, Forthcoming). In 2011, Costa Rica passed a law mandating gender parity for the boards of civil society organizations. Like other quotas, this measure incorporates women into traditionally male-dominated organizations, including labor unions, sports federations, and business associations such as the chamber of commerce – but it also brings...
men into traditionally female-dominated organizations, namely charities providing social services. Quotas for public administration, state boards, and civil society organizations are multi-sectoral initiatives that challenge perceptions not just of stereotypically masculine policy domains, but also of stereotypically feminine domains.

II. Explaining Quotas’ Evolution

That mostly male parliamentarians voted for weak or hollow laws explains quotas’ initial adoption, but not their evolution into stronger and more far-reaching laws. Party elites’ decisions to reform quotas seems counterintuitive, as voting to strengthen or expand quotas essentially guarantees that some of these same male elites will lose their seats not just in the legislature, but in other posts in the executive, the public administration, and the private sector. While single case studies reveal that certain national-level quota laws remain ineffective despite retooling, as in the case of Brazil (Wylie and dos Santos, 2016), a more global view indicates that quotas in fact redistribute power across the public and private sectors.

My research explains this outcome by focusing not on parties’ decision-making in the legislature, but on the role of the state. I argue that quotas’ evolution signals the transformation of passive states into activist states, ones increasingly willing to use coercive measures to bring about women’s inclusion (Franceschet and Piscopo, 2013; Piscopo, 2015). Whereas classically liberal states support gender equality by using antidiscrimination laws to punish exclusion after it occurs, activist states now proactively prevent exclusion by requiring the incorporation of women at the outset.

Focusing on the state draws attention to the oft-overlooked role of constitutional courts and electoral management bodies. In Latin America, electoral management bodies (usually called electoral institutions, chambers, or tribunals) enjoy significant regulatory powers over elections, controlling everything from parties’ campaign expenditures to media access (Van Biezen and Kopecký, 2007; Harbers and Ingram, 2015). Electoral institutions’ decisions and rulings have the force of law; electoral officials are often called ‘magistrates,’ with the country’s constitutional or supreme court typically serving as the immediate court of appeal and thus the ultimate arbiter. My research traces how quota reforms usually arrive in Congress following key court cases. Throughout Latin America, cross-party ‘quota networks’ of female politicians have worked strategically with electoral institutions and high courts to obtain rulings that back the constitutionality of quotas, both in general and in terms of their specific requirements (Piscopo, 2015, 2016a,b, 2017a). Party leaders thus vote for stronger quota reforms because autonomous state institutions essentially force their hands.

Several variables come together to make these regulatory and judicial processes work. First, not all gender equality policies break along party lines in the same way. Right-wing and left-wing women continue to have profound disagreements about abortion, for instance, but often agree on gender quotas, because affirmative action laws apply to all parties equally – and therefore benefit women irrespective of party ideology. My interviews with female legislators in Argentina and Mexico indicate that conservative women join quota networks later than feminist women, but they become the most ardent quota supporters once they do. Right-leaning parties often resist quotas on grounds that affirmative action undercuts merit in candidate selection. The women within these parties stop accepting this argument once they realize that, despite their qualifications and preparedness, they face the same discrimination as their female peers in left-leaning parties. These hurdles include nominations to losing districts and placement in the lowest-ranked ballot positions that nonetheless comply with the quota. In fact, in separate research examining women’s nomination and election across 168 parties in Latin America, my coauthors and I have shown that left-leaning parties do no better at promoting women than right-leaning parties, even when controlling for different quota rules (Funk, Hinojosa and Piscopo, Forthcoming).

Second, quota networks cultivate personal relationships with electoral regulators and judges, who have their own incentives to support quotas. The autonomy and capacity of electoral management bodies varies widely across Latin America, but I argue that autonomy and capacity vary within these institutions as well. Even strong institutions like Mexico’s National Electoral Institute may struggle to rein in parties’ more cor-

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4For example, in Mexico, the electoral management body is split into two institutions, a regulatory body (the National Electoral Institute) and an electoral court (The Supreme Electoral Tribunal). The electoral court is an autonomous branch of the federal judiciary, and its decisions are final.
rupt practices, such as distributing prepaid debit cards to voters. Supporting and enforcing quotas thus be-
comes a ‘win’ that electoral officials can achieve. Reg-
ulators and judges see quota reforms as an opportunity
to burnish their institutions’ reputation both domesti-
cally and internationally, and they support their deci-
sions by appealing to constitutional principles of gender
equality and legal measures to promote equal opportu-
nity (nearly every Latin American constitution incorpo-
rates an equal rights clause, and nearly every country
has a general law for women’s equality). The develop-
ment of the jurisprudence surrounding gender quotas
has been termed by its authors as “electoral justice with
a gender perspective” (Alanís Figueroa, 2013).

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hands.

For example, quota networks in Mexico achieved
a landmark ruling that required political parties to re-
spect the then-40 percent quota without exception. This
decision eliminated several famous loopholes, includ-
ing the provision that parties could avoid the quota if
using internal primaries to select candidates for the
single-member districts. Another ruling eliminated
the law’s 2-in-5 placement mandate for women’s names
on the proportional representation lists, determining
that alternation was required. The political parties had
steadfastly refused these reforms when introduced in
congress. However, following the electoral court’s rul-
ing, the Mexican Congress voted to incorporate gender
parity for national and subnational elections into the
2014 constitution. The subsequent electoral code con-
tained no loopholes, mandated alternation for PR lists,
and stipulated that parties could not assign women ‘ex-
clusively’ to losing SMDs (Piscopo, 2016b, 2017a).

In Costa Rica, the electoral tribunal likewise pushed
for alternation on PR lists even when the country’s quota

III. The Effects of Women’s Inclusion

Gender quotas clearly matter as mechanisms that sig-
nal states’ commitments to women’s inclusion on the
grounds of modernity, fairness, and justice. Yet do quo-
tas have an impact beyond their normative effects? A
significant body of comparative politics literature ex-
plores the question of women’s substantive representa-
tion – that is, whether female legislators indeed change
policies in ways that benefit female citizens. Though
some scholars argue that party identity explains sup-
port for women’s rights and feminist policies more than
gender (Htun and Power, 2006; Frederick, 2009), many
others have demonstrated that gender shapes female
legislators’ policy advocacy. Across the globe, female
legislators have collaborated to improve laws on domes-
tic violence and sexual assault, distribute social benefits
in gender-sensitive ways, and improve women’s access
to maternity leave and child care. The adoption of gen-
der quotas, then, should make women’s substantive rep-
resentation even more likely.

My research from Latin America supports this
proposition. In both Argentina and Mexico, female
legislators wrote more bills focused on women’s in-
terests than male legislators, and the total number of
women’s interests bills increased as women entered the
congresses in greater numbers (Franceschet and Pisco-
po, 2008; Piscopo, 2014). These patterns persist even
when controlling for party identification. In Mexico,
for instance, female legislators from the conservative
party introduced fewer women’s rights initiatives than
women from the left party – but conservative women in-
troduced more bills promoting women’s rights than bills
restricting women rights, and they did so at higher rates
than conservative men (Piscopo, 2014, p.102). Conserv-
ative women may therefore hold positions to the left of
their male copartisans, and may find common ground
with their centrist or progressive colleagues on certain

http://comparativenewsletter.com/ contact@comparativenewsletter.com
issues. Looking again at the Mexican case, I found that female deputies came together not just on strengthening and expanding quotas, but on improving protections for sexual violence, introducing gender-responsive budgeting, and creating a bicameral commission on gender equality.

As the most popular electoral reform of the past few decades, gender quotas have far-reaching consequences. The expansion of quotas to arenas beyond the legislature has reconstituted the distribution of power in the public and private sectors, opening an enormous array of questions about the causes and consequences of women’s inclusion. Studying quota laws’ adoption and implementation has already called scholars’ attention to previously under-theorized aspects of political change, namely, the role of the state in binding party actors to devolving power and the role of gender in building policy advocacy networks across partisan and ideological divides. Future work will surely build on these theories, exploring how, why, and when women in the public and the private sector transform institutional practices and outputs.

References

Despite advances towards equality, women continue to have lower economic, social, and political status than men. These longstanding injustices work against democratic aspirations for equal citizenship rights, and many believe that one way to enhance gender equality is to elect more women to positions of power. Modern democracies will then better approximate their ideals.\(^1\) Compelling studies back this expectation. Evidence from the U.S., Europe, Asia, and Latin America demonstrates that female politicians are more likely than their male counterparts to act on behalf of women citizens, thereby improving their historically marginalized status (Carroll, 2001; Wängnerud, 2000; Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004; Franceschet and Piscopo, 2008; Schwindt-Bayer, 2010). Yet women’s impact clearly varies. The pressing question no longer is simply whether female politicians – to a greater degree than their male counterparts – act on behalf of women citizens. A more relevant inquiry also explores the conditions under which this is true. This research therefore requires comparing men and women politicians (inter-gender comparisons) as well as among women politicians (intra-gender comparisons).

I. Women and Presidential Power in Latin America

Fortunately for scholars of gender and the executive branch, variation in our independent variable of interest – the sex of chief executives – is increasing. The trend may not be monotonic as the latest reports suggest the numbers of female leaders worldwide have stagnated (Geiger and Kent, 2017). Yet, in the long run, women will probably continue to access executive power as the supply of women with national-level experience in politics expands: the percent of women in legislatures and executive cabinets steadily continues to climb (Thames and Williams, 2013).

It often surprises people that a region known for machismo is leading the world in terms of electing female presidents. About half of all female presidents are from Latin America. From 2006-14, women won the presidency seven times – twice in Chile, twice in Argentina, twice in Brazil and once in Costa Rica. Other women recently have come very close to winning. For example, Keiko Fujimori in Peru finished runner-up not once but twice in recent consecutive elections, losing by about three percentage points in 2011 and less than half a percentage point in 2016.

\(^1\)There are many arguments for increasing women’s presence in office – including a fairness principle (Phillips, 1995). Why should half the population enjoy just 10% of leadership positions? Still, one of the most common arguments is that women politicians will use their power to improve the historically marginalized status of women citizens.
These recent victories appear concentrated in the Southern Cone, but more sweeping trends toward greater participation and relative electoral success suggest that women will win the presidency in other countries as well. As of March 2017, fourteen of the region’s eighteen countries have had at least one viable female presidential candidate (defined as having obtained at least 15% of the first-round vote) (Reyes-Housholder and Thomas, Forthcoming).

The emergence of female presidents in Latin America challenges dominant theories about female chief executives worldwide. The conventional wisdom argues that women become leaders in countries experiencing a regime transition or in countries with weak executive powers (Jalalzai, 2013). Explanations for presidentas’ emergence instead point to the region’s left turn and incumbent party status (Reyes-Housholder and Thomas, Forthcoming).

How could the rise of female presidents potentially transform the status of women in Latin America? Presidents in this region possess expansive appointment and legislative prerogatives. Presidents can hire and fire their ministers as they please, as Congress generally holds no sway over cabinet picks. Latin American presidents – unlike their counterparts in the U.S. – are also their countries’ premier legislators. They tend to initiate more bills than Congress and are more effective in passing legislation (Siavelis, 2000; Melo and Pereira, 2013). Presidents – sometimes with just a stroke of a pen – can have a direct and enduring impact on the lives of millions of women and their families. Women at the helm of Latin America’s highly presidentialist democracies are uniquely positioned to improve the historically disadvantaged status of women citizens.

II. Assessing the Conditional Impact of Female Presidents in Latin America

What do we know so far about the pro-women consequences of female presidents in Latin America? In a recent study, I used quantitative methods to estimate the effect of presidents’ sex on the likelihood of appointing a female minister during the 1999-2015 period (Reyes-Housholder, 2016a). Female presidents tend to name more women to their cabinets than their male counterparts, but the relationship is not the strongest \( p < 0.10 \).

Female presidents appear constrained in part by the supply of female ministerial candidates. The relationship between presidents’ and ministers’ sex is more robust when we look just at inaugural cabinets or stereotypically feminine ministries, such as education and health.2 The takeaway here is familiar to scholars of representation and gender. Overall, female presidents are making a significant, but relatively modest, impact.

What about legislative power? Michelle Bachelet of Chile stands out as the region’s paradigmatic example of a female president promoting a pro-women agenda, featuring more preschools, social security reforms, and easier access to contraception (Staab and Waylen, 2016). Although Bachelet is known for her stereotypically feminine, horizontal leadership style (Thomas, 2011), her use of power to push some of this legislation through Congress is better characterized as aggressive, a more stereotypically masculine trait (Reyes-Housholder, 2016b).

Other recently elected female presidents – Cristina Fernández de Kirchner in Argentina, Laura Chinchilla in Costa Rica, and Dilma Rousseff in Brazil – seem to have pushed for fewer and less ambitious pro-women reforms. The use of power by female presidents to advance pro-women policies therefore seems to vary. However, this research to date largely consists of single case studies, most of which have yet to explicitly and systematically compare these female presidents to their male predecessors.

My ongoing research seeks to improve these assessments by conducting both intra-gender (Bachelet vs. Rousseff) and inter-gender comparisons (Bachelet and Rousseff vs. their copartisan male predecessors). The Bachelet and Rousseff cases are interesting because of

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2Naming more women to ‘feminine’ ministries may reinforce, rather than challenge, traditional gender stereotypes, potentially muting the overall pro-women impact.
their similar situations. Unlike other female presidents in the region, Bachelet and Rousseff were single mothers. Both pioneered women’s presence in cabinets by leading stereotypically masculine ministries such as defense and energy, and neither had won political office before running for president. Hailing from the center-left, both managed ideologically diverse multi-party coalitions and succeeded popular copartisan male presidents. They also governed countries where female legislators at the national level comprised a small minority, less than 15% of the upper and lower chambers.

In addition to systematically comparing ‘most similar’ female presidents with their male predecessors, there are other ways to improve our assessments of the impact of female presidents. Existing studies generally rely on elite interviews (Jalalzai, 2016; Jalalzai and dos Santos, 2015). Although this approach has helped build basic knowledge, analysis from elite interviews will tend to overestimate female presidents’ contributions to pro-women change. Officials from previous administrations may have an interest in exaggerating the merits of their former boss’s legacy. This becomes especially problematic as many perceive higher expectations for the pro-women policy legacy of first woman presidents than their male counterparts. Past officials whose boss was a male president will not feel as much need to defend their former boss’s pro-women legacy.

A better approach to assessing the pro-women legislative impact of female presidents – and one frequently found in studies of female legislators – is to employ archives from countries’ congressional libraries. These tend to more accurately document presidents’ legislative decision-making. Effectively searching these online archives requires assistance from congressional librarians responsible for maintaining and updating them. Brazil’s publicly available archives are missing legislation (something you would only find out if you asked). Congressional librarians in Brasília have full access to archives and are willing to search for legislation for members of the public.

My analysis of original databases of presidents’ pro-women decision-making for Chile and Brazil both confirm used her bill initiation and urgency powers to a statistically greater degree than her male predecessor to advance pro-women legislation while Rousseff did not. This is not to say that Rousseff advanced no pro-women reforms. She did, but not to a greater degree than her copartisan male predecessor. Rousseff’s null impact on pro-women policies challenges existing studies, which as mentioned above, primarily rely on evidence from elite interviews (Jalalzai and dos Santos, 2015). Presidents’ gender mattered in Chile, but not Brazil.

III. Theorizing the Conditional Impact of Female Presidents in Latin America

Why did Bachelet legislate on behalf of women to a greater degree than her male predecessor while Rousseff did not? No overarching theory on the conditional impact of female presidents has yet emerged. Single case studies on female chief executives worldwide, including Latin America, tend to point to personal idiosyncrasies (i.e. feminist consciousness and individual backgrounds) or country-specific factors (progressive/traditional parties and cultures).

One way to improve theorization starts with laying out why any president – male or female – would promote pro-women policies. Presidents will push for reforms in a specific area if (i) they believe their core constituencies demand it (incentives); and (ii) they have the political and technical information, provided by their advisors, related to that policy domain (capacity). This final discussion will show how theorizing on these incentives and capacities generates both inter-gender and intra-gender expectations for the use of power to advance reforms favoring women.

To begin, presidents’ core constituencies and networks of advisors usually crystallize during campaigns. Because of their perceived advantage with women voters, female candidates are more likely to try to mobilize a core constituency of women on the basis of gender identity. They attempt this by meeting with groups of women voters, evoking shared gender identities and promising pro-women change on the campaign trail. If female presidents successfully mobilize women in this way, they are more likely to legislate on behalf of women firms and challenges existing evaluations. Bachelet used her bill initiation and urgency powers to a statistically greater degree than her male predecessor to advance pro-women legislation while Rousseff did not. This is not to say that Rousseff advanced no pro-women reforms. She did, but not to a greater degree than her copartisan male predecessor. Rousseff’s null impact on pro-women policies challenges existing studies, which as mentioned above, primarily rely on evidence from elite interviews (Jalalzai and dos Santos, 2015). Presidents’ gender mattered in Chile, but not Brazil.

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Female presidents are also more likely to network with elite feminists, central players in almost any story of pro-women policymaking. Preferring to elect more women to office, elite feminists are more likely to enter the inner circles of viable female candidates (future female presidents) than those of male contenders. These feminists possess specialized political and technical knowledge about legislation that ameliorates women’s historical marginalization. Any president would need this kind of expert information to legislate effectively and frequently on these kinds of issues.

This generates inter-gender and intra-gender theoretical expectations. Compared to their male counterparts, female presidents have a greater propensity for mobilizing women on the basis of gender identity and networking with elite feminists. This is why, ceteris paribus, female presidents should be more likely than their male counterparts to advance pro-women reforms.

What is the catch? Why do some female presidents do this more than their male counterparts while other female presidents do not? Not all female presidents successfully mobilize a core constituency on the basis of gender identity and not all network extensively with other female politicians or elite feminists. The intra-gender expectation is that only female presidents who do both are most likely to significantly deploy their power to advance pro-women legislation.

The first presidential campaigns and administrations of Bachelet and Rousseff exemplify this kind of intra-gender divergence. Both sought to mobilize a core constituency of women by evoking shared identities and promising pro-women change. Only Bachelet succeeded in this, as Rousseff mobilized virtually the same groups that her predecessor had in the previous election. Moreover, Bachelet assigned many elite feminists to top posts in her campaign and then her administration. Rousseff did not.

Bachelet promoted so much pro-women legislation not just because she might be a feminist (a label she rarely uses to describe herself). She did so because she had both bottom-up constituency incentives and top-down expertise provided by elite feminists in her inner circle.

To sum up, there are strong theoretical reasons to expect female presidents in the long run will push for more pro-women policies than their male counterparts. But, as the Bachelet and Rousseff cases illustrate, there is no guarantee that they will.

The emergence of female chief executives worldwide is an exciting phenomenon, but the direct benefits for women citizens appear contingent on their motivations and abilities to pursue pro-women change. This piece has suggested that theorizing the gendered mechanics of constituency formation in campaigns illuminates novel reasons why women presidents in Latin America (sometimes) act on behalf of women.

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**Researching Gender and Women in Muslim Contexts: Beyond Orientalism?**

by Rochelle Terman

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Research on women and gender in the Muslim world has exploded in the last few decades. The field is highly interdisciplinary, represented largely by anthropologists, historians, and area studies scholars. Despite their diversity in methodological and substantive focus, one overarching concern binds these scholars together: the desire to critique Orientalism and unsettle its portrayal of the oppressed Muslim woman. This goal has motivated a rich body of scholarship containing a number of theoretical innovations, including an emphasis on heterogeneity and change in Muslim societies, a fuller exploration of women’s agency, and an investigation into the transnational processes that shape gender relations in the Muslim world.

Thus far, political science has been largely absent from this conversation. Comparative politics research on gender in the Muslim world is sparse, reflecting a deeper neglect of the study of gender in the discipline as a whole. Of the material that has been published in political science journals, much of it is analytically divorced from the more critical literature centered on Orientalism. This is unfortunate because, as I will argue in this essay, not only will comparativists benefit from a fuller engagement with the critical literature, but the reverse is true as well. Comparativists are uniquely qualified to contribute to our understanding of gender in Muslim contexts in ways that have thus far gone unfulfilled by other approaches and would benefit the field as a whole.

The purpose of this essay is not to conduct a comprehensive review of the literature on women in the Muslim world, a task that has been deftly achieved by other scholars. Rather, I focus on a facet of this research oriented towards the critique of Orientalism – what I refer to as the ‘critical literature’ – and the ways in which comparativists can productively engage this critique as they embark on empirical research. I first explain what motivated scholars to challenge Orientalism in the study of gender and women in Muslim contexts. I then describe three theoretical innovations emanating from this critique and their relevance to comparative politics. I close by enumerating some of the limitations to the critical approach to gender in Muslim contexts and how comparativists can contribute to the field by providing much needed empirical analysis.

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1. The Challenge to Orientalism and its Legacy

If one theme anchors the interdisciplinary literature on women and gender in Muslim contexts, it is a critique of Orientalism and its legacy. Most people associate the term Orientalism with Edward Said, who used it to describe historical representations of the ‘Orient’ (in-

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1 The author thanks Lisa Blaydes, Terry Johnson, and Mona Tajali for their suggestions and comments on this essay.

2 When discussing women in Muslim societies, issues surrounding geography, labels, and conceptual boundaries present significant difficulties. Even the seemingly benign phrase ‘Muslim women’ is fraught with analytic problems; we rarely use the comparable phrase ‘Christian women’ to refer to all women living in Christian-majority nations from France to Uganda. And yet ‘Muslim women’ is often used to designate women in Muslim-majority nations regardless of their personal faith. While acknowledging the manifold complexity surrounding these questions, this essay is primarily concerned with research addressing women and gender relations in Muslim societies, however the researcher defines that space.

3 For an excellent review of the political science literature on this topic, see Jamal and Langohr’s (2014) contribution in the *Encyclopedia of Women & Islamic Cultures*. Entries covering sociology and anthropology in that volume may be of interest as well. See also Charrad (2001) for a helpful review of Middle Eastern women’s studies.

http://comparativenewsletter.com/  contact@comparativenewsletter.com
cluding the Middle East and broader Muslim world) in European scholarly, political, and cultural circles (Said, 1979). These representations were grounded in essentialist and binary categories separating the ‘West’ (modern, rational, emancipatory) from the ‘East’ (tradition-bound, irrational, oppressive.) Thus Orientalism not only structured knowledge about the Middle East but also constructed the ‘West’ as culturally and politically superior, thereby legitimizing and facilitating European domination over those regions.

While some may see Islam’s immense diversity as a foil to parsimony, I see it as an opportunity, especially for comparativists who are eminently qualified to explore these kinds of variations.

While Orientalism did not devote extensive attention to gender, scholars have since unearthed the gendered dimensions of Orientalist discourse (Abu-Lughod, 2001; Yegenoglu, 1998). Key to Orientalist thinking, these scholars argue, is the trope of the passive, oppressed Muslim woman who is subjugated by her native patriarchal culture. A great deal of historical work demonstrates the centrality of gender in imperial projects, where women’s oppression was used to justify, legitimize, and sustain colonial rule (Ahmed, 1992; Al-loula, 1986; Chatterjee, 1989; Lazreg, 1994). Crucially, women’s subjugation was seen as inextricably tied to other pathologies plaguing the region, including economic underdevelopment, political dysfunction, and cultural backwardness.

The interest in gendered Orientalism burgeoned following 9/11, when scholars observed similar logics being reenacted in the War on Terror. The purported need to ‘save’ Afghani and Iraqi women via military intervention demonstrated the continued resonance of Orientalist thinking in the policy sphere. Even as popular enthusiasm for these wars dwindled, public discourse surrounding Islam continues to render the Muslim woman as oppressed, Muslim men as misogynists, and Islam as fundamentally (and incomparably) patriarchal. These portrayals often circulate in tandem with anti-Muslim bigotry, as well as support for policies that harm Muslims at home and abroad (Terman, Forthcoming). Insofar as gendered Orientalism has become especially dangerous in recent years, the need to challenge it has assumed an urgency that is unlikely to dissipate anytime soon.

In their attempt to unsettle Orientalist stereotypes, scholars from a variety of disciplines have produced an extensive literature on gender and women in Muslim societies. Most of these works seek to challenge the dominant assumption that Islam constitutes the root cause of women’s oppression, and to recover the complex realities of gender relations in Muslim contexts. These efforts have resulted in a number of theoretical innovations, of which I focus on three: (i) an emphasis on diversity and change in the development and interpretation of Islamic traditions, (ii) a fuller exploration of women’s agency, and (iii) an investigation into the transnational and geopolitical processes that shape gender relations in the Muslim world.

II. Diversity in ‘Islamic Cultures’

The critical literature is fundamentally skeptical of a monolithic ‘Islam’ or ‘Islamic culture’ that uniformly oppresses women across time and space. This skepticism has several components. First, scholars challenge the ahistorical perspective that views Islam as a set of dogmatic legal injunctions that are unchanging and frozen in time. Some have reexamined the history of Islamic civilization through a gender lens, tracking the status of women as it responds to various political and social developments. Likewise, many have questioned the treatment of ‘Muslim/Islamic culture’ as a homogenous or singular entity, given the dizzying amount of diversity represented in a religious group stretching from Eastern Europe to Southern Africa to the Far East. Despite common scriptures, interpretations of Islamic tenets and practices – including those governing gender relations – vary significantly across Muslim societies. By emphasizing these aspects of complexity, diversity, and change, the critical literature attempts to challenge the essentialism that grounds Orientalist thinking, and any paradigm that holds religion as an autonomous sphere untouched by political, economic, or social forces.

These criticisms raise thorny analytic questions for comparativists working on gender in Muslim contexts. Indeed, some of the most important political science contributions in this area not only reify Islam but insist that it constitutes the root cause of women’s oppression. Rooted in modernization and/or ‘clash of civilizations’ paradigms, these works assign the blame for women’s subordination on patriarchal attitudes, which them-
selves are cultivated by the patriarchal culture and/or religion that permeates Muslim societies (Fish, 2002, 2011; Inglehart and Norris, 2003a). Inglehart and Norris sum up the argument when they write: “an Islamic religious heritage is one of the most powerful barriers to the rising tide of gender equality” (Inglehart and Norris, 2003b, 49).

In fairness, the prognosis blaming Islam for women’s oppression has been heavily scrutinized from within the discipline, mostly on empirical grounds. For example, some researchers propose that the Arab region, more so than the Muslim world, is ‘distinctive’ in this regard (Donno and Russett, 2004; Rizzo, Abdel-Latif and Meyer, 2007). Despite these important empirical debates, there is some degree of consensus that cultural and religious traditions are detrimental to gender equality, and that modernization improves women’s lives by ushering in secularism, cosmopolitanism, and economic development – all with a concurrent decline in religiosity (Alexander and Welzel, 2011; Beath, Charrad and Enikolopov, 2013). Throughout, Islam is reified as the paradigmatic cultural logic in ‘Muslim societies’: stable and autonomous, antithetical to modernity, and inherently patriarchal.

Part of the problem may reside in the empirical approach driving this debate, which calls for investigating the relationship between Islam and gender equality (and democracy or development) using cross-national designs. Although scholars disagree on the precise nature of these empirical relationships, there is a common tendency to reduce Islam to a binary or continuous variable that supposedly exerts uniform causal effects, rather than to investigate the internal variation displayed by Islamic institutions and practices. Likewise, ‘women’s rights’ or ‘gender equality’ is commonly operationalized through a series of more or less interchangeable indicators, thus obscuring the ways in which particular institutions have disparate impacts on various facets of women’s lives. For instance, literacy is not necessarily collinear with participation in the workforce or attitudes towards equality, and these phenomena are not synonymous with ‘rights’ or ‘empowerment.’ The extent to which different indicators are correlated is fundamentally an empirical question, one that is too often neglected in the discipline. The more common move is to collapse various facets of women’s status within the narrow rubric of ‘oppression’ or ‘empowerment.’

Some political scientists have attempted to move past the narrow focus on Islam by suggesting that economic and structural factors, more than religion and culture, are to blame for women’s subordination in Muslim contexts. Michael Ross, for instance, offers compelling evidence that oil production – not Islam – drives gender inequality, first in the economic sphere and then into social and political realms (Ross, 2008). But while such findings contribute an important piece of the puzzle, it would be shortsighted to proceed as if culture and religion were entirely irrelevant to gender relations in Muslim societies (or anywhere else for that matter.) Importantly, a strict dichotomy between ‘cultural/religious’ versus ‘economic/structural’ explanations obscures the fact that religious institutions, cultural attitudes, and socioeconomic pressures intersect and determine one another.

The point is not to ignore or minimize very real gender inequality in the Muslim world, but rather to caution that a myopic focus on women’s subjugation could obscure other aspects of gender relations that are no less real, interesting, or important.

A more fruitful approach would be to examine particular Islamic institutions as mediating variables, shaped by political and economic processes while at the same time affecting gender relations in a given society. Here, scholars could build on insights drawn from area studies and sociology on the ways in which women’s rights were historically entangled in domestic political struggles. For instance, one avenue for future research could investigate the ways in which gender policies in Muslim-majority countries are negotiated in the course of elite disputes and coalition-building. How do gender issues become politicized and to what extent are they politicized differently across countries? How does state management over, and cooperation with, religious constituents impact the development of personal status law or other institutions impacting women’s lives? These questions begin from the presupposition that ‘Islam’ is determined, at least in part, by political processes that vary over time and space. Thus, while some may see Islam’s immense diversity as a foil to parsimony, I see it as an opportunity, especially for comparativists who are

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4 A ground-breaking example in this line of inquiry is Charrad (2001). For a review of others, see Charrad (2011).
eminently qualified to explore these kinds of variations.

III. Muslim Women’s Agency

In addition to emphasizing Islam’s diversity, the critical literature has challenged the stereotype of Muslim women as passive victims by emphasizing their agency as political subjects. Research on women’s agency spans vast empirical terrain, from creative expressions in art and literature to everyday maneuvering in the family and community. Here, I highlight work on women’s political activism, and especially their engagements with religious frameworks and institutions.

One prolific area of research attempts to reclaim feminism from inside the Islamic tradition. These thinkers reject the view that Islam is essentially patriarchal, or that women’s rights or feminism constitute Western imports. Instead, they look to Islam’s holy texts, progressive jurisprudence, and historical precedent for evidence that feminism can coexist with (and is even mandated by) Islam (Ahmed, 1992; Barlas, 2002; Wadud, 1999). By grounding claims to women’s rights in a religious framework, this perspective provides the basis for a social and academic movement known as ‘Islamic feminism’ or ‘Muslim feminism’, which has flourished in many parts of the world (Badran, 2013; Mir-Hosseini, 2006; Moghadam, 2002).

Another body of research examines women’s agency in the context of religious-political movements (Abu-Lughod, 2013; Bracke, 2008; Mahmoud, 2011; Shitrit, 2015). Why do women participate in organizations, institutions, and structures that seem to limit their freedom and equality, and what are the consequences of that participation? Even in arenas that are patriarchal by design, women have strategized in creative ways to further their interests, often destabilizing traditional gender norms in the process. In Iran, for example, mandatory veiling and gender segregation imposed after the Islamic revolution had the paradoxical effect of drawing women into the public sphere. This was especially so for pious and Islamist women, who took advantage of these newly established religious sanctions to join universities, the work force, and social organizations. Gaining a degree of autonomy and access, Islamist women used their newfound power to push the regime towards more progressive policies, while contributing to the overall reform movement (Afary, 2009; Hoodfar and Sadeghi, 2009; Mir-Hosseini, 1999). Thus, even environments designed to impose gender hierarchies can be sources for women’s empowerment.

While the above research largely discusses Muslim women’s agency in the context of subversion to patriarchal norms, some scholars challenge this apparent conflation of agency with resistance. In her influential study of the mosque movement in Egypt, Saba Mahmood argues that pious women exert their agency by accepting, inhabiting, and consolidating patriarchal norms such as modesty and gender segregation (Mahmood, 2011). Fidelity to such norms cannot be dismissed as ‘false consciousness’ or blind ideology, she argues, but are rather an exercise in women’s moral agency.

A common theme throughout this literature is that women may not always wish to emancipate themselves from religious constraints, and oftentimes volunteer to work within such constraints – however patriarchal – to advance their own interests as they see them. Even the word ‘constraints’ may be misleading, as religious environments provide resources and opportunities that are unavailable within secular alternatives. Indeed, the fact that Islamist political movements often outperform their more liberal counterparts in terms of women’s support provides yet another reason to rethink modernization/secularization theories linking religion with women’s oppression. The point is not to ignore or minimize very real gender inequality in the Muslim world, but rather to caution that a myopic focus on women’s subjugation could obscure other aspects of gender relations that are no less real, interesting, or important.

In addition to generating significant theoretical insights, the literature on women’s agency in the Muslim world raises a number of empirical questions that calls for systematic comparative work. For instance, more research is needed to address the impact of various strategies used in women’s movements. Many studies on Islamic feminism insist that religious discourses are more effective than liberal arguments for gender equality in Muslim societies, and yet systematic evidence su-

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1 For critiques of Islamic feminism, see Moghissi (1994) and Mojab (2001).

2 For a critique of this argument and the broader theoretical fascination with Muslim women’s agency, see Abbas (2013)

3 It is important to note that ‘women’s interests’ is a contested concept and that women mobilize not just as women but also as citizens, workers, members of a particularly community, and so on.
porting this claim is limited. In an excellent example of cross-disciplinary engagement, Masoud, Jamal and Nugent (2016) address this question using a large-scale survey experiment in Egypt. They show that respondents are more likely to support women’s political leadership when exposed to an argument based on Quranic teachings compared to a non-religious argument, thus lending support to the Islamic feminism thesis. Future work could systematically examine the tactics and influence of different women’s organizations in Muslim societies (Moghadam and Gheytanchi, 2010). Likewise, a deeper comparison of secular versus religious activism could generate fresh insight into the dynamics of women’s movements, while pushing us past tired stereotypes of religious activism as ‘fanatical’ (and thus oppressive) or secular activism as ‘Western’ (and thus inauthentic.)

In addition to emphasizing Islam’s diversity, the critical literature has challenged the stereotype of Muslim women as passive victims by emphasizing their agency as political subjects.

We could also stand to learn more about women’s participation in broader religious-political movements. Many observers note a dramatic increase in women’s participation and representation in Islamist political parties, which in some cases accompany an ideological shift towards more progressive gender stances within these parties. Recent comparative work credits women’s own strategic maneuvering and mobilization for the increase in Islamist women’s leadership (Arat, 2012; Clark and Schwedler, 2003; Tajali, 2015). However, it is less clear what impact, if any, women exert on these parties once they do become involved. What are the conditions in which Islamist women can make real in-roads for women’s rights? In attempting answers, we should resist abstracting the problem as a fight between Women versus The Patriarchy. As Mahmood taught us, women are very often the agents enforcing patriarchal norms.

Lastly, little is known about why women are attracted towards one form of political engagement or another. A few comparative studies reveal the role of economic pressures and incentives – particularly surrounding marriage – driving women to adopt conservative value systems (Blaydes and Linzer, 2008; Hoodfar, 1997). Future work could extend this line of inquiry by examining the conditions in which class (or ethnicity, religious affiliation, and so on) shape women’s political identities.

IV. Gender and Islam in a Transnational Perspective

Finally, the critical literature highlights the importance of the global context in the study of gender in Muslim societies. Orientalism, argued Said, was not simply about (mis)representing ‘the East’; it also served an active role in constructing the ‘West’ and its relationship to Muslim lands. Such engagements in turn shape the object of Muslim societies themselves. Indeed, transnational processes of colonialism and state building have had profound effects on Muslim societies, and even so-called ‘indigenous’ or ‘local’ practices are produced in relation to these global processes. One implication is that our understanding of gender in Muslim societies is fundamentally incomplete insofar as we treat these societies as self-contained and analytically divorced from the transnational.

For instance, recent scholarship posits that modern Islamic personal code or family law has roots in colonial rule, which molded religious institutions in order to fit the requirements of a modern state based on a European template. In her comparison of Malaysia, Egypt, and India, Iza Hussin shows how the category of ‘Islamic law’ was produced and codified through a series of encounters between colonial rulers and local elites, a process which simultaneously centralized and relegated ‘Islamic law’ to the domain of the family, inheritance, and other ‘private sphere’ matters (Hussin, 2016).

Other work highlights the significance of nationalist and anti-colonial movements in shaping contemporary gender practices. Because women were so central to colonial discourses and policies, they were once again invoked in anti-colonial rhetoric as markers for national identity. Indeed, women’s bodies often served as sites for broader political struggles, as well as the repositories for whatever version of modernity or nationhood or sovereignty was being championed at the time (Yuval-Davis, 1997). In Iran, for instance, forced unveiling during the Shah’s period led to the elevation of the chador as an anti-imperialist uniform par excellence during the Islamic Revolution (Najmabadi, 1991). Likewise, veiling in Algeria assumed new political significance as an act of anti-colonial resistance following French campaigns aimed at unveiling (Lazreg, 1994).
The development of ‘authentic’ or ‘indigenous’ gender norms in contradistinction to Western ones continues to unfold in the contemporary period, especially since the Islamic revival beginning in the 1970s and 1980s. Recent accounts of women’s veiling and return to piety reveal the pervasive desire to achieve an alternative modernity distinct from Western secular models (Göle, 1996). Thus, what appears at first glance to be a resurgence of traditional gender mores is in fact the result of distinctly modern processes, albeit not one fully anticipated by modernization theories.

The central insight is that gender relations in Muslim societies are not determined purely by factors internal to those societies, and that outside influences often have paradoxical and unintended consequences on women’s lives. Thus, in order to fully comprehend gendered practices or women’s agency, we need a theoretical apparatus that pays close attention to transnational connections. For political scientists working in comparative politics and international relations, this observation raises intriguing questions about contemporary gender dynamics in the Muslim world. Here I will raise just two areas for potential research.

First, many scholars have observed that the debate surrounding women’s rights in Arab countries is shaped by anti-Americanism and anti-Westernism (Bush and Jamal, 2015; Rizzo, Abdel-Latif and Meyer, 2007). Many Arabs view women’s rights norms as a form of cultural imperialism, thus animating resistance to such norms under the heading of sovereignty and nationalism. But does this observation hold throughout the Muslim world? If not, what explains variation in the perceived link between women’s rights and American hegemony or cultural imperialism? One clue may lie in the work of Blaydes and Linzer (2012), who show that anti-Americanism has its roots in the domestic competition between religious and secular parties in the Middle East. Their findings suggest that the degree to which women’s rights norms are tainted by anti-Americanism is conditional both on the ideological milieu of a particular society as well as the strategies of elites who manipulate such ideological beliefs for political gain. However, more research is necessary to fully comprehend those strategies, as well as the transnational circulation of ‘non-Western’ or ‘anti-Western’ gender ideologies that are sweeping large parts of the Muslim world.

Second, we urgently need a better understanding of how foreign military involvement and perpetual war has affected women’s lives in the Middle East and elsewhere. The reality is likely to defy easy normative conclusions. On the one hand, Western-assisted governance may have ushered in new opportunities for women in education, the workforce, and the civil sector. On the other hand, political scientists and critical scholars agree that Western attempts to instill democracy and liberty abroad very often engender unintended consequences that exacerbate the very illiberalism they were meant to destroy. In the face of this complexity, the comparative method is a critical tool towards identifying general patterns and causal relationships.

V. Conclusions: Beyond Orientalism?

In claiming that comparativists can productively learn from the critique of Orientalism, I do not wish to imply that the critical literature is without flaws or inadequacies. The centrality of Orientalism imposes a number of limitations on this field, including a devaluation of social relations in favor of an analysis of representations, a deflection away from local patriarchal institutions that do not emanate from the West, and a troubling tendency to conflate any attempt to condemn gender inequality in the Muslim world with Orientalist thinking (Terman, 2016). In light of these shortcomings, comparativists bring unique skills, methods, and insights to the study of gender and women in the Muslim World. Indeed, the critical literature often employs empirical claims that go unverified or are, even worse, performed as tenets of faith. Comparativists should assume the task of testing such claims against the available data, which would surely enrich the theoretical debate and push it past a stagnant preoccupation with Orientalism.

Researchers conducting empirical work in this area will continue to face a number of difficulties, especially a lack of available data and methodological challenges surrounding measurement. But by engaging the critique of Orientalism and integrating it into our work, comparativists are likely to generate a more nuanced view of gender relations in Muslim societies. In doing so, we must avoid the tendency to universalize, assuming that all women want the same things everywhere. At the same time, we must resist the twin temptation to marginalize Muslim women as so unique and particular that their social world is irrelevant to general theories about gender and politics. Ideally, comparativists will
take the knowledge we gain about gender in Muslim contexts and use it to rethink our understanding of gender elsewhere (including in the United States), and indeed of politics writ large. In the effort to ‘mainstream’ gender into political science, the true mark of progress will not be the number of papers or books written about gender but their centrality in the discipline as a whole.

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Gender Bias in U.S. Elections

by Emily Anne West

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Given women’s political underrepresentation in the United States (currently, women hold only 19.4% of the seats in the U.S. Congress, only 24% of statewide executive seats, and only 25% of all state legislative seats), political science research has long focused on the potential for gender bias in U.S. elections. The historically groundbreaking candidacy of Hillary Clinton in the 2016 presidential election has only served to further ignite this research topic. The extant literature largely focuses on two primary sources of potential bias against female candidates: (i) institutional barriers, such as party selection, campaign contributions, and media coverage; and (ii) women’s reluctance to run for office, perhaps in reaction to these institutional barriers. However, this mechanism is underexplored relative to the first two. This is due in large part to the many difficulties in isolating the effect of candidate gender on vote choice using data from real-world elections. There are many factors potentially confounding the effect of a candidate’s gender on vote choice. For example, the institutional barriers to entry for female candidates could potentially make women who run for office sufficiently ‘different’ from their male counterparts such that any observed differences in vote share or probability of victory could be explained by these other candidate-level discrepancies (such as quality) instead of purely the fact that these candidates are women (Fulton, 2012; Pearson and McGhee, 2013). Nonetheless, while institutional barriers to entry and a reluctance among women to run for office have been shown to exist (Fox and Lawless, 2010; Kanthak and Woon, 2015; Sanbonmatsu, 2002b; Jenkins, 2007; Lawless and Pearson, 2008), the potential for voters to exhibit bias against women even when they do run for office is important and should not be overlooked.

Using experimental data, scholars have evaluated the various sources of potential gender bias among voters. These studies show that there is heterogeneity among voters in terms of their gender stereotypes, whether cues about candidate quality can overcome these stereotypes, and how these might affect vote choice (Sanbonmatsu, 2002a; Mo, 2015). While such...
findings develop our understanding of the psychological origins of certain biases against female candidates, they leave us wondering: what explains this heterogeneity in gender stereotypes among the voting population? One potential explanation is that women exhibit an affinity for female candidates (Dolan, 2008). Another explanation is that there are differences in voter bias against female candidates according to party affiliation. In recent strides towards documenting the causal effect of candidate gender on probability of victory, it has been shown that being a woman reduces a candidate’s chances of winning congressional seats (in cases where the primary was extremely close) exclusively among Republican women (Bucchianeri, Forthcoming). While differences in the institutional barriers to entry for women (such as campaign funding) may partially explain this partisan heterogeneity, differences in voters’ willingness to vote for female candidates may also vary along party lines, which is something that recent observational studies on voter gender bias have not investigated (Hayes and Lawless, 2016).

The results suggest only slight affinity towards female candidates among women, and only in certain conditions. The results also suggest that there may be a slight partisan effect among men when it comes to voting for female candidates.

Descriptive statistics from a recent online survey experiment shed light on these potential sources of heterogeneity in voter willingness to vote for female candidates. I sourced subjects from Survey Sampling International. Among other experimental tasks (the results of which are not reported here), subjects ranked their likelihood of voting for two hypothetical candidates, a man and a woman. Since voters tend to take cues from candidate gender (McDermott, 1998; King and Maland, 2003), I hold the effect of partisanship constant by matching both the male and female candidates’ party identification to the subject’s self-reported partisanship in a pre-survey. In order to test voters’ reactions to explicit policy information in such a setting, I randomly assign subjects to one of three conditions. In the first condition, the in-group candidate (the male candidate among male subjects, and the female candidate among female subjects) matches the subject’s pre-stated position on the death penalty (oppose or support) while the out-group candidate does not match the subject’s position. In the second condition, this relationship was flipped such that the candidate with the shared gender was now incongruent with the voter’s position on the death penalty, while the out-group candidate matched the voter’s position. In the third condition, subjects were shown the same two male and female candidates, but this time both candidates matched the subject’s pre-stated position on the death penalty.

Table 1 reports mean voter preferences for the female and male candidates, as well as cases in which subjects reported equal likelihoods of voting for both candidates. These mean preferences are broken down by subjects’ gender and partisanship. First, mean preferences for the female candidate in Table 1 can help address whether women exhibit an affinity for female candidates. When the female candidate is congruent to their position on the death penalty (and the male candidate is incongruent — the first three columns), Democratic women are eighteen percentage points less likely to prefer the female candidate than their male Democratic counterparts, and there is an even wider spread (29 percentage points) between Republican women and men. However, very few voters (only 28 individuals out of 596, or 4.7%) in these four groups of gender-partisans actually prefers the policy-incongruent male candidate. In effect, the difference in preference for the female candidate along gender lines is accounted for by the fact that women are much more likely than men to rank the male and female candidates as equal in this condition. This pattern is in fact mirrored in the next condition in which the female candidate does not match the voters’ policy position. In this condition where the female candidate is incongruent, men are now more likely to assign equal preference for both candidates (similar to women in the previous condition). This could be driven by social desirability bias in which some men and women do not want to seem to favor the shared-gender candidate, even when that candidate matches their policy preference.

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1. The sample looks similar to CCES 2016 data on a host of covariates; results upon request.
2. Candidates were presented as photographs of a man and woman described as two candidates for office. The photographs of the man and the woman were ranked as equally competent to each other by both men and women and by Republicans and Democrats in a pre-test (also run on respondents from Survey Sampling International).
3. This policy was chosen based on pre-test results, which showed that there were no significant differences in the extent to which men and women, or Republicans and Democrats, supported or opposed the death penalty.
Table 1: Preferences for Female vs. Male Candidates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Female Candidate Congruent</th>
<th>Female Candidate Incongruent</th>
<th>Both Candidates Match</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Woman Man Equal</td>
<td>Woman Man Equal</td>
<td>Woman Man Equal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Women</td>
<td>49% 5% 46%</td>
<td>4% 66% 30%</td>
<td>19% 4% 77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>71 8 66</td>
<td>6 99 45</td>
<td>13 3 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat Women</td>
<td>50% 3% 47%</td>
<td>5% 60% 35%</td>
<td>23% 3% 74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>78 4 73</td>
<td>8 92 54</td>
<td>15 2 49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Men</td>
<td>78% 4% 18%</td>
<td>6% 51% 43%</td>
<td>7% 14% 79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>125 7 28</td>
<td>9 78 65</td>
<td>5 10 56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat Men</td>
<td>68% 7% 25%</td>
<td>13% 37% 50%</td>
<td>14% 7% 79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>93 9 34</td>
<td>20 56 75</td>
<td>10 5 56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Subjects were asked to report their likelihood of voting for both a female and male candidate using a 7 point scale ranging from 3 Extremely likely to -3 Extremely Unlikely, where 0 is Neither likely nor unlikely. Thus, the percentages reported above are based on (i) the subject reporting a higher probability of voting for the woman over the man; (ii) the subject reporting a higher probability of voting for the man over the woman; or (iii) the subject reporting equal probabilities of voting for both candidates. The policy issue that is mentioned for both candidates is whether they support or oppose the death penalty. Both candidates always match the subject’s party ID.

When both candidates match the voters’ policy position (the last three columns), there is some evidence of affinity for female candidates among women. In this condition, women are on average about 10.5 percentage points more likely than men to prefer the female candidate, twelve percentage points among Republicans and nine percentage points among Democrats (this partisan difference is statistically insignificant). This female affinity is only slightly attenuated in magnitude (significant at the 1% level) when subjects’ positions on the death penalty, as well as the importance of the death penalty to them (also asked in the pre-survey), are held constant.4 When these individual-level voter controls are included, women are still nine percentage points more likely than men to prefer the female candidate in this condition where both candidates match the voters’ policy positions.

The second hypothesis that these results can speak to is whether there is a difference in willingness to vote for female candidates among male partisans. Again, the last three columns, where both candidates match voters’ policy positions, shed light here. In this condition, Democratic men are twice as likely to vote for the female candidate than their Republican male counterparts. The magnitude of this effect is unchanged when the individual-level voter controls of death penalty position and importance are included, where Republicans are seven percentage points less likely to prefer the female candidate than their Democratic male counterparts (significant at the 10% level).

The findings presented here are descriptive statistics from a larger experiment, and thus should be interpreted as an exploration of the heterogeneity in the proclivity to vote for female candidates among men and women along partisan lines, when partisanship is held constant (such as a party primary) and policy congruence with the shared-gender candidate is manipulated. The results suggest only slight affinity towards female candidates among women, and only in certain conditions. The results also suggest that there may be a slight partisan effect among men when it comes to voting for female candidates. Taken together, these results suggest that it is worth further probing the issue of whether gender-bias exists not just at the institutional or candidate level, but also among voters. That is, voter gender-bias may contribute to women’s underrepresentation.

4Results are from an OLS regression using the same dependent variable from Table 1, including a dummy for whether the voter is male as the explanatory variable, as well as the mentioned controls for voter positions and importance placed on the death penalty policy.
in the U.S. government. This underrepresentation is important for several reasons. First, it has been shown that women who replace men in the same electoral district tend to focus more on ‘women’s issues’ such as child care (Gerrity, Osborn and Mendez, 2007), suggesting that descriptive representation translates into substantive representation. And second, while there does not seem to be an effect at the presidential level (West, 2017), women in politics can lead to increased political participation and efficacy among women voters (Burns, Schlozman and Verba, 2001; Atkeson and Carrillo, 2007; Atkeson, 2003), and even spur political ambition among adolescent women (Campbell and Wolbrecht, 2006).

References


Special Topic: Women and the Profession

Visions in Methodology (VIM): Origins and Evolution

by Janet Box-Steffensmeier

The Ohio State University

I. VIM Goals

The Visions in Methodology (VIM) initiative was designed to address the broad goal of supporting women who study political methodology. In addition to providing a forum to share scholarly work, VIM also serves to connect women in a field where they are underrepresented. VIM provides opportunities for scholarly progress, networking, and professional mentoring in research and teaching to support women in the political methodology community. The VIM conferences provide a forum for discussion on career-focused issues.

http://comparativenewsletter.com/ contact@comparativenewsletter.com
II. Origins and Evolution

VIM began as an implementation of recommendations for improved networking and systematic mentoring of women that were drawn from a 2007 National Academy of Sciences report, Beyond Bias and Barriers: Fulfilling the Potential of Women in Academic Science and Engineering, a 2004 American Political Science Association Workshop on the Advancement of Women in Academic Political Science in the United States, and the Society for Political Methodology (SPM) Section's 2006 Long Range Strategic Planning Committee Report. The SPM website details some history at https://www.cambridge.org/core/membership/spm. The Long Range Planning Committee was charged with planning for the growth and institutionalization of the section. Specifically, the charge was to look five, ten, and twenty years ahead to see how the section could continue to build on its reputation for innovation. James Granato served as the Chair, and the other members were Christopher Achen, Henry Brady, John Freeman, Guillermina Jasso, Gary King, Corrine McConnaughy, and William Reed.

In 2005, the SPM formed a Diversity Committee, which has been active in encouraging more participation by women at professional conferences. The Diversity Committee was also spearheaded by the leadership of the SPM. The inaugural Diversity Committee Chair was Caroline Tolbert. Other members included Susan Banducci, Janet Box-Steffensmeier, Claudine Gay, Elisabeth Gerber, and Sara Mitchell. The first activity was an informal gathering for women, which provided an opportunity for networking at the 2006 American Political Science Association annual meeting. That same year, the Diversity Committee targeted selected women and invited them to attend the annual summer methods meeting by offering assistance through a National Science Foundation (NSF) grant for their travel and registration fees. Fifteen travel fellowships were awarded to female scholars to attend the 23rd Annual SPM Meeting at the University of California, Davis. There was a 93% positive response rate to the invitations. A then record number of women attended the 2006 meeting, with an inaugural First Annual Women's Dinner hosted by Cindy Kam for women fellows. NSF support for graduate students, women, and minorities to attend the summer SPM (PolMeth) meetings has continued since then as well.

Out of the Diversity Committee discussions grew the Visions in Methodology (VIM) conferences. A critical role was played by the formal leadership of the SPM, the informal leaders, and the partnership with the leadership at the NSF, and in particular, that of Brian Humes, the Political Science Program Director. VIM has been funded through the efforts of the many leaders of the SPM, who have written the NSF grants with VIM conference support included in the proposals following the initial innovations in 2006. The first NSF grant that funded both the PolMeth and VIM meetings was written by Janet Box- Steffensmeier and Phil Schrodt, 2007-2012, “Support for Conferences and Mentoring Activities in Political Methodology,” which was jointly funded by the Methodology, Measurement, and Statistics and Political Science Programs.

The driving idea behind VIM is to address the leaky pipeline found in the subfield of political methodology all along the career track for women.

The first VIM conference was held in 2008 at Ohio State University and was hosted by Janet Box-Steffensmeier and Corrine McConnaughy. The meeting moved to the University of Iowa in 2010 and was hosted by Sara McLaughlin Mitchell and Caroline Tolbert, and in 2011 it returned to Ohio State University with Janet Box-Steffensmeier and Corrine McConnaughy again hosting. At that point, the meeting became annual and has moved around to hosts at Pennsylvania State University, Florida State University, McMaster University in Canada, the University of Kentucky, and the University of California, Davis; the 2017 meeting will be held at the State University of New York at Stony Brook. There were 118 applications to attend the 2017 meeting, which is a new record and a great sign of interest and of the value that is being provided. A full summary of the conference history and the generous hosts can be found at http://visionsinmethodology.org/conferences/. Michelle Dion also organized a mini-VIM conference at the Association for Canadian Studies Meeting. Michelle Dion and Laura Stephenson (2017) also wrote about expanding methods training in Canada and have specifically included efforts to consider diversity. The shared
model of hosting conferences has worked well by providing ownership and leadership of VIM to many VIMmers.

The VIM conferences serve as a complement to the activities at the PolMeth summer meeting. The VIM meetings provide a forum for a smaller group of women, especially a balanced group of junior and senior women, to exchange ideas, network, and advance both substantive and methodological questions, as well as discuss issues of gender in the discipline and especially in the subfield. These meetings have been a great resource for many individuals and for advancing women in the profession.

The Society for Political Methodology continues to advocate and examine issues of diversity. For example, there was a special issue of The Political Methodologist in 2014, by lead editor, Justin Esarey, and guest editor, Meg Shannon, on gender diversity in political methodology. In addition to articles on VIM, there were articles on implicit bias, mentoring, and graduate students. Importantly, Chris Achen provided the article entitled, “Why do we need diversity in the Political Methodology Society?” The bibliography from all of these articles provides a great reading list. In that same issue, Barnes, Beaulieu and Krupnikov (2014) report that VIM participants were better networked and more productive. Innovations in this space include Women Also Know Stuff, which has been phenomenally successful in promoting women in political science (Beaulieu, 2016). Justin Esarey’s International Methods Colloquium project has also been an important innovation. Related to the topic of gender diversity, Esarey and Wood (Forthcoming) find in their survey that women identified interpersonal interactions, whether online or not, as being more important for learning about new research and ideas compared to men. The upshot is that webinars might be a particularly important tool for women who do not have access to traditional networks through which scholarship is disseminated and refined.

III. Looking Ahead

As VIM institutionalizes and begins to have formal leadership, it is also important to consider VIM’s goals and its hope for the future. The nominations committee to identify the inaugural officers were drawn from previous VIM hosts: Lee Ann Banaszak (Pennsylvania State University), Tiffany Barnes (University of Kentucky), Emily Beaulieu (University of Kentucky), Janet Box-Steffensmeier (Ohio State University), Amber Boydstun (University of California, Davis), Courtenay Conrad (University of California, Merced), Michelle Dion (McMaster University), Sona Golder (Pennsylvania State University), Suzanna Linn (Pennsylvania State University), Corrine McConnaghy (George Washington University), Sara Mitchell (University of Iowa), Emily Ritter (University of California, Merced), Laura Stephenson (Western University), and Caroline Tolbert (University of Iowa).

The new officers and committee members are:

- **President**: Sara Mitchell (University of Iowa).
- **President Elect**: Betsy Sinclair (Washington University in St. Louis).
- **Vice President**: Amber Boydstun (University of California, Davis).
- **Grant Committee**: Caroline Tolbert, Chair (University of Iowa), Shane Nordyke (University of South Dakota), and Mirya Holman (Tulane University).
- **Treasurer, Recorder, and Liaison with PolMeth**: Michelle Dion (McMaster University).
- **Listserv Moderators**: Emily West (University of Pittsburgh) and Alison Craig (University of Texas, Austin).
- **Webmaster**: Shawna Metzger (National University of Singapore).
- **Mentoring**: Emily Beaulieu (University of Kentucky) and Nicole Baerg (University of Essex).
- **Social Media**: Natalie Jackson (Senior Polling Editor, Huffington Post) and Molly Roberts (University of California, San Diego).
- **Conference Selection Host Site**: Yanna Knupnikov, Chair (State University of New York, Stony Brook), Nahomi Ichino (University of Michigan), and Emily Ritter (University of California, Merced).
- **Nominations Committee**: Suzanna Linn, Chair (Pennsylvania State University), Jane Sumner (University of Minnesota), and Ines Levin (University of California, Irvine).

Importantly, these positions will facilitate communication with PolMeth, as well as to a very broad audience internal and external to the political science discipline.

The formalization of VIM has the potential power through an organizational structure to work together with the Society for Political Methodology leadership to advance the goal of being the “world's premier academic organization for quantitative political science.”
Importantly, VIM has expanded beyond conferences to help move the field of political methodology forward. There is a mentor-matching program started by Meg Shannon for female graduate students and untenured faculty members. Women interested in being matched with a mentor should send an email to Emily Beaulieu and Nicole Baerg. The email should include information that will help the VIM program identify a suitable match, including a brief statement of research interests and current academic status (for example, ABD, first time on the job market, post-doc, non-tenure track faculty, tenure-track faculty). Tenured faculty members (male or female) who are interested in serving as mentors through the VIM program should also email Emily and Nicole.

There is a listserv started thanks to Michelle Dion and a VIMbot, which is a Twitter bot that checks current issues of certain political science journals (via RSS) for content authored by Visions in Methodology participants. VIMbot automatically tweets out the article's link and a “congrats!” to the VIMmer (or VIMmers) in question and was developed by Shawna Metzger.

A resources page accumulates funding opportunities and professionalization readings that have been used at previous conferences. There is a Facebook group, Visions in Methodology, started by Jane SUMNER in 2015 with 102 members.

We are confident that there are amazing innovations ahead for VIM as the new officers get in place and because of the support of the entire political methodology community.

References


Esarey, Justin and Andrew R. Wood. Forthcoming. “Blogs, online seminars, and social media as tools of scholarship in political science.” *PS: Political Science and Politics*. 

How are Women Political Scientists Doing? A Report from the APSA Committee for the Status of Women in the Profession and the Thelen Presidential Taskforce

by Nadia Brown  
Purdue University 
Mala Htun  
University of New Mexico 
Frances Rosenbluth  
Yale University 
Kathleen Thelen  
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Denise Walsh  
University of Virginia

What is the status of women in the profession and how can it be improved? In recent data that we have collected from the largest twenty departments, women now make up about half of the Ph.D. students (42% of all Ph.D.s received in 2012, according to the last NSF statistics) and nearly half of assistant professors; but on average they make up only one in five full professors. Women are also disproportionately represented in the ranks of non-ladder faculty. Does this pattern reflect the fact that women have only recently been accepted into Ph.D. programs in equal numbers as men? Or do hostile climates, unconscious bias, exclusion from social networks, sex discrimination, and/or work-family conflicts thwart women’s advancement? Do the same patterns hold for women of color, queer and trans women, women from economically disadvantaged backgrounds, and women who are first-generation college graduates?

The APSA’s Committee for the Status of Women in the Profession (CSWP) is taking two steps to address barriers to women’s advancement and to investigate their root causes. The first step is to help women in the profession build networks, share experiences, and mentor one another so that more women scholars succeed and advance through the ranks. The CSWP recently established a visible online presence through its website, http://web.apsanet.org/cswp/. The website is the brainchild of University of Virginia professors Carol Mershon and Denise Walsh (currently a member of the CSWP, as well as President of the APSA Women’s Caucus for 2016–2017), who won an NSF grant to build a data-rich, community-building location designed to help advance the success of women in the profession. Former APSA
president Jane Mansbridge, who has worked throughout her career to mentor women one-on-one as well as in larger, institutional ways, both shepherded the website to its official location and came up with the concept of 'Graphs to Make You Gasp', a visually powerful set of data images about how women fare in political science and in other walks of life. It is a highly-trafficked and often shared part of the website.

In addition to community building, the CSWP [Committee for the Status of Women in the Profession] is also beginning to gather systematic, longitudinal data that can help us answer questions about why women remain underrepresented in the top ranks of the political science professoriate. Thanks to the continuing efforts of Jenny Mansbridge, the cooperation of APSA’s new Deputy Director and head of research on the profession Betsy Super, the support of APSA President-elect Kathleen Thelen, with excellent ideas and analysis from Dawn Teele, APSA has begun to collect data on PWAM (Pipeline for Women and Minorities) in political science. Beginning with the twenty largest Ph.D. programs, a PWAM survey asks departments to report departmental demographics for students and every rank of the professoriate. At a minimum, comparing snapshots over time can pinpoint where the pipeline seems to be leaking. In the future we may be able to get an even more fine-grained picture with individual-level longitudinal data. The data gathering is still in the pilot stage, but it will be available soon (in forms that shield private, individual information) on the CSWP and APSA websites.

Another popular item on the website is a blog curated by Nadia Brown that features issues of concern to women of color political scientists. ‘Issue Discussions Relevant to Women of Color and Intersectionality’ also features the scholarship of women of color in the discipline. The purpose of the column is to highlight ways in which women of color navigate the discipline to ultimately alter both the social and cultural environment of the academy. In an effort to stretch the traditional boundaries of the discipline, this column seeks to include the narratives, experiences, and scholarship on women of color as a means to contribute to institutional change. To date, two blog posts have been published – featuring Professors Dianne Pinderhughes and Wendy Wong – which have demonstrated the need to prioritize intersectional issues (as articulated by these scholars) as deserving respect, support, and inclusion within political science.

The website also features ‘Wondering Woman’, an advice column moderated by Kristen Monroe, the first of which is ‘How to Write a Book and Get it Published.’ Each column features comments by several women, sometimes disagreeing, making it a lively and useful resource. In addition, the ‘Pipeline Practices’ section details the different good practices that universities have instituted to fight discrimination against women and minorities. This feature makes it possible for any woman dissatisfied with the practices in her university or department to see what steps other universities have taken to hold her own university or department accountable and inspire a ‘race to the top’.

In addition to community building, the CSWP is also beginning to gather systematic, longitudinal data that can help us answer questions about why women remain underrepresented in the top ranks of the political science professoriate. Thanks to the continuing efforts of Jenny Mansbridge, the cooperation of APSA’s new Deputy Director and head of research on the profession Betsy Super, the support of APSA President-elect Kathleen Thelen, with excellent ideas and analysis from Dawn Teele, APSA has begun to collect data on PWAM (Pipeline for Women and Minorities) in political science. Beginning with the twenty largest Ph.D. programs, a PWAM survey asks departments to report departmental demographics for students and every rank of the professoriate. At a minimum, comparing snapshots over time can pinpoint where the pipeline seems to be leaking. In the future we may be able to get an even more fine-grained picture with individual-level longitudinal data. The data gathering is still in the pilot stage, but it will be available soon (in forms that shield private, individual information) on the CSWP and APSA websites.

A broader set of studies is also being undertaken by the members of Thelen’s Presidential Taskforce on Women in the Profession, launched in August 2016, under the inspired and energetic leadership of Mala Htun and Frances Rosenbluth. With the intent to pick up where Diane Pinderhughes’s 2006 Presidential Taskforce left off, members of the Task Force are working in teams to tackle different aspects of the pipeline problem.

1. Where and why does the pipeline leak? Designing a longitudinal survey: Kira Sanbonmatsu (Rutgers), Laura van Assendelft (Sarah Baldwin), Page Fortna (Columbia), and Claudine Gay (Harvard).
2. Departmental practices and their effects on climate, promotion, and retention: Lisa Baldez (Dartmouth), Lisa Garcia Bedolla (UC Berkeley), Sara Parker (Chabot College), and Alvin Tillery (Northwestern).
3. Women and publications: Is the review process even-handed? David Samuels (Minnesota) and Nadia Brown (Purdue) are gathering systematic data on who submits manuscripts to leading disciplinary journals for peer review and whose work is accepted or rejected, by gender and type of scholarship.
4. Designing interventions: Tali Mendelberg (Princeton) and Jens Hainmueller (Stanford) are collecting data on successful interventions to advance women by universities and departments across academic disciplines (some of which are on view in the CSWP report on Pipeline Practices at http://web.apsanet.org/cswp/pipeline-practices/). They will then advise whether or not further RCT experiments can help to pinpoint what works to promote disciplinary gender equality, or if we have enough information to suggest ‘best practices’ to departments and universities for implementation.

We do not expect easy answers but tough questions and hard scrutiny. One of the greatest challenges for women – the fact that professional advancement requires extraordinary levels of investment in scholarly production precisely during the reproductive years – has big implications for how and when universities sequence reviews, support family obligations, and implement meaningful changes to departmental practices and culture.

Future Directions in Comparative Research on Politics and Gender

by Mary Caputi
California State University, Long Beach

I would like to thank the editors of the Comparative Politics Newsletter for inviting me to contribute to the current issue. Having assumed the editorship of Politics & Gender in July 2016, I would like to share my insights regarding trends in comparative scholarship that have a bearing on gender. I would also like to describe my vision for Politics & Gender, explaining ways in which an already established and highly regarded journal can become even stronger.

Gender is now recognized as a critical category equal in weight to class, race, ethnicity, religion, and other axes of identity and power. The articles that have appeared in Politics & Gender within the field of comparative politics reflect this clearly, for we have featured numerous scholarly pieces that discuss political phenomena from countries around the world through a gendered lens. For instance, the June 2017 issue of the journal features articles on voting behavior and legislative politics, women in office, the waning or resurgence of gender stereotypes, the changing role of women in society, and the status of transgendered politics. These research articles are accompanied by a book review section whose reviews focus exclusively on gender and contemporary African politics. Thus, the issue reveals the many ways that gender now broadly impacts comparative politics, allowing the comparative method to be enriched by gender’s numerous analytic points of entry, such as intersectionality, performativity, LGBTQ politics, the impact of same-sex marriage on democratic societies, gender and political parties, the sexual politics of the workplace, and the advocacy of an ethic of care in political life.

Politics & Gender is committed to publishing scholarship that utilizes these cutting-edge tools of analysis in ways that demonstrate the changing nature of the field and the growing impact that gender exerts. Importantly, these tools signal that the incorporation of gender into the field is no longer limited to a liberal feminist paradigm: it is not merely the addition of women to the analysis that is under scrutiny. Rather, the usefulness of intersectionality, performativity, and so on allows the study of gender to move in other directions and problematize how our society interprets gendered meanings. The relationship between politics and gender hardly confines itself to the simple addition of women to spheres previously off limits to them. For this reason, the journal has deliberately enlarged its framework beyond liberal feminism so that a richer and more nuanced understanding of gender can prevail.

With the aid of my assistant, Sun Young Kwak, and my book review editor, Timothy Kaufman-Osborn, I therefore aim to expand the journal’s repertoire of offerings by welcoming articles that deepen and enrich our understanding of how politics and gender prove mutually constituting. My goal is to expand the meanings of both terms by featuring articles that explore the conceptual richness of both ‘politics’ and ‘gender.’ Subsequently, I hope to demonstrate the importance of intersectional analysis and illustrate how politics is gendered and gender is political. For instance, a forthcoming article on the American criminal justice state demonstrates the deep interconnections between race, class, gender, and the realities of incarceration for the imprisoned as well as for their loved ones. In “For love and justice: The mobilizing impacts of race, gender, and criminal justice contact,” Hannah Walker and Marcela García-Castañon (Forthcoming) argue that the tragic realities of a loved

http://comparativenewsletter.com/ contact@comparativenewsletter.com
one's incarceration – disproportionately felt by the male Black and Latino populations – actually mobilize caregivers who are committed to an ethic of care and who are painfully aware of the racial prejudices that come into play where the criminal justice system is concerned. Imprisoned men of color ignite the desire to promulgate an ethic of care at all levels of American politics, causing the reality of human interconnection and vulnerability to inform legal and judicial decision-making. The realities of incarceration as experienced by those imprisoned, as well as by their loved ones, thus proves a site of fruitful political analysis, demonstrating how politics and gender intertwine and often cannot be disaggregated from one another.

The relationship between politics and gender hardly confines itself to the simple addition of women to spheres previously off limits to them.

Because theorizing gender is crucial to this task, I welcome articles in the field of comparative politics that display theoretical sophistication. Thanks to the inherent instability of the categories ‘woman’ or ‘man’ and the fluidity that accompanies such terms as ‘cis’ and ‘trans’, we strive to promote scholarship that capitalizes on this fluidity and that problematizes calcified traditional understandings of gender. A forthcoming special issue on women and conservatism, to appear in 2018, underscores this point, for its articles query whether or not ‘women’s issues’ must always be understood as feminist, begging the question of how we define ‘feminism’ in the first place. The prominence of analytic tools such as those mentioned above is increasingly felt in comparative politics, illustrating the heightened role that theory now plays in the field. It is for this reason that we will devote an entire book review section to the reception of The Oxford Handbook of Feminist Theory (2016) edited by Lisa Disch and Mary Hawkesworth. This comprehensive volume features a wide range of entries on subjects relating to feminist theory, all of which impact the use of gender in comparative politics as well as other subfields of political science. Because we intend to have Politics & Gender publish cutting edge, agenda-setting scholarship that addresses contemporary issues in the field, I seek articles grounded in a theoretical sophistication that delivers a nuanced understanding of both politics and gender.

Politics & Gender strives to reflect the most current scholarly trends in comparative politics sensitive to the topic of gender. This is an intellectually rich and exciting field. Sun Young, Timothy, and I wish to thank our contributors whose imagination and rigor produce scholarly interventions that define the discipline.

References


Trends in Comparative Research on Politics and Gender

by Jill A. Irvine & Cindy Simon Rosenthal
University of Oklahoma

We would like to begin by thanking the editors of the Comparative Politics Newsletter for inviting us to contribute to this issue focused on women/gender and politics. As editors of the APSA journal Politics & Gender from 2013 to 2016, we aim to contribute to this discussion by offering some observations about trends in current comparative research on gender and politics and suggesting possible directions for future research.

In the past three decades, virtually no area of comparative politics has remained untouched by research on gender. Our understanding of electoral behavior, policy making, social movements, and institutional dynamics to name just a few research areas has been enriched by this work. The 1990s were characterized by a strong comparative focus on gender in conflict and post-conflict settings and in democratic transitions. Electoral quotas and representation became a particular focus of this research on democratization, which is reflected in the large number of submitted articles we received on this topic during our tenure as editors. Indeed, while interesting questions remain to be explored in this area of research, for example concerning the impact of electoral quotas on policy outcomes, the preponderance of current research on electoral quotas does not widen the
scope of comparative research on politics and gender.

When we began our tenure as editors of Politics & Gender, we made a commitment to reach out to comparative scholars in particular. What we found was an enthusiastic community working collaboratively on a variety of initiatives. Three highly productive research areas have emerged in that effort: feminist institutionalism, gender and comparative policy making, and comparative studies in intersectionality. Feminist institutionalism has developed into a robust research program generating new theoretical insights, honing new methods, and informing graduate student training. Focusing on formal and informal organizational and institutional norms, this approach has deepened our understanding of gendered organizational dynamics and the context in which gender equality policy occurs. In so doing, it has stretched the concept of political institutions more generally, reviving and enriching the long-standing interest in political science on their comparative development, dynamics, and impact. A recent themed issue of Politics & Gender (Vol. 10, no. 4, 2014) on feminist institutionalism highlights the variety of methods employed in this approach as well as the multiplicity of research questions it tackles. The new book series from Rowman & Littlefield on Feminist Institutionalist Perspectives and the Feminism and Institutionalism International Network (FIIN) offer increased opportunities for drawing together new research in this area. Feminist institutionalism will no doubt continue to attract graduate students working in the area of gender and comparative politics. Moreover, it offers fruitful cross-fertilization with the work on gender and comparative public policy.

While scholarship on women is an integral part of comparative research, women should not be conflated with gender analytically.

Gender in the policy-making process has long been an interest of comparative scholars but in the past decade it has expanded its scope considerably. This research has received an enormous boost from such large international collaborative projects as Weldon and Htun's cross-national study and dataset examining why national governments adopt different types of gender equality policies. Several other cross-national gender equality policy studies such as QUING (Quality in Gender Equality Policies) and VEIL, funded largely by the European Union, have examined the role of civil society, transnational organizations, and gender equality architecture in generating gender equality policies. These research programs, employing such methods as critical frame analysis, qualitative network analysis, and feminist biographies have generated a host of insights about how gender equality is shaping and is shaped by the policy-making process while at the same time sharpening new methodological tools. Future research will continue to explore the conditions for formulating and implementing effective gender equality policies.

A third area shaping current trends in research on gender and politics involves intersectionality. This is not surprising given that intersectionality may be, as McCall (2005) put it over ten years ago, “the most important theoretical contribution that women's studies, in conjunction with related fields, has made so far.” And, indeed, it has provided a foundational concept in the study of gender in institutions, policy making, and social movements. As the number of important comparative works on the theory and practice of intersectionality increases, major presses have established new series, such as the two series on Citizenship, Gender and Diversity and on the Politics of Intersectionality by Palgrave MacMillan Press. Similarly, the Routledge series on Advances in Feminist Studies and Intersectionality and the series on Gender and Comparative Politics address some of the emerging themes in research on intersectionality. This research has not only informed work from the feminist institutionalist and comparative policy approaches, it has also generated a rich body of literature on the ways in which multiple and shifting identities underpin political behavior from voting in elections to protests in the streets.

The richness of comparative work on gender and politics has been reflected in the growing methodological pluralism for undertaking this work. Indeed, feminist research on gender and politics has greatly enriched the methodological toolkit employed by political scientists more generally. Initial methodological critiques from feminist scholars were directed toward the positivist and methodological roots of political science and toward adopting methods that emphasized self reflexivity, what Sandra Harding called “strong objectivism”, and a focus on including the direct voices and experiences of women. As the editor of a recent Critical Perspectives section of Politics & Gender (Vol.12, No. 3, 2016) wrote, a more recent crossover between feminist and comparative methods has been fueled by the emer-
gence of more systematic mixed methods approaches and a “more nuanced epistemological position” among feminist scholars; these approaches recognize that “it is not specific methods that are androcentric, but the way in which these methods are applied and their results are interpreted that lead to severe androcentric bias” (Spierings, 2016). What we have seen in the research programs developed around feminist institutionalism, gendered policy making, and intersectionality is the further development of a variety of comparative methods and techniques including qualitative comparative analysis, which takes account of contextual and historical contingencies of causal mechanisms; critical frame analysis, which studies the content and context of political discourse; micro-level regression analysis, which addresses the context dependency of micro-level relationships; and the host of methodological tools that have been developed by feminist institutionalist work (Vol. 10, No.4, 2014). This ever expanding methodological toolkit bodes well for possible future directions in the study of politics and gender.

A great deal of cutting edge scholarship on politics and gender in recent years has focused on constructions of masculinity as well as femininity, on flexible, multiple, and shifting identities encompassed in queer movements and LGBT politics. …These broader understandings of gender can be incorporated into the comparative research agenda on gender and politics without diluting its strong historical concern with women and politics.

While the body of comparative research on gender and politics continues to deepen and widen its scope, our experience as editors of Politics & Gender leads us to believe that this research could expand in a number of fruitful directions both conceptually and empirically. Research on politics and gender has not shied away from tackling the issue of how to define and operationalize its foundational concepts, but we believe it can do better. Gender has often been reduced to women in the way it has been conceptualized in the comparative scholarship on gender and politics. The vast majority of submissions to Politics & Gender, for example, have failed to treat gender in a broader sense than simply referring to women. While scholarship on women is an integral part of comparative research, women should not be conflated with gender analytically. A great deal of cutting edge scholarship on politics and gender in recent years has focused on constructions of masculinity as well as femininity, on flexible, multiple, and shifting identities encompassed in queer movements and LGBT politics. Similarly, focus on the gendered body has taken scholarship in such areas as feminist security studies in new and fruitful directions. These broader understandings of gender can be incorporated into the comparative research agenda on gender and politics without diluting its strong historical concern with women and politics.

A richer picture of gender and its relationship to politics can also be achieved through a greater attention to employing an intersectional lens. While intersectionality has been a growing focus of research on gender and politics, it has remained difficult to define and operationalize. The importance of this concept is reflected by the decision of three separate editorial teams of Politics & Gender to dedicate a Critical Perspectives section to discussion of this topic (Vol. 3, No.2, 2007; Vol.8, No.3 2012; Vol.10, No.1, 2014. Politics & Gender has made a real contribution to our understanding of intersectionality and the challenges political scientists face in operationalizing this concept. The task facing all subfields in political science is now to utilize intersectionality in new and fruitful ways and to approach it, as Leslie McCall enjoined us, in a methodologically diverse fashion. Much of the comparative research has focused on the ways in which institutions and policy have addressed issues of diversity and intersectionality. A promising future direction for research utilizing this concept would be investigating how activists engage in intersectional organizing and in addressing issues of diversity within and across movements.

This intersectional approach would greatly inform what is emerging as an important research topic, namely the comparative study of rightwing populism and populist movements. Just as democracy and democratization emerged as a dominant research agenda in the 1990s, an agenda which remains in the study of gender and politics, the comparative study of rightwing populism and populist movements is emerging as an important research area in the present moment. A host of questions about the role of gender in rightwing populist movements remains to be studied, including the causes of the wide variation in gender policies adopted...
by rightwing populist movements, the use of gender equality rhetoric in anti-immigration campaigns, the emergence of female leaders of rightwing populist political parties, and the variations in gender gaps in support for rightwing populist parties, to name a few. During our tenure as editors, we solicited a themed issue on gender and rightwing populism that we anticipate will come to fruition in a future issue of Politics & Gender.

Finally, we believe it is important for comparative research on gender and politics to extend beyond its largely liberal feminist roots to include other feminist approaches. Few articles submitted to Politics & Gender, for example, explicitly identify a non-liberal feminist approach as centrally informing their work, although that number has risen in recent years. Yet, a great deal of rich material has been produced by researchers who explicitly adopt such frameworks as the starting point for their analysis. Employing a gender lens unifies all research on politics and gender, but the tint of the lens can matter very much indeed. Comparative research on politics and gender would benefit from a variety of approaches including those put forth by postmodernist, postcolonial, and critical race theory.

References


Gender Studies and Political Science

by Juliet A. Williams
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To comprehend the costs of neglecting research questions arising at the intersection of politics and gender, one need look no further than the 2016 U.S. presidential election. As predicted, gender politics were front and center throughout the campaign – but not in the way many observers had anticipated. Rather than ‘the women’s vote’ carrying Hillary Clinton to victory as the first female president in U.S. history, one group of voters in particular – white women without college degrees – cast their votes in unexpectedly high numbers for Donald Trump, contributing to a widely unforeseen electoral college victory (Malone, 2016; Williams, 2016a).

The 2016 election stands as a bracing reminder that when it comes to politics, gender isn’t just another variable. Beyond demonstrating that stubborn fictions like ‘the women’s vote’ dangerously distort political reality, the long campaign season underscored the persistence of gender as a singularly potent signifier in U.S. political discourse. Indeed, the often cringe-worthy, and not infrequently profoundly disturbing, citation of gender throughout the election stands as a vivid rebuke to the pretense that we live in a postfeminist age – that is, one in which sexism is no longer a dominant force (Anderson, 2014). To regard gender as anything less than fundamental in contemporary politics is as absurd as chalkling it up to mere coincidence that the man who ran against the first woman ever to receive a major party nomination for president also happens to be the candidate known for such lines as “Look at that face! Would anyone vote for that?” and “Look at those hands ... I guarantee you there is no problem!” – let alone being the individual single-handedly (as it were) responsible for entering the term “pussy-grabbing” into the national political vernacular.

It would be a serious mistake, however, to presume that the imprint of gender on the 2016 election extends no further than the ambit of one man’s ill-considered remarks. One could just as easily ask, for example, why Americans proved so quick to embrace the Appalachian coal miner, rather than, say, the public school teacher, as the emblem of the disempowered American worker? Or why so many voters remain fixated on the goal of using state power to control women’s reproductive choices? Answers to these questions are not simple, but there should be no doubt about their centrality, let alone urgency, to inquiry in the discipline of political science – and not just to those primarily concerned with U.S. politics, as the recent presidential campaign in France indicates. It was a race closely scrutinized around the globe as a bellwether for populist conservatism – and one that would be entirely illegible without deciphering the ‘canny’ gender play that defined each of the leading candidates’ public personae (Chira, 2017).

Given the enduring salience of gender in politics, one might expect there to be substantial intellectual traffic between the discipline of political science and the interdisciplinary field of gender studies, but this gener-

1 I use the term gender studies rather than women's studies or other related designations as a reflection of recent shifts in institutional
ally has not been the case. For decades now, observers have concluded that opportunities for fruitful exchange among scholars in these fields remains largely unexploited (Boneparth, 1980; Cassese, Bos and Duncan, 2012; Hawkesworth, 2005; Lovenduski, 1998; Shanley, 1980). This uncatalyzed potential is especially surprising given broad recognition across the social sciences that gender is an irreducibly social relation (Beauvoir, 1989; Butler, 1990). Furthermore, at least in the field of gender studies, it is taken as axiomatic that gender difference marks not just a distinction, but a hierarchical order (Lorber, 1994). This is a profoundly political insight, and one that provides the foundation for wide-ranging investigation of how gender inequality has been institutionalized, enforced, enabled, and contested across different political systems over time.

To insist that there is more work to be done in integrating gender into the study of politics is not to deny that political science has ‘come a long way’ (although the ironic undertones of the phrase seem apt given the still incomplete integration of gender analysis into the self-understanding of the discipline). Until quite recently, political science has engaged the subject of gender either not at all, or primarily by looking at differences in the way men and women behave – as voters, candidates, leaders, policymakers, activists, and citizens. In accounting for women as members of the polity, and as political actors, scholars have sought to address a long-standing practice of erasure – or what was characterized in a landmark 1974 article as a “facile dismissal [of women] as non-political beings” (Shanley and Schuck, 1974, 632. See also Beckwith, 2005; Keohane, 1981; Krauss, 1974). Remarkably, even the prolonged and momentous campaign for women’s suffrage in the early decades of the twentieth century was barely registered by the discipline. As Mary Shanley and Victoria Schuck have documented, a meager one percent of articles published in the American Political Science Review and Political Science Quarterly from the years 1906 to 1924 addressed issues concerning women and politics (1974, 633).

While greater attention to women by researchers in the discipline has been welcomed, some commentators have warned of the risk of a hollow victory if change goes no further than ‘add women and stir’ approaches. One problem is that the demand to include women inadvertently may reinforce the fallacy that men are not appropriate or productive subjects of gender analysis. As sociologist R. W. Connell has pointedly observed, “[i]n almost all policy discussions, to adopt a gender perspective substantially means to address women’s concerns” (2006, 1805). Today, women remain the primary subjects of gender analysis in political science, perhaps reflecting a degree of skepticism about the call to (re)center men in the discipline while the task of rid-

ding political science of its ‘masculine biases’ is still unfinished (Lovenduski, 1998, 333; but see Apostolidis and Williams (Forthcoming)).

Given the enduring salience of gender in politics, one might expect there to be substantial intellectual traffic between the discipline of political science and the interdisciplinary field of gender studies, but this generally has not been the case.

Beyond widening the gender lens to include men, political scientists might also build on another key premise of gender studies research – that gender designates not simply an individual attribute, but a “socially constructed stratification system – one that plays a central role in determining an individual’s place in the social order” (Risman, 2004, 430; see also Htun (2005)). Conceptualizing gender as a system has paved the way for studies that empirically substantiate the feminist slogan ‘the personal is political’ by connecting embodied experience to an understanding of how “gender power and disadvantage are created and maintained not only through law but also through institutional processes, practices, images, ideologies, and distributional mechanisms” (Hawkesworth, 2005, 146). Still, the notion of a gender regime, and the attendant possibilities for conceptualizing gender regime change as it has been manifest in domains ranging from antidiscrimination law to so-called ‘bathroom bills’ remains underdevel-

oped in political science.

In charting a path beyond additive approaches to gender analysis, feminist political theorists have played nomenclature. Since the early 2000s, many programs and departments across the United States have changed their names from Women’s Studies to Gender Studies, Gender and Sexuality Studies, or Women, Gender and Sexuality Studies. These changes have been undertaken to better reflect the nature of the work conducted under the heading of women’s studies, which increasingly includes research on masculinities and sexuality among other subjects. See Wiegman (2012) for an extended discussion of the intellectual stakes of these various field names.

http://comparativenewsletter.com/ contact@comparativenewsletter.com
a leading role in disclosing the unacknowledged gender ideologies undergirding central concepts in the field, including the idea of ‘politics’ itself. As Susan Bourque and Jean Grossholtz put it in a landmark article: “That politics is a man’s world is a familiar adage; that political science as a discipline tends to keep it that way is less well accepted, but perhaps closer to the truth” (1974, 225).

While greater attention to women by researchers in the discipline has been welcomed, some commentators have warned of the risk of a hollow victory if change goes no further than ‘add women and stir’ approaches. One problem is that the demand to include women inadvertently may reinforce the fallacy that men are not appropriate or productive subjects of gender analysis.

In recent decades, there have been encouraging signs of change, as gender-related research has gained visibility in the field. Particularly since the 1990s, this scholarship attests to the formative influence of the idea of intersectionality, not only in political science, but across the social sciences and humanities more broadly. The term intersectionality commonly is attributed to the generative writings of legal scholar Kimberlé Crenshaw, whose two canonical law review articles have drawn intense critical scrutiny to “relationships among multiple dimensions and modalities of social relations and subject formation” (McCall, 2005, 1771; see Crenshaw (1989) and Crenshaw (1991)). In these early writings, Crenshaw was principally concerned with the phenomenon of ‘multiple marginalization,’ which she explored in the context of black women’s lives. As Crenshaw explained, “the failure of feminism to interrogate race means that the resistance strategies of feminism will often replicate and reinforce the subordination of people of color, and the failure of antiracism to interrogate patriarchy means that antiracism will frequently reproduce the subordination of women” (Crenshaw, 1991, 1252). Statements such as this underscore the fact that from the beginning, intersectionality theory has aspired to upend prevailing wisdom in political science concerning social movements and political change.

Not so long ago, sociologist Leslie McCall (2005, 1771) remarked that “feminists are perhaps alone in the academy in the extent to which they have embraced intersectionality.” This may be true, but it is also the case that political scientists have been at the very forefront of intersectionality research, a tribute to innovative studies that have elaborated intersectionality’s theoretical implications and produced empirically-grounded insights into its effects as a political dynamic (Hancock, 2007; Strolovitch, 2008). The hallmark of this research is a commitment to take gender seriously, but nonetheless to reject the methodological assumption that gender inequality can be understood in isolation from other dimensions of social difference.

In the contemporary moment, political scientists are perhaps uniquely equipped to fulfill on intersectionality’s usefulness as a political analytic, and to resist the tendency to regard it primarily as a theory of individual identity formation and experience (Williams, 2016b). As Cho, Crenshaw, and McCall have recently affirmed:

... what makes an analysis intersectional – whatever terms it deploys, whatever its iteration, whatever its field or discipline – is its adoption of an intersectional way of thinking about the problem of sameness and difference and its relation to power. This framing – conceiving of categories not as distinct but as always permeated by other categories, fluid and changing, always in the process of creating and being created by dynamics of power – emphasizes what intersectionality does rather than what intersectionality is” (emphasis added, Cho, Crenshaw and McCall, 2013, 797).

In emphasizing the centrality of power in intersectional analysis, Cho, Crenshaw, and McCall take issue with those who would deploy or dismiss the approach as “a theory primarily fascinated with the infinite combinations and implications of overlapping identities.” They are understandably confounded that such a distorted view has come to be associated with an analytic so evidently “concerned with structures of power and exclusion” (Cho, Crenshaw and McCall, 2013, 797). Looking ahead, one can expect political scientists to play a critical role in steering intersectional research on gender in directions that avoid the hazard of depoliticization.
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Datasets

Electoral Gender Quotas and the Passage of Women’s Rights Laws: A Cross-National Longitudinal Analysis Using the New QAROT Dataset

by Amanda Clayton

Vanderbilt University

Gender quotas have taken national legislatures by storm. The adoption and implementation of national quota laws (and increasingly the strengthening of these laws) have profoundly changed the face of representative democracy worldwide. Seventy-five countries have implemented legally mandated parliamentary gender quotas, either reserving seats for women in legislative bodies or requiring parties to have a certain percentage of female candidates on party lists. Over 60 political parties in more than 30 additional countries have voluntarily put quota measures in place to increase women’s inclusion (International IDEA, 2017). Women’s representation in national office has grown in tandem. In 1995, eight countries had legally mandated gender quotas and women’s parliamentary representation stood at 11.3 percent. Today, the number has more than doubled; currently women hold 23.4 percent of seats in...
unicameral or lower parliamentary houses.

I. The New QAROT Dataset

Responding to this phenomenon, studies related to the causes and consequences of electoral gender quotas have become one of the fastest growing subfields in gender and politics research (Krook, 2009; Krook and O’Brien, 2012). Yet the majority of this research remains case-based in part because of a lack of reliable public data on quota adoption and reform over time. Whereas the Global Database of Quotas for Women (www.quotaproject.org) is an indispensable public resource for information about current gender quotas in national and subnational legislatures, it does not provide the sort of detailed longitudinal data necessary for cross-national research. Moreover, whereas a handful of studies have developed cross-national measures of quota adoption (Hughes, 2011; Bush, 2011; Hughes, Krook and Paxton, 2015; Clayton and Zetterberg, 2015; Rosen, 2013; Tripp and Kang, 2008), to date these efforts have remained largely uncoordinated and the resulting datasets are not publically available. Enter QAROT. Melanie Hughes, Pam Paxton, Pär Zetterberg, and I have created the new Quota Adoption and Reform Over Time (QAROT) dataset to fill this lacuna (Hughes et al., 2016).

The QAROT dataset has several features we hope will be of interest both to gender and politics scholars, as well as to those conducting cross-national research on legislative institutions more generally. For those conducting cross-national work not related to quotas, we hope the QAROT dataset can provide an important control variable – similar to other standard institutional controls related to electoral systems – such as proportional vs. single-member systems, presidential vs. parliamentary systems, federal vs. unitary systems, and so on.

QAROT provides complete information on 190 countries from the first instances of quota adoptions in 1945 (in Pakistan and China) to the end of 2015. We code the design of 63 candidate quota adoptions, 35 candidate quota reforms, 31 reserved seat adoptions, and 25 reserved seat reforms during this period. Currently QAROT includes legally required quota policies (those that either reserve seats in legislative bodies for women or those that require a certain number of female candidates on party lists) – but we hope that future versions will also include data on voluntary political party quotas.

The dataset is the first to code both the year of quota adoption and the year of quota implementation (often a year or more after adoption), as well as the year of specific quota reforms. Data on quota reforms over time are an essential resource for scholars interested in how party and state actors respond to initial quota design (Piscopo, 2017). Indeed, our data reveal that 44 percent of quota-adopting states reformed their quota laws at least once after their initial adoption and 28 percent have done so twice or more.

The dataset is the first to code both the year of quota adoption and the year of quota implementation (often a year or more after adoption), as well as the year of specific quota reforms.

We code reforms along the following dimensions: First we code the quota thresholds, which range from non-existent – laws that do not specify the number of women who should enter through the quota (e.g. Romania) – to parity – quotas that require that women comprise 50 percent of the legislative candidates (e.g. Mexico, Senegal, Tunisia). The average quota threshold in 1990 was 6.6 percent of legislative seats; by the end of 2015 it was 30 percent. This increase is due both to reforms to existing quota thresholds that have increased within states over time (e.g. Mexico) as well as the result of high quota thresholds among more recent quota-adopting states (e.g. Tunisia).

For candidate quotas, we also measure the presence and strength of placement mandates for women on party lists and the presence and strength of sanctions for non-compliance with quota requirements. We are also the first to code different forms of reserved seat quotas. Globally, reserved seats are filled through special electoral districts in which only women compete (e.g. Uganda, Morocco), through ‘best-loser’ systems in which women with the highest vote share fill the seats (e.g. Afghanistan, Jordan), or through appointment by national leaders or political parties (e.g. Saudi Arabia, Tanzania). Some reserved seat quota laws fail to specify a mechanism through which the seats should be filled (e.g. Haiti, Somalia).
The QAROT dataset provides researchers with the details of quota adoption and reform in the hope that quota scholars can use this institutional variation to understand why different quota policies are adopted and the effects of different quota designs. We understand though that not all QAROT users will be quota scholars – and we therefore synthesize the quota design variables to create one measure of effective quotas; quotas that are designed in such a way that they should work in reaching their goal of increasing women's representation. We code candidate quotas as effective if they have strong placement mandates and/or sanctions for non-compliance and are above a ten percent threshold. Reserved seat quotas are effective if they cross the ten percent threshold and specify some mechanism for filling seats. Of the 75 countries with legally-mandated, national-level gender quotas at the end of 2015, we code 54 as meeting these effective requirements.

The QAROT dataset, which is ready for release and we hope to post as soon as possible, comes in two structures. The first quota-year format is organized by country and codes each quota that has been adopted along with each major reform, as well as a text field providing notes relevant to each case. The county-year format codes the quota design variables for each of the 190 states from 1945 – 2015 in a format that is easy to merge with other off-the-shelf cross-national time-series datasets. Our sources include the Global Database of Quotas for Women and associated reports (International IDEA, 2017); national constitutions and secondary laws; local newspapers; reports from local, regional, and international NGOs and election observers; academic research; consultation with country experts; as well as our own case-specific knowledge, including in-country interviews. We gratefully acknowledge data collected by Bush (2011), Krook (2009), and Dahlerup et al. (2014).

II. Demonstration Analysis: Quota Implementation and the Passage of Women's Rights Laws

To demonstrate how the new QAROT dataset can be used in cross-national research, I provide a brief demonstration analysis that examines whether the implementation of effective quota laws is followed by an increased rate in the passage of women's rights laws.

One question that has occupied quota scholars is whether and how increases in women's political presence through quotas affects the substantive representation of women's interests in the legislative process. Work in this vein of scholarship typically examines whether women legislators bring up gender-related issues during legislative debates or introduce legislation related to women's rights at a higher rate than their male colleagues (Barnes, 2012; Clayton, Josefsson and Wang, 2016; Xydias, 2007; Franceschet and Piscopo, 2008; Kerevel and Atkeson, 2013; Htun, Lacalle and Micozzi, 2013). Whereas in unison these studies generally suggest that women legislators advocate for women's rights issues to a greater degree than their male colleagues, the role of quotas as a particular means of increasing legislative attention to women's interests and priorities is less clear.

Whereas the above body of work has both built important theory and accumulated a great deal of evidence on the relationship between quota adoption and the substantive representation of women's interests, to date this vein of research is dominated by analyses of quota implementation in particular cases. Here I provide a brief cross-national and longitudinal analysis to examine whether quota implementation is likely to be followed by progressive changes to national women's rights laws.

I take as my dependent variable the passage of laws that grant women equal status under the law. These data come from the World Bank's Women Business and the Law (WBL) dataset (http://wbl.worldbank.org/). The World Bank provides longitudinal data on 100 countries from 1960 to 2010 and codes women's rights across seventeen indicators relating to property ownership, titling, and inheritance; rights within marriage (e.g. whether married women can open a bank account, can initiate legal proceedings without their husband's permission, and so on); and the codification of gender equality in national constitutions (e.g. the presence of non-discrimination clauses covering gender/sex, the precedence of customary law, and so on).

The dependent variable in the following models is...
Table 1: The Adoption of Laws Improving Women’s Rights, 1960-2010

Dependent Variable: Was there a change in the law that improved women's rights? 1 = yes, 0 = no.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ever Implemented</td>
<td>0.706 (0.954)</td>
<td>0.729 (0.955)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Implemented</td>
<td>0.278 (0.867)</td>
<td>0.153 (0.865)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ever Implemented × Current Implemented</td>
<td>-1.143 (1.055)</td>
<td>-1.047 (1.055)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>4.396* (1.739)</td>
<td>3.739* (1.851)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year²</td>
<td>-0.001* (0.000)</td>
<td>-0.001* (0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-4361.509* (1779.135)</td>
<td>-3713.048* (1837.192)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Country Fixed Effects ✓ ✓
N (countries) 100 84
N (country-years) 4663 3949
Log Likelihood -685.105 -628.719

*p < 0.05

Note: The analysis examines the adoption of laws that improve the rights of women in 100 countries from 1960 to 2010. Model 1 includes all 100 countries, while Model 2 omits rich industrialized countries. Ever Implemented is a dichotomous variable that equals 1 for the subset of countries that have ever implemented an effective gender quota, and 0 otherwise. Current Implemented is a dichotomous variable that equals 1 for all those country-years in which an effective gender quota is in place. Data on the adoption of laws improving women's rights come from the World Bank’s Women Business and Law dataset (http://wbl.worldbank.org/). Data on gender quotas comes from the QAROT dataset.

Model 1 of Table 1 shows the results of a logistic regression with the complete sample of 100 countries. Model 2 removes rich industrialized nations (those with a current GDP per capita over $20,000), which are both less likely to adopt legally mandated gender quotas and are less likely to have gender discrimination codified in law in the post-1960 period. This reduces the sample size from 100 to 86. We see that the interaction terms...
in both models are not statistically distinguishable from zero. Plotting the cumulative number of gender quota adoptions by year for the 100-country sample as well the cumulative passage of women's rights laws in this period (Figure 1) suggests why the relevant coefficients in Table 1 are insignificant. The passage of women's rights laws that remedy codified gender discrimination is most frequent in the pre-1995 period, whereas quota adoption (as well as implementation and reform) appear most frequently after 1995.

Whereas the implementation of effective quotas was not followed by this particular operationalization of the substantive representation of women's interests, this analysis – made possible by the QAROT dataset – suggests a future research agenda still underexplored in quota research. Additional scholarship, for instance, could analyze more recent changes in women's rights laws that include a greater range of variables – including protection against violence. Of course, the presence of women's rights groups in civil society also play an important role – and future work could seek to understand how the presence of quotas in combination with autonomous women's movements affect various measures of the substantive representation of women's interests (Htun and Weldon, 2012).

III. Conclusion

Here I have demonstrated one way in which the QAROT data can be used – but this analysis only scratches the surface of what QAROT can do. The QAROT dataset offers an exciting new resource for researchers interested in the causes and consequences, both substantive and symbolic, of electoral gender quotas worldwide. Many of the scholars featured in this issue of the Comparative Politics Newsletter have convincingly argued that quotas are the most transformative institutional change in representative democracy in the last quarter of a century. As such, having accurate global data on quota adoption and reform over time is essential for scholars interested in topics related to gender in comparative politics, as well as those interested in the design of legislative institutions more broadly.
References


Introducing the Women’s Political Empowerment Index (WPEI)

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Women’s political empowerment is increasingly recognized as critical to modern states. Scholars and practitioners see a link between women’s political empowerment and outcomes for women, as well as for children and society as a whole. Gender equality is also increasingly significant to the international community. With the inclusion of women’s political representation and the empowerment of women and girls in the fifth Sustainable Development Goal, women’s political empowerment is a high-priority issue in international development cooperation. Despite several attempts to measure and track the level of women’s empowerment, we still do not have adequate measures of this concept. Scholars have argued that prevailing measures have conceptual limitations or do not have the spatial or temporal coverage to truly test theories. There is hence a need to present theoretically relevant estimates comparable across time and space.

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To meet this demand, we have developed the Women’s Political Empowerment Index (WPEI) that seek to overcome many of the challenges in existing indices. The WPEI gauges women’s political empowerment since 1900 in a global sample of 173 countries. The goal of this index is to conceptualize, operationalize, and measure women’s political empowerment comparably across wide periods of time and many countries. The index includes three sub-dimensions: civil liberties, civil society participation, and political participation for women. Each sub-index is conceptualized as a latent trait, constructed from several concrete indicators, and estimated with Bayesian factor analysis allowing for measurement error. The index is a part of the Varieties of Democracy Project (V-Dem). This essay discusses and introduces the measure, with a focus on illustrating why it may be of use for comparative scholars.

The WPEI gauges women’s political empowerment since 1900 in a global sample of 173 countries. The goal of this index is to conceptualize, operationalize, and measure women’s political empowerment comparably across wide periods of time and many countries.

Based on prior theory and research we define women’s political empowerment as a process of increasing capacity for women, leading to greater choice, agency, and participation in societal decision-making. Our definition is three dimensional, capturing the three most prominent strands in thinking on empowerment: that of choice, that of agency, and that of participation. By choice, we refer to the importance for women of being able to make meaningful decisions on critical areas and key aspects of their lives and to enable this, women must have basic freedom of movement, have property rights, be free from forced labor, and be treated as equals in the justice system. By agency, we refer to the ability of women of being able to define their goals, a feature closely related to having voice and for this to be possible, women must have freedom of discussion and be able to participate in civil society organizations, as well as be represented in the ranks of journalists. By participation, we refer to the importance of women’s representation, which requires a descriptive presence in formal political positions and that women de facto have an equal share of the distribution of power. As with other definitions of empowerment, we stress women’s political empowerment as a temporal process, as a transition from disempowerment. A longitudinal perspective is therefore crucial for women’s political empowerment, as some rights that are almost universal today were not present in the past.

Prior measures of women’s empowerment include the Gender-Related Development Index (GDI) and Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) (advanced by UNDP in 1995 to complement the Human Development Index). These influential measurements were abandoned in 2010 and replaced with the Gender Inequality Index (GII) and, to some extent, the Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI). The GII was available in 2014 across 149 countries. Other authors have proposed alternative measures. The Cingranelli & Richards (CIRI) project on human rights is an expert-based survey that assesses to what extent countries provide certain rights in law as well as to what extent these are adhered to in practice. This data contains two relevant measures, Women’s Economic Rights and Women’s Political Rights, available across approximately 200 countries since 1981. More recently, the Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI) was advanced by the OECD. The measures gauge gender inequality in institutions rather than outcomes and are combined into five sub-indices for 108 countries in 2009, 2012, and 2014.

While these measurements have contributed greatly, they have also faced critique. For instance, the CIRI measurement has been criticized for not taking account of differences among women and capturing only the stance taken by the government rather than the actual situation of women. Some measures, such as the GEM, are generally seen as biased in coverage towards highly industrialized countries. A related problem is the frequent shifts in methodology of the UNDP’s measure of women’s empowerment. While the dismantling of the GEM and GDI indices and the recent introduction of the GII may be welcome in terms of improving conceptualizations, it disfavors comparisons across time. Thus, current alternatives do not meet the need of policymakers or scholars for indicators that are comparable and available on an annual basis and measure the situation in a majority of low-income countries over time.

To construct the three sub-indices that capture women’s capacity of choice, agency, and participation in societal decision-making, we use nine indicators
collected by the V-Dem project. The V-Dem project is currently the largest dataset on democracy and related issues, covering 173 polities across the globe from 1900 forward for more than 350 indicators (available at http://www.v-dem.net/en/data/ for download and at https://www.v-dem.net/en/analysis/analysis/ for online visualization). In addition to gathering information from existing data sources, the V-Dem compiles expert ratings for questions that require evaluation. Differing from other datasets, the V-Dem project works with over 2,600 local and cross-national experts to provide judgments. Experts’ ratings are aggregated through a Bayesian item response theory model. The underpinnings of the measurement model are straightforward: patterns of cross-rater (dis)agreement are used to estimate variations in reliability and systematic differences in raters’ thresholds between ordinal response categories to adjust estimates of the latent concept in question. V-Dem also recruited ‘lateral’ coders who rated multiple countries for a limited time period, as well as ‘bridge’ coders who coded the full time series for more than one country covering one or more surveys. Ratings provided by lateral and bridge coders are utilized to improve the cross-national comparability of measures.

For scholars of comparative politics, we see a great utility for using the WPEI in future research. The data opens up possibilities to examine the determinants of variation in women’s political empowerment over time and across countries.

We believe it is important that a measure of empowerment combines the absolute status of women as well as relative inequality between men and women. For some aspects of empowerment, it is important to employ absolute measures. For example, whether women can move freely is relevant to their empowerment regardless of whether men can move freely too. Put another way, when both men and women experience equally low levels of freedom, scoring women as highly empowered relative to men would not capture women’s lived experience. However, other aspects of women’s empowerment are best assessed in relation to men, such as the gender ratio of members in a parliament. In addition, as the critics of prior measures have stressed, one must consider all women, not simply elite women when evaluating the level of empowerment. Finally, we also believe it is important to precisely measure empowerment within relevant domains such as economic, education, or political spheres. Based on these considerations, we incorporate the following composing indicators for the three-dimensional index of women’s political empowerment.

To measure the dimension of choice, we construct a women civil liberties index. This index combines expert assessments of four aspects identified by the existing literature as critical: women’s freedom of domestic movement, freedom from forced labor, property rights, and access to justice. For the dimension of agency, we theorize a women civil society participation index. This index combines expert assessments of three issues: women’s freedom of discussion, participation in civil society organizations, and representation in the ranks of journalists. For the third dimension, participation, we construct a women political participation index. This index combines the legislative presence of women and political power distribution by gender. A variable measures the percentage of the lower chamber of the legislature that is female. The variable is compiled by V-Dem from existing data sources and is thus, unlike all the other variables we use, not an expert-based evaluation. The variable ‘power distributed by gender’ is an expert-coded assessment of the extent to which political power is distributed according to gender. Briefly we note that the correlation coefficients between the three indices suggest that the scores on the three dimensions tend to co-vary; but for a substantial amount of country-years, the ranking on the three dimensions can be quite different. In some countries, women may enjoy full civil liberties but not have an equal presence in formal politics.

To construct an overall women’s political empowerment index, we take the average of these three dimensions. From comparisons with other existing measures, it is evident that the WPEI coverage is far more encompassing in scope than any other index. For any interested reader, more information about the construction of this index is available in an article we recently published in World Development (Sundström et al., 2017).

To illustrate the use of the WPEI and how a country may score on the three sub-indices, we present the trajectories for four countries in Figure 1. As is evident in the upper left panel of the figure, Denmark is an example of a country that currently grants women very high levels of political empowerment, almost reaching

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Figure 1: Women's Political Empowerment in Four Countries, 1900-2010

Note: This figure plots the trajectory for women's civil liberties, women's civil society participation, and women's political participation in Denmark, the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Russia from 1900 to 2010. The data come from the Women's Political Empowerment Index (Sundström et al., 2017).

Figure 2: Women's Political Empowerment Globally in 2010

Note: This map shows the geographic distribution of women's political empowerment around the world in 2010. Higher values (red) indicate higher levels of women's political empowerment. The data come from the Women's Political Empowerment Index (Sundström et al., 2017).
top-scores in the different dimensions for the last three decades. Yet, the trend reported in this figure also shows that the situation was very different in the early 1900s, with low scores particularly in the political participation dimension. The plot for the United States (the upper right panel) shows a similar pattern, but the development of all three dimensions slightly lags behind those in Denmark. As a contrast to the situation in Denmark and the United States, Saudi Arabia (the lower left panel) continues to exhibit extremely low levels of women’s political empowerment across the three sub-indices, even in the modern period. One other example of a sharp improvement in the political empowerment of women is the lower right panel of the figure, outlining the historical trajectory of Russia. From this illustration, it is evident that the fall of communist rule had a major impact on women’s political empowerment. These examples also illustrate the benefit of viewing women’s political empowerment as a three dimensional concept: In many places – such as Denmark in the 1910’s, the U.S. before the 1950’s, and Russia in the 1990’s – there is a clear difference in how a country scores across the three sub-indices. As seen in the lower right panel of the figure, for Russia, the events in the early 1990’s brought a quick increase in civil liberties and civil society participation – generally suppressed during communist rule. However, during this period of time there was a simultaneous decrease in the legislative presence of women – captured by the relatively sharp reduction in the political participation dimension of our index in these years.

To further illustrate the distribution of this index, the map in Figure 2 displays how the overall WPEI is distributed across the globe in the year 2010. Most countries in North America and Western Europe have reached very high levels of political empowerment for women. By contrast, many countries in the Middle East and Northern Africa score below the median on the scale.

For scholars of comparative politics, we see a great utility for using the WPEI in future research. The data opens up possibilities to examine the determinants of variation in women’s political empowerment over time and across countries. It also enables scholars to use this index, and its three subcomponents, as predictors of other variables to further explore the consequences of the improvement in women’s situation.

To download data: The WPEI and its three sub-indices have been included in the V-Dem dataset since version 5, and can be accessed at https://www.v-dem.net/en/data/.

References

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The Organized Section in Comparative Politics is the largest organized section in the American Political Science Association (APSA) with over 1,300 members. The purpose of the Section is to promote the comparative, especially cross-national, study of politics and to integrate the work of comparativists, area studies specialists, and those interested in American politics. The Section organizes panels for APSA’s annual meetings; awards annual prizes for best paper, best article, best book, and best data set; and oversees and helps finance the publication of the Newsletter. For more information, please visit the Section's website.

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